Catalytic Deterrence? Apartheid South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Strategy

Abstract

Although South Africa's nuclear decommissioning has received extensive analysis in the proliferation literature, few have devoted much attention to understanding how the apartheid government's purported weapons strategy modifies existing theories of nuclear deterrence. Importantly, a principal objective of South Africa's arsenal was not to deter hostile neighbouring countries by threatening tactical use of nuclear force as in classical deterrence theory, but instead to compel the intervention of an ambivalent ally, the United States. Thus, the case does not correspond to existing deterrence theories, which envision situations involving only a ‘defender’ and ‘initiator’, and more accurately may be conceptualized as ‘catalytic deterrence’. While South Africa is a unique case of denuclearization, the country's nuclear strategy shares many characteristics with other ‘opaque’ proliferators, such as no nuclear tests, denial of possession, and no direct threats. Understanding the mechanism of South Africa's catalytic deterrent subsequently provides an important case to amend our notions of deterrence and how similar opaque arsenals – such as those of Israel – may be employed in the future.