‘The Nuclear Myth’: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International Politics of Anglo-French Nuclear Co-Operation 1970–3

Abstract

This article examines the course of Edward Heath's initiative to seek Anglo-French nuclear co-operation, 1970–3. It focuses on the deliberations in Whitehall, and the high-level international politics among Britain, the United States, and France. It does so to bring to light the negligible progress made in nuclear matters between Britain and France, and to comment on the place of nuclear diplomacy within wider British policy towards Europe, France, and the United States. It also examines Britain's policy in an international context. The development of US nuclear co-operation with France trumped anything Britain could offer. While it appears compelling that the 1973 ‘Year of Europe’ broke apart Anglo-French agreement, British and French nuclear strategies reflected broader national political trajectories in the cold war, and agreement between them was always extremely unlikely. The failure to generate nuclear co-operation between Britain and France also prompts some comment on the difficulties leaders faced in implementing ‘grand designs’.