Risk Of Violent Conflict Research Articles

Debating Environmental Change and Conflict in the Global South: Learning from Selected Cases in Africa

The crux of this paper centres on the dynamics of environmental change and ensuing conflict. This review paper accentuates the various theoretical underpinnings regarding environmental change and conflict. Particular reference was given to countries in the Global South because they are the most affected by environmental change-related conflict. It was established in this paper that population growth is positively correlated to militarised interstate disputes, although this is not always the case. Again, there is a lack of coding in current conflict dates, to the extent that it is often complicated to ascertain whether specific conflict trends can be traced back to environmental change. Conflict data usually use data sets from the environment-conflict nexus that only capture high-intensity conflict events, which often ignore low-scale conflict within states and districts. Thirdly, the averaging conflict would likely lead to biassed academic and policy conclusions. Fourthly, poor economic performances, either persistent or temporary, have the likelihood of causing violent conflicts. For instance, a land invasion in Brazil occurred immediately after adverse economic shocks.Further environmental degradation can cause migration by perpetuating migration. A significant obstacle encountered in the field of Risk perception literature pertains to the tendency of scholars to heavily depend on excessively deterministic explanations when conceptualising the concept of resource scarcity. Once more, the assessment of environmental change is exclusively based on small variations in temperature and precipitation. The examples examined in this study were selected from diverse geographical regions, encompassing East Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, and Southern Africa. In agro-pastoral West Africa, the frequency of conflicts is on the rise. As a result, policymakers and multilateral funders are increasingly shouldering the responsibility due to the ongoing growth of populations and the changing environmental conditions. There seems to be a correlation between environmental degradation and conflict; however, the relationship between these two is not always apparent or might be the other way around. Based on current theorising and available empirical evidence, it remains debatable whether environmental degradation increases the risk of violent conflict or whether conflict is leading to natural resource deterioration.

The bioeconomics of planetary energy transitions—a theoretical note

Evidence is mounting that unprecedented economic growth experienced by human societies over the past two centuries has induced a state of crisis for the Earth’s ecological systems—a crisis that threatens human society’s existence and heightens the risk of violent conflict. This article presents a simplified model of bioenergetic evolution on a planetary level. It examines human energy exploitation based on three strategies vis-à-vis the natural world: (1) predation, (2) competition, and, more cursorily, (3) mutualism. Predation involves the capture of energy pre-processed by the biotic community (living organisms sharing a common environment). Competition involves appropriating lands to capture solar-generated energy, edging the biotic community out. Mutualism involves engaging the biotic community in a mutualistic effort to harvest energy (and discard energy waste in the form of heat) outside of the planetary system. The model implies that, theoretically, substantial government investment in Earth-based solar generation may be required to effect a planetary energy transition to avert ecological collapse. The model suggests that this transition is not likely to happen automatically as a function of substitution by individual economic actors prior to ecological collapse; rather, it requires top-down coercive and/or incentive measures applied by government.

Secessionist conflict and affective polarization: Evidence from Catalonia

Can secessionism be a basis for affective or social polarization? Despite much research on independence movements, their relationship to polarization, a key mechanism theorized as increasing the risk of violent conflict, remains less understood. We argue that the issue of secession can affectively polarize along both policy and ethnic group lines even in the case of nonviolent disputes, and posit a number of expectations regarding such secessionist-based polarization. We test our argument with the case of Catalonia, a substate territory that has experienced a deep secessionist crisis since 2017, using new data from a panel survey and embedded experiments fielded across two key time periods. We find that individuals’ secessionist preferences condition high levels of affective polarization, in that pro- and anti-independence advocates have strong negative views of one another. In addition, there is spillover in terms of stereotypes of associated language groups (i.e. Catalan, Spanish). Importantly, we find a group of moderates in between the two policy poles that exhibit far less polarization. Finally, we document the persistence of these overall patterns. Our results contribute to understanding the underexplored polarization dynamics of secessionist movements, particularly in contexts where high intensity violence (e.g. terrorism, civil war) has not occurred.

Societal drought vulnerability and the Syrian climate-conflict nexus are better explained by agriculture than meteorology

Droughts are often suspected to increase the risk of violent conflict through agricultural production shocks, and existing studies often explore these links through meteorological proxies. In Syria, an alleged agricultural collapse caused by drought is assumed to have contributed to increased migration and the conflict outbreak in 2011. Here we use satellite derived cropland and climate data to study land use dynamics in relation to drought and conflict in Syria. We show that claims of an agricultural collapse cannot be substantiated as croplands saw a fast recovery after the 2007–2009 drought. Our study highlights the importance of considering land-use dynamics for understanding linkages between meteorological droughts, agricultural impacts, migration and conflict. Furthermore, our results suggest that the influential drought-migration-conflict narrative for Syria needs to be reexamined, with implications for wider discussions of how climate change might alter conflict risk.

Climate and cohesion: The effects of droughts on intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic trust

While a large body of research has highlighted the conflict-inducing effects of climate change, we still know very little about the mechanisms linking environmental conditions to violent conflict. This article investigates the plausibility of a prominent channel according to which scarcity of natural resources can foster violent conflict through deteriorating intergroup relations. In addition to assessing the direct effects of adverse environmental conditions on intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic trust, we suggest a conditional argument on the role of horizontal inequality of hazard exposure. Environmental hazards are ‘unequal’ if they systematically affect ethnic groups differently. While inequality may reinforce intra-ethnic ties and out-group suspicion, equal hazard exposure may create a sense of unity among diverse victims in their collective struggle to cope with harsh environmental conditions. We test these arguments in the context of the severe drought periods that affected most East African countries in the years 2004 and 2005. The empirical analysis combines gridded information on drought severity with geo-located survey data across six countries in the region (Afrobarometer survey 2005/2006). Our main analyses find that exposure to drought hazards correlates positively with self-reported trust within and across ethnic groups. The latter association, however, depends on the degree of intergroup equality of hazard exposure and wanes as inequality increases. Taken together, these findings indicate that if droughts increase the risk of violent conflict, they seem to do so through mechanisms other than intergroup polarization and despite their positive association with ethnic trust. This is most likely the case in contexts where there is pronounced horizontal inequality of drought hazards.

Revisiting the Contested Role of Natural Resources in Violent Conflict Risk through Machine Learning

The integrated character of the sustainable development goals in Agenda 2030, as well as research in environmental security, flag that sustainable peace requires sustainable and conflict-sensitive natural resource use. The precise relationship between the risk for violent conflict and natural resources remains contested because of the interplay with socio-economic variables. This paper aims to improve the understanding of natural resources’ role in the risk of violent conflicts by accounting for complex interactions with socio-economic conditions. Conflict data was analysed with machine learning techniques, which can account for complex patterns, such as variable interactions. More commonly used logistic regression models are compared with neural network models and random forest models. The results indicate that a country’s natural resource features are important predictors of its risk for violent conflict and that they interact with socio-economic conditions. Based on these empirical results and the existing literature, we interpret that natural resources can be root causes of violent intrastate conflict, and that signals from natural resources leading to conflict risk are reflected in and influenced by interacting socio-economic conditions. More specifically, the results show that variables such as access to water and food security are important predictors of conflict, while resource rents and oil and ore exports are relatively less important than other natural resource variables, contrasting what prior research has suggested. Given the potential of natural resource features to act as an early warning for violent conflict, we argue that natural resources should be included in conflict risk models for conflict prevention.

The Global Conflict Risk Index: A quantitative tool for policy support on conflict prevention

In an effort to bridge the gap between academic and governmental initiatives on quantitative conflict modelling, this article presents, validates and discusses the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI), the quantitative starting point of the European Union Conflict Early Warning System. Based on open-source data of five risk areas representing the structural conditions characterising a given country (political, economic, social, environmental and security areas), it evaluates the risk of violent conflict in the next one to four years. Using logistic regression, the GCRI calculates the probability of national and subnational conflict risk. Several model design decisions, including definition of the dependent variable, predictor variable selection, data imputation, and probability threshold definition, are tested and discussed in light of the model's direct application in the EU policy support on conflict prevention. While the GCRI remains firmly rooted by its conception and development in the European conflict prevention policy agenda, it is validated as a scientifically robust and rigorous method for a baseline quantitative evaluation of armed conflict risk. Despite its standard, simple methodology, the model predicts better than six other published quantitative conflict early warning systems for ten out of twelve reported performance metrics. Thereby, this article aims to contribute to a cross-fertilisation of academic and governmental efforts in quantitative conflict risk modelling.

Climate change and the opportunity cost of conflict

A growing empirical literature associates climate anomalies with increased risk of violent conflict. This association has been portrayed as a bellwether of future societal instability as the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events are predicted to increase. This paper investigates the theoretical foundation of this claim. A seminal microeconomic model of opportunity costs-a mechanism often thought to drive climate-conflict relationships-is extended by considering realistic changes in the distribution of climate-dependent agricultural income. Results advise caution in using empirical associations between short-run climate anomalies and conflicts to predict the effect of sustained shifts in climate regimes: Although war occurs in bad years, conflict may decrease if agents expect more frequent bad years. Theory suggests a nonmonotonic relation between climate variability and conflict that emerges as agents adapt and adjust their behavior to the new income distribution. We identify 3 measurable statistics of the income distribution that are each unambiguously associated with conflict likelihood. Jointly, these statistics offer a unique signature to distinguish opportunity costs from competing mechanisms that may relate climate anomalies to conflict.

Power-Sharing Coalitions and Ethnic Armed Conflict

How do multiethnic coalitions affect the risk of violent conflict? We argue that government leaders form larger ruling coalitions as the uncertainty over violent threats from radical sub-groups increases. We formalize this argument in a novel multi-actor model. Our game-theoretic approach illustrates how power-maximizing government leaders reduce the risk of rebellion by sharing power with radical subgroup leaders, while only slightly increasing the risk of coups. Empirically, we rely on a novel selection estimator and data on ethnic coalitions to investigate the predictions from our theoretical model. Our findings show that the conflict-reducing effect of power sharing increases once we consider the endogeneity of coalition formation and conflict. Our results also demonstrate that power-sharing coalitions are most effective when including radical sub-groups. Our study has important implications for research on coalition formation, authoritarian politics, and armed conflict.

The influence of climate change on the escalating communal conflict between herdsmen and farmers: the case of the Fulani ethnic group in Nigeria

Current scientific evidence shows that human activities are causing interference at different levels in the global climate and availability of natural resources, and many authors already relate water scarcity to the increased risk of violent conflict, particularly in rural societies on the African continent. Climate disruptions caused by climate change are reflected on a regional and local scale, and the greatest impacts are already being felt in the poorest areas of the planet. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, has been facing environmental problems in its territory that can be associated with climate change, such as rising temperatures, reduced rainfall and advancing desertification. Considering that all these phenomena have been worsening since the early twentieth century in Nigeria and, due to the escalating of violent conflicts since the beginning of the current century, the objective of this paper is to analyse how climate change can interfere in the conflict between herdsmen and farmers, as well as the possible impact of seasonal variation in rainfall on the dynamics of these communal conflicts. The study focused on literature review and the case study took place in four Nigerian states (Plateau, Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa) for the period 2010-2017, focusing on the communal conflict involving the Fulani ethnic group. The approach adopted was the inductive method in which the behaviour of rainfall in the study area was compared with the number of deaths resulting from the conflict, in addition to using geo-processing software to understand the spatial and temporal distribution of casualties. The theoretical framework used was that proposed by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) and the information was collected from primary sources, with consultation of qualitative and quantitative data, and from secondary sources through book reviews, publications and papers in scientific journals. While it is not yet possible to establish a direct and linear relationship between climate change and violent conflict, the revised literature indicates that competition for water and other natural resources in certain parts of Nigeria is increasing, and that the violent conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and farmers are increasing due to the dispute over access to water sources and grazing lands. Data analysis shows that in the study area there are 46.4% more deaths in the dry season (November to April) than in the rainy season (May to October). While there are still not enough elements to conclude that climate change is the primary cause of the conflict, the analysis reinforces the need, in certain contexts, particularly in developing countries with populations highly dependent on the primary sector of the economy, for the impacts of climate change to be seriously considered as a risk to human security.

Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion: Avoiding Blueprint Traps and Incomplete Democratic Transitions

Western donors attempting to promote democracy across the globe face a dilemma. Democracy is a highly valued policy goal, but they are fearful that the path to democ¬racy will undermine another highly valued goal – political stability – and potentially cause widespread violence in the recipient countries or beyond. We ask whether these fears have empirical support and how donors can balance the potentially conflicting objectives of democratisation and stability when intervening in governance matters. Recent research at the German Development Institute shows that fears about the destabilising effects of democratisation do indeed have some empirical support (Leininger et al 2012; Ziaja 2013). But these fears deflect attention from the bigger problem of “getting stuck in the middle”. Hybrid regimes that exhibit authoritarian traits under a facade of formal democratic institutions constitute, in the long run, a larger security risk than attempts to make these countries more democratic. Hybrid regimes also hamper economic development, thus constituting an additional, indirect, risk of violent conflict. The promotion of democracy is hence a laudable effort, but it may itself carry risks. A recent DIE study of 47 African countries suggests that support for democracy increases popular mobilisation in the short run, leading to increased demonstrations and riots. However, the same study produced no evidence that democracy support is likely to spark civil wars. Increased mobilisation is thus rather a sign of aid effectiveness than a reason to worry. Yet, to be effective in the long run and to help steer popular demands into peaceful channels, democracy support must assist domestic actors in building institutions that fit the needs of their society. In the past, the potentially de¬stabilising consequences of popular participation have seduced would-be engineers of social change into re¬stricting competition in young democracies. This is a bad idea, as our recent research shows: narrow, elite pacts have, on average, led to worse political outcomes than open competition. The best contribution that donors can make from the out¬side is to enable marginalised groups to participate in crea¬ting the institutional setup. This is best achieved when many donors promote democracy simultaneously. Only then can they avoid the “blueprint trap”, which snaps shut when donors try to impose – advertently or inadvertently – an institutional setup on the partner country that does not fit its society’s needs. Diversity on the donor side increases the chances of finding a context-adequate institutional design. These findings suggest that an overly cautious sequencing approach to democracy promotion – stability first, only then democracy – has little empirical support. Most countries in the world embarked on a (formally) democratic path more than two decades ago. A gradualist approach that builds institutions while at the same time encouraging mobilisation is thus the more viable approach. Recommendations in brief: Promote democracy now Keep democracy aid diverse Encourage endogenous, inclusive polity design Enforce conditionality on conflict resolution mechanisms in institutional design Balance trade-offs of democratic transitions.

Climate Change and Violent Conflict in East Africa: Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Research to Probe the Mechanisms

How does climate change affect the risk and dynamics of violent conflict? Existing research shows that climate change can increase the risk of violent conflict and significantly alter the dynamics ...

The role of the state and the transnational in lifting the resource curse

In the past, natural resources such as coal and iron ore were catalysts for development and the economic theory focused mainlyon how the exploitation of natural resources could promote trade and development. Since the 1970s, however, we have been increasingly confronted with resource-rich countries lagging behind in economic growth and facing high risks of violent conflict. Using Sierra Leone as a case study, this article briefly explores the resource curse paradox, noting the role of the national government and international actors in maintaining the status quo. It highlights the fragile state of postconflict governments, focusing on the delicate balance between attracting foreign investment and fighting corruption and poverty in environments already susceptible to recurring violence. The article further examines both government and private sector activities that have contributed to the economies of violence through unequal distribution of natural resource rents and revenues. It also argues that to move from resource curse to resource blessing, both the affected states and the international community need to refocus their attention on the effectiveness of returns on natural resource revenues and the critical role of transnational corporations in perpetuating the curse.Keywords: Sierra Leone, resource curse, TNCs, natural resources, postconflictstates

Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict

ABSTRACTMany scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China.

What are the Chances of War?

Abstract Pasquale Cirillo and Nassim Nicholas Taleb respond to December's “Ask a Statistician” column, explaining more about their work to understand the risk of violent conflicts

On the statistical properties and tail risk of violent conflicts

We examine statistical pictures of violent conflicts over the last 2000 years, providing techniques for dealing with the unreliability of historical data.We make use of a novel approach to deal with fat-tailed random variables with a remote but nonetheless finite upper bound, by defining a corresponding unbounded dual distribution (given that potential war casualties are bounded by the world population). This approach can also be applied to other fields of science where power laws play a role in modeling, like geology, hydrology, statistical physics and finance.We apply methods from extreme value theory on the dual distribution and derive its tail properties. The dual method allows us to calculate the real tail mean of war casualties, which proves to be considerably larger than the corresponding sample mean for large thresholds, meaning severe underestimation of the tail risks of conflicts from naive observation. We analyze the robustness of our results to errors in historical reports.We study inter-arrival times between tail events and find that no particular trend can be asserted.All the statistical pictures obtained are at variance with the prevailing claims about “long peace”, namely that violence has been declining over time.

Understanding Mass Atrocity Prevention during Periods of Democratic Transition

The purpose of this article is to provide a better understanding of why some countries experience mass atrocities during periods of democratic transition, while others do not. Scholars have long regarded democracy as an important source of stability and protection from mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. But democratic transition itself is fraught with the heightened risk of violent conflict and even mass atrocities. Indeed, a number of studies have identified regimes in transition as containing the highest risk of political instability and mass atrocities. What is overlooked is the question of how and why some regimes undergo such transitions without experiencing mass atrocities, despite the presence of a number of salient risk factors, including state-based discrimination, inter-group tension and horizontal inequality. Utilizing a new analytical framework, this article investigates this lacuna by conducting a comparative analysis of two countries—one that experienced atrocities (Burundi) during transition, and one that did not (Guyana). How countries avoid such violence during transition has the potential to yield insights for the mitigation of risk associated with mass atrocity crimes.

Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for Less

Abstract: US strategic approaches in the African Great Lakes region are primarily based on security assistance for training and equipping African forces for operations in East, North, and West Africa. This assistance risks causing more incidents of violence. A new strategy, based on a comprehensive approach to the security challenges in the region, as well as the deployment of international boots on the ground--American or others--is needed to reduce violence and to minimize the risk of new terrorist safe havens appearing in central Africa. ********* One of the main security interests of the United States in Africa is to counter the violent extremism perpetrated by organizations such as the al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). (1) In order to do so, current US military strategy aims at training and equipping African forces for peacekeeping and counterterrorist operations. (2) Violent extremism in the Great Lakes region in central Africa (here understood as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda) is rare; nonetheless, over the past seven years, the United States has trained tens of thousands of troops in the region for deployment to other parts of Africa. Burundi and Uganda, for example, have almost 12,000 troops currendy deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Rwanda has more than 3,500 troops deployed in Sudan as part of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Great Lakes region is highly unstable and characterized by a long history of violence, weak governments, a great number of armed groups, and regional power struggles. The most violent and unstable state is the DRC, where 7 million people currently require humanitarian assistance and nearly 2.8 million are internally displaced. (3) After three decades of authoritarian rule and widespread human rights violations by the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997), two regional wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003), several insurgencies, and perpetual local conflicts, the DRC is currently one of the world's five most fragile states. (4) The ungoverned territory in the eastern part of the country is utilized as a safe haven by a variety of domestic and foreign armed groups, including several from neighboring Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Over time, conflicts have been fueled across borders, creating an intricate web of violence within the region. This article argues improving the capacity of the armed forces in this unstable region to conduct peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations against violent extremists, current US military strategy actually risks escalating violent conflict in the Great Lakes. Not only would such an escalation be devastating for the populations living in the region, it would also be counterproductive for the United States, increasing the risk that terrorist safe havens will increase in central Africa. There are two major problems with the current strategic approach. First, states in the region are fragile, making security cooperation perilous. Second, bilateral approaches in this region, which is characterized by intricate entanglements, risks disturbing the balance of power and increasing the risk of violent conflict. By changing the current US strategy of bilateral security assistance and small-footprint interventions to one of putting international boots on the ground--American or others--the same amount of US resources might have more success in countering violent extremists in Africa. The United States should therefore support a regional intervention, either by the United Nations or the African Union. United States in the Great Lakes Region The United States military strategy in Africa rests on the principle that efforts to meet security challenges in Africa is best led and conducted by African partners. (5) The United States thus relies on providing security assistance and small-footprint interventions. …

Can Military Normalization in Japan and Opcon Transfer in South Korea Enhance Regional Stability? A Conflict Management Framework for Rivalry Dyads

Much conventional thinking on conflict in Northeast Asia assumes Japan’s military normalization and South Korea’s operational control (opcon) transfer will increase tensions and heighten the risks of violent conflict. This paper will argue it is time to review and reassess such thinking by asking whether military normalization in Japan and opcon transfer in South Korea can enhance regional stability and peace. Using an interdisciplinary approach comprised of theoretical elements from the literature on rivalry dyads, historical grievance discourse analysis and conflict management, this paper creates a framework of ‘conflict management process flow’ in an attempt to lessen issue dissonance and reassess these two policies. The paper begins with a basic introduction of the issue at hand, followed by an explanation of what is termed a process map of conflict management flow-a tool for reframing rivalries. Section three is a general discussion of tensions and conflict in NE Asia, guided by the concepts of rivalry dyad and status dilemma. The paper proceeds with two case study sections. The first being an examination of military normalization by Japan and its possible affect on rival neighbors; the second discussing the issue of opcon transfer in South Korea and its possible affect on rival neighbors. The paper concludes with thoughts on the prospects for enhanced regional stability should military normalization in Japan and opcon transfer in South Korea occur. This paper may be unique in its attempt to evaluate these policies as elements of the conflict management process and harbingers of peace.

On the Statistical Properties and Tail Risk of Violent Conflicts

We examine statistical pictures of violent conflicts over the last 2000 years, finding techniques for dealing with incompleteness and unreliability of historical data.We introduce a novel approach to apply extreme value theory to fat-tailed variables that have a remote, but nonetheless finite upper bound, by defining a corresponding unbounded dual distribution (given that potential war casualties are bounded by the world population).We apply methods from extreme value theory on the dual distribution and derive its tail properties. The dual method allows us to calculate the real mean of war casualties, which proves to be considerably larger than the sample mean, meaning severe underestimation of the tail risks of conflicts from naive observation. We analyze the robustness of our results to errors in historical reports, taking into account the unreliability of accounts by historians and absence of critical data.We study inter-arrival times between tail events and find that no particular trend can be asserted.All the statistical pictures obtained are at variance with the prevailing claims about long peace, namely that violence has been declining over time.