Nuclear Strategy Research Articles

China and India's Nuclear Strategies

Nuclear rivalry in south Asia is discussed almost exclusively in terms of the India-Pakistan binary relationship. However, the detail of the nuclear weapons proliferation in the region cannot be reviewed without taking account of the triangular relationship between China, India and Pakistan, and examining the wider global context. This article explores the understudied Indian and Chinese nuclear strategies, analyses their motivations in strengthening their nuclear weapons capabilities and the role of international norms and regimes on non-proliferation in their national decision making. It concludes that for China the perceived threat is primarily the USA; for India it is primarily China. Both have the economic capacity for nuclear investments and the desire of powerful states to access the large Chinese and Indian markets meant there was no real threat of sanctions. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been largely irrelevant to their nuclear calculations, indicating a weak norm and a weak regime against strong and emerging powers. Ultimately, it was the power relations between states and not the international regime which framed their decision-making. The article also explores the compatibility of these states' respective nuclear strategies with the renewed call for global nuclear disarmament in the wake of President Obama's 2009 Prague speech, arguing ultimately that measures and counter-measures taken will result in nuclear weapons continuing to play a central role in Chinese and Indian national security efforts.

China and India's Nuclear Strategies

Nuclear rivalry in south Asia is discussed almost exclusively in terms of the India-Pakistan binary relationship. However, the detail of the nuclear weapons proliferation in the region cannot be reviewed without taking account of the triangular relationship between China, India and Pakistan, and examining the wider global context. This article explores the understudied Indian and Chinese nuclear strategies, analyses their motivations in strengthening their nuclear weapons capabilities and the role of international norms and regimes on nonproliferation in their national decision making. It concludes that for China the perceived threat is primarily the USA; for India it is primarily China. Both have the economic capacity for nuclear investments and the desire of powerful states to access the large Chinese and Indian markets meant there was no real threat of sanctions. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been largely irrelevant to their nuclear calculations, indicating a weak norm and a weak regime against strong and emerging powers. Ultimately, it was the power relations between states and not the international regime which framed their decision-making. The article also explores the compatibility of these states’ respective nuclear strategies with the renewed call for global nuclear disarmament in the wake of President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, arguing ultimately that measures and counter-measures taken will result in nuclear weapons continuing to play a central role in Chinese and Indian national security efforts. Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 25 (2014), 73–88. doi: 10.3318/ISIA.2014.25.13 *Text of a paper delivered at the symposium ‘Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Historical Perspectives and Future Objectives’, which took place at the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, on 28 March 2014. Authors’ e-mails: j.douglas@umail.ucc.ie; john.doyle@dcu.ie This content downloaded from 157.55.39.148 on Sun, 12 Jun 2016 06:01:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Beyond MAD: Obama’s Realistic – but Risky – Effort to Reduce the Role of Nuclear Weapons

New presidential guidance may, finally, render obsolete the Mutual Assured Destruction paradigm that has structured US nuclear strategy and arms-control policy for over 50 years – if a security dilemma can be avoided.

‘Getting’ A Discourse on Winning and Losing: A Primer on Boyd's ‘Theory of Intellectual Evolution’

Boyd's A Discourse is not a ‘Theory of Everything’, but what Colin Gray calls a partial theory, with some elements of a general theory. It does not have much to say about current security problems such as fragile states, the proliferation of WMD, nuclear strategy, maritime or air warfare, nor was it intended to do so. Yet it contains insights that have a generic applicability beyond military battle and beyond interstate warfare. It is strongest as an exploration of operational art but also offers novel highly conceptual generic interpretations of manoeuvre warfare and guerrilla warfare, and of the nature of tactics and strategy. Apart from tangible doctrinal influence, Boyd has given scholars and strategic thinkers new and fruitful perspectives on the dynamics of armed conflict. Hasík neatly summarizes the main lines of critique over the past decade. What these critiques lack is a full engagement with Boyd's work.

Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments

Why do countries deploy nuclear weapons abroad? Since 1945, more than twenty states have hosted foreign nuclear weapons on their territory, and five countries continue to do so today. These deployments have important consequences for international security, yet there is little systematic research about the factors that drive them. In this article, we develop three broad theoretical frameworks to explain why foreign nuclear deployments occur. Using a new data set of foreign nuclear deployments between 1945 and 2000, we find that two factors weigh heavily in driving these deployments: the protection of allies and the projection of military power. Nonproliferation motives, however, appear to play little role. The results carry important implications for our understanding of the causes of proliferation and the sources of nuclear posture.

Obama's Second Term: Time for a New Discourse on Nuclear Strategy

President Obama's policy toward nuclear weapons has seriously undermined the flexibility and credibility of U.S. nuclear strategy. As a consequence of its desire to provide leadership on nuclear abolition, nuclear strategy under the Obama administration is shallow and unconvincing. This article seeks to put strategy back at the center of discourse on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. In this endeavor, and in contrast to Obama's stated stance, this article resurrects some important elements of Cold War strategic thinking on the subject. Warfighting, nuclear bargaining, and escalation dominance are particularly worthy of renewed attention.

Nuclear Diversion Theory and Legitimacy Crisis: The Case of Iran

Can an insecure regime use nuclear diversion to address its eroding domestic legitimacy? This article argues that facing a domestic legitimacy crisis, a regime might opt to “rally round the nuclear flag” to survive. Theoretically, I argue that, compared with conventional diversion, nuclear diversion is less susceptible to structural restraints, has a unique symbolic value that could aid in coping with an acute legitimacy crisis, and spans a host of diversionary strategies as it ascends the escalation ladder, both before and after acquiring the bomb. The theory is examined empirically via Iranian nuclear policy. I argue that facing a deepening legitimacy crisis, the Iranian regime, throughout Ahmadinejad's tenure, has been increasingly drawing on nuclear diversion to boost public support and that, if the legitimacy crisis lingers, the regime may opt to further employ diversionary nuclear strategies, most of which require a viable “nuclear latency,” rather than actual military nuclear capability.Related Articles Ripberger, Joseph T., Thomas M. Rabovsky, and Kerry G. Herron. 2011. “.” Politics & Policy 39 (): 891‐923. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2011.00327.x/abstract Kane, John, and Haig Patapan. 2010. “.” Politics & Policy 38 (): 589‐610. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00250.x/abstract Darvich, Djamchid, and W. R. Campbell. 1982. “.” Southeastern Political Review 10 (): 37‐87. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.1982.tb00034.x/abstract Related Media Kurzman, Charles. 2009. “.” . July 18. http://chronicle.com/article/Social‐Science‐on‐Trial‐in‐/48949/ . 2011. “.” . February 24. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐africa‐12570279

Nuclear deterrence and the logic of deliberative mindreading

Although the computational modeling of “mindreading” (e.g., believing that you believe that there’s a deadly boa in the box, Smith mindreadingly predicts that you will refrain from removing the top) is well-established, this success has been achieved primarily in connection with scenarios that, relatively speaking, are both simple and common. Herein, we introduce a new computational-logic framework that allows formalization of mindreading of a rather more demanding sort: viz., deliberative multi-agent mindreading, applied to the realm of nuclear strategy. This form of mindreading, in this domain, is both complex and uncommon: it for example can quickly involve at least formulae reflecting fifth-order beliefs, and requires precise deductive reasoning over such iterated beliefs. In addition, the relevant models and simulations involve three, four, five agents, and sometimes many more. In the nuclear-strategy realm, for example, the better kind of modeling, simulation, and prediction (MSP) that our framework is intended to enable, should ultimately be capable of formalizing, at once, the arbitrarily iterated beliefs of at least every civilized nation on Earth. Based on our modeling, we present a set of desiderata that any modeling framework should satisy to be able to capture deliberative multi-agent mindreading in domains such as nuclear deterrence. Using our desiderata, we evaluate game theory, metagame theory, digital games, and tabletop games when used to model nuclear deterrence. Finally, we consider and rebut possible objections to our modeling paradigm and conclude with a map of ongoing and future work.

Five Myths about India's Nuclear Posture

For a democracy that otherwise leaks secrets like a sieve, India's entire nuclear journey has been shrouded in remarkable secrecy. It is therefore unsurprising that India has closely guarded the de...

Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

China's nuclear deterrent relies on so-called ‘first strike uncertainty’, which means not letting the other side be confident of a completely successful disarming strike. But in order to deter, the uncertainty must be high enough. After reviewing the developmental history of China's nuclear capability and the evolution of Chinese and foreign leaders’ perceptions of China's nuclear retaliatory capability, this article identifies the criteria of nuclear deterrence for China and other countries. This research can contribute to Sino-US strategic dialogue and deepening understanding of the security consequences of nuclear proliferation.

“The High Priest of Deterrence”: Sir Michael Quinlan, Nuclear Weapons, and the Just War Tradition

THE 1950s AND EARLY 1960s have been called the Golden Age of Nuclear Strategy, an era in which civilian scholars and practitioners, principally Americans but French theorists as well, dominated strategic thought. These theorists--physicists, military officers, economists, and political scientists--defined nuclear strategy and the potentiality for Armageddon with a detached, cold calculus, granting negligible consideration to the moral implications of such a war. Ostensibly, the argument over nuclear strategy and its abstract constructs ceased when the four nuclear powers adapted to mutual assured destruction as an established element of the Cold War environment. Nearly two decades later, however, after President Jimmy Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty from U.S. Senate ratification, and President Ronald Reagan announced plans to introduce intermediate-range nuclear weapons into Western Europe, the debate was revitalized. It gathered energy from the dissenting voices of the European nuclear freeze and disarmament movements, but also from the U.S. Catholic bishops' 1983 Pastoral Letter on War and Peace. In this document, the bishops examined the key issues of modern warfare, including nuclear weapons and deterrence. It is at this point that Michael Quinlan, a Jesuit-educated, senior British defense official entered the public discussion. He would remain a potent elucidator of the logic of nuclear weapons as it related to British national interests throughout his tenure as permanent secretary, the highest civil service rank, at the Ministry of Defence under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and continuing until his death in 2009. This article explores Quinlan's role as a significant thinker on nuclear strategy and international security by examining his arguments for the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons within the just war tradition. Some critics contend that Quinlan entered the civic contest primarily to uphold British defense policy by arguing that its nuclear weapons provided a second centre of (in addition to the United States) that deterred the Soviet leadership from believing it could risk a nuclear attack on Europe without prompting U.S. retaliation. However, such a narrow perspective removes an important impetus to Quinlan's actions: the tension that existed in his conscience. For Quinlan, the argument was not solely about nuclear strategy, the employment of these weapons, and the ethical norms associated with targeting. As a member of British strategic culture, he also needed to reduce the conflict between his temporal identity as a senior civil servant (defender of the realm) and his spiritual identity as a devout Roman Catholic. Moreover, his profound identification with these two cultures, while recognized but not fully examined, (1) accounts for his decision to act as a bridge between them through his personal correspondence as well as his writings and speeches to various public audiences. Thus, Quinlan stands astride British strategic culture and Catholicism. To interpret his thinking on the role of the state, deterrence, and the morality of nuclear weapons first requires an understanding of these two cultures. Cultures and Tradition C.P. Snow, the British scientist and novelist who served in several high-ranking civil service positions, declared in his 1959 Rede lecture the existence of two prominent cultures in modern society, science and humanities, and lamented the communication barrier that existed between them. He argued that this obstruction diminished both sides and impeded efforts to solve the problems of the world. (2) Quinlan, who represented a new generation of intellectuals, decried the strains between two other cultures of which he was part, ones more venerable and ancient than the ones Snow identified: the temporal and the spiritual or more specifically, that of the political order and Christianity. Quinlan considered the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as his home, and his 1981 transfer to the treasury after nearly three decades of service in the defense establishment resulted in considerable vexation; he characterized the reassignment as a deportation. …

Rethinking the Bomb: Europe and Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century

The end of the Cold War and subsequent reductions in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals have led to a situation where concerns about nuclear weapons have largely vanished from the public mind-set and the political agenda. The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, as publicly expressed by US President Barack Obama in 2009; Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons programme; and concerns over nuclear proliferation have brought the issue back onto the agenda. On closer inspection it becomes apparent that Europe, and especially the European Union, lacks a nuclear strategy for the twenty-first century. The legitimate use of nuclear weapons as well as arms controls are issues which have a predominant place in the current discussion regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. While multilateralism is of utmost importance, it should not be forgotten that this requires Europe to agree on a common position, not only on non-proliferation but also on nuclear weapon use in general, and that this position should then serve as the basis for talks with our key ally, the US. It is important to realize that non-proliferation cannot be achieved by a handful of countries, but requires dedication and cooperation from as many countries as possible.

‘The Nuclear Myth’: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International Politics of Anglo-French Nuclear Co-Operation 1970–3

This article examines the course of Edward Heath's initiative to seek Anglo-French nuclear co-operation, 1970–3. It focuses on the deliberations in Whitehall, and the high-level international politics among Britain, the United States, and France. It does so to bring to light the negligible progress made in nuclear matters between Britain and France, and to comment on the place of nuclear diplomacy within wider British policy towards Europe, France, and the United States. It also examines Britain's policy in an international context. The development of US nuclear co-operation with France trumped anything Britain could offer. While it appears compelling that the 1973 ‘Year of Europe’ broke apart Anglo-French agreement, British and French nuclear strategies reflected broader national political trajectories in the cold war, and agreement between them was always extremely unlikely. The failure to generate nuclear co-operation between Britain and France also prompts some comment on the difficulties leaders faced in implementing ‘grand designs’.

Economical analysis of an alternative strategy for CO2 mitigation based on nuclear power

Many countries are pursuing greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policies resulting in the increase of use of renewable sources in the electricity sector to mitigate CO2 emissions. Nuclear energy is a non-emitting CO2 source that could be used as part of that policy. However, its main drawback is the high investment required for its deployment. On the other hand, wind power is the clean source preferred option to mitigate CO2 emissions. However, due to its intermittence backup power is needed, in most of the cases it must be provided with combined cycle thermal plants using natural gas. This study performs an economical comparison of a hypothetical implementation of a nuclear strategy to meet the same CO2 emissions reduction goal that has been obtained by the actual Spaniard strategy (2005–2010) based on wind power. The investment required in both strategies is assessed under different investment scenarios and electricity production conditions for nuclear power. Also, the cost of electricity generation is compared for both strategies.

World outlook for nuclear power

The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 2011 has re-ignited the debate about the role of nuclear power in the future global energy mix. More than one and a half years after the accident, a somewhat clearer picture is emerging – different countries responded with different nuclear policies, e.g., one size does not fit all. While several countries confirmed or decided to phase-out the use of the technology or to cancel their plans of adding nuclear power to their future electricity generating mix, the majority of countries with operating nuclear power plants or plans to eventually start national nuclear power programmes continue with the implementation of their pre-Fukushima nuclear strategies albeit at a somewhat slower pace. Projections of future nuclear capacity expansion for the year 2030 show a likely shift of global nuclear generating capacities by about a decade but no significant retraction of national nuclear power programmes globally.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND CATHOLICISM: A REAPPRAISAL

During the Cold War sections within the Catholic Church reached an uneasy compromise on the moral validity of nuclear strategy. As an ‘interim ethic’ the dominant Catholic position accepted the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, but rejected many of the doctrines that underpinned nuclear strategy at the time. Since the end of the Cold War this position has come under increased scrutiny from within the Church. Some commentators claim that the time has come for the Church to officially jettison any vestiges of the interim ethic and reject nuclear strategy outright on moral grounds. Others argue that the Church's position is unsustainable from a strategic perspective. This paper presents a reappraisal of the Catholic position on nuclear strategy. In particular, the work assesses whether there is any common ground between the Strategic Studies approach to nuclear strategy and the Catholic position. The paper concludes that, with evolution in both perspectives, limited congruence can be expanded to produce a new nuclear strategy that satisfies both strategy and Catholic teaching.

The Iranian nuclear dilemma: light at the end of the tunnel?

In February 2012, Iran announced its willingness to resume negotiations with the Western powers. This statement followed in the wake of a damning report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and the imposition of additional sanctions by the international community on an Iranian economy already under pressure. Tehran's announcement also coincided with increased speculation regarding an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, however, this seemingly positive step appeared to be undermined by Iran's concomitant announcement that “huge” technical progress has been made on Iran's nuclear programme. This article will explore the significance of the recent political, diplomatic and technical developments in the Iranian nuclear affair and situate them in the broader context of Tehran's nuclear strategy. The analysis will assess the potential for this latest phase in the Iranian nuclear crisis to reverse Iran's current trajectory and initiate a rapprochement between Iran and Western powers.

The End of Ends

This paper assesses the conceptual and technological negotiation of an absolute end. The idea of a total ending is sublime: it is located outside of language and powerful precisely because of its sheer incomprehensibility. Yet, through the 20th century the United States built large-scale technological systems capable of achieving an absolute end to civilization. This paper engages both the idea of an end, and the means to an end, informing US nuclear strategy. It begins with an assessment of Cold War nuclear war plans that, if enacted, would certainly have eliminated most, if not all, life on Earth. I then examine how this expert fixation on nuclear crisis was itself circumscribed by new technological systems—notably secret space satellites that provided images of Earth in its totality as well as a vital check on the American projections of Soviet power. The exploration of outer space was thus a crucial means of checking American fantasies of an imminent and total danger, establishing a new limit on thought while opening up the possibility of an “end of ends” in the nuclear age.

Catalytic Deterrence? Apartheid South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Strategy

Although South Africa's nuclear decommissioning has received extensive analysis in the proliferation literature, few have devoted much attention to understanding how the apartheid government's purported weapons strategy modifies existing theories of nuclear deterrence. Importantly, a principal objective of South Africa's arsenal was not to deter hostile neighbouring countries by threatening tactical use of nuclear force as in classical deterrence theory, but instead to compel the intervention of an ambivalent ally, the United States. Thus, the case does not correspond to existing deterrence theories, which envision situations involving only a ‘defender’ and ‘initiator’, and more accurately may be conceptualized as ‘catalytic deterrence’. While South Africa is a unique case of denuclearization, the country's nuclear strategy shares many characteristics with other ‘opaque’ proliferators, such as no nuclear tests, denial of possession, and no direct threats. Understanding the mechanism of South Africa's catalytic deterrent subsequently provides an important case to amend our notions of deterrence and how similar opaque arsenals – such as those of Israel – may be employed in the future.

Change and innovation in Chinese nuclear weapons strategy

This article explores change and conceptual innovation in Chinese nuclear weapons strategy. It argues that drastic change towards a war-fighting strategy is not considered likely. Some transition is underway, towards what some have termed assured retaliation, but this transition is not a dramatic departure from past strategy which was based on uncertain retaliation. To illustrate this view, the article focuses on three areas: declaratory nuclear policy, military modernization, and academic discussions among military and civilian strategists in China. Declaratory policy offers a useful lens through which to consider Chinese nuclear strategy, especially nuclear deterrence and the policy of no first use. For its part, China’s ongoing military modernization has been a source of much concern in the West, but here a distinction is made between nuclear and non-nuclear modernization, and emphasis is placed on how both underpin no first use. Lastly, in Chinese academic circles, discussions have expanded upon declaratory policy and introduced innovative ideas on how best to shape future strategy. These discussions represent important efforts to demystify misconceptions regarding Chinese strategy, moving beyond traditional frameworks of analysis such as minimum deterrence, towards concepts such as counter-coercion.