Nuclear Strategy Research Articles

From Nuclear Hedging to Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone: Japan's Nuclear Options

This article discusses both the positive and negative effects of Japan's three nuclear strategies: nuclear hedging, nuclear breakout, and the Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (KJNWFZ). Nuclear hedging has been the longest established strategy to protect Japan's national security but it will become increasingly unreliable in the coming decades. Nuclear breakout, an alternative strategy, is impractical due to its high costs. In comparison, this article argues that KJNWFZ is the ideal option for Japan's future nuclear strategy. However, in recent years, the Japanese government has maintained the status quo, despite the scale of anti-nuclear protest across the country following the Fukushima crisis. Civilian anti-nuclear does not effectively in-fluence nuclear strategy decision-making, due to a combination of national electoral politics, interests groups, the 'veto players' of the right-wing, and the broader regional security context. In conclusion, the nuclear hedging policy remains the accepted balance of interests supported by decision-makers.

Open Innovation: Revealing and Engagement in Open Data Organisations Franz

Among many factors, we conclude it is difficult fully to comprehend the persistent intensity of official UK attachments to nuclear power, without also considering aims to maintain nuclear submarine capabilities. Yet this aspect is entirely undocumented anywhere in UK energy policy literatures. To acknowledge this, is not to entertain a conspiracy theory. It can be understood instead, in terms of more distributed and relational dynamics of power. Building on literatures in political science, we refer to this as a ‘deep incumbency complex’. Such an evidently under-visible phenomenon would hold important implications not only for UK nuclear strategies, but also the wider state of British democracy.

Putin and the Nuclear Dimension to Russian Strategy

ABSTRACTNuclear weapons and nuclear strategy have found themselves as parts of the discussions among expert and other commentators about the future of Russian President Vladimir Putin and about Russia’s military-strategic options in Europe following its annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. This study considers some of the nuclear-related aspects of Putin’s and Russia’s survivability with respect to: (1) principal challenges for NATO in the face of improving Russian military capabilities and plausible strategies, (2) the future relationship between Russia’s conventional military and nuclear capabilities and military-strategic priorities, and (3) assessment of Russia’s threat perceptions in the context of its ‘strategic history’.

Understanding the Intensity of UK Policy Commitments to Nuclear Power

The UK Government has long been planning to build up to 16 GWe of new nuclear power – aproportional level of support unparalleled in other liberalised energy markets. Despite many challenging developments, these general nuclear attachments show no sign of easing. With many viable alternative strategies for efficient, secure, low-carbon energy services, it is difficult to explain these commitments solely in terms of officially-declared policy rationales.A variety of possible reasons are suggested for the persistent intensity of UK attachments to civil nuclear power. Each is taken here as a basis for systematic hypothesis testing. And one additional hypothesis is also interrogated that has hitherto been virtually entirely neglected–about maintainingnational capabilities to build and operate nuclear-propelled submarines. To explore and test this idea, this paper analyses linkages between UK military and civilian nuclear sectorsin terms of high-level policy processes around supply chains, skills and expertise. Especially interesting is the critical juncture between 2003 -2006, whenstated policy moved radically from nuclear power as ‘unattractive’to calls for a ‘nuclear renaissance’. In this period,especially intense activity can be observed around UK nuclear submarine capabilities. Among manyfactors, we conclude it is difficult fully to comprehend the persistent intensity of official UK attachments to nuclear power, without also considering aims to maintain nuclear submarine capabilities. Yet thisaspect is entirely undocumented anywhere in UK energy policy literatures. To acknowledge this,is not to entertain a conspiracy theory. It can be understood instead, in terms of more distributed and relational dynamics of power. Building on literatures in political science, we refer to this as a‘deep incumbency complex’. Such an evidently under-visible phenomenon would hold important implications not only for UK nuclear strategies, but also the wider state of British democracy.

북한 핵무장에 대비한 대한민국 핵억제전략 연구 : 핵보유 국가들의 핵무장사례를 중심으로

북한 핵무장에 대비한 대한민국 핵억제전략 연구 : 핵보유 국가들의 핵무장사례를 중심으로

Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China

Abstract As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the Soviet force was. Part of the answer depends on the military-technical feasibility of the United States achieving a significant damage-limitation capability: What would be the outcome of military competition over the survivability of China's intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and command and control, and over the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defenses? The answer also depends on the benefits that a damage-limitation capability would provide; these could include contributions to homeland deterrence, extended deterrence, and reassurance of U.S. regional allies. The final piece of the analysis concerns the potential costs of a damage-limitation capability, which could include increased escalatory pressures during crises and growing political tension between the United States and China. A thorough analysis demonstrates that the United States should forgo such a capability because the prospects for preserving a significant damage-limitation capability are poor; the deterrent benefits would be small; and the escalatory and political costs would be relatively large.

The case for U.S. nuclear weapons in the 21st century

This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds-including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author's experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them.

China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy and its Consistency with the Chinese Leadership’s Perception of Minimum Deterrence

China is one of the recognized nuclear weapons states since it first tested its nuclear capability in 1964. Amongst major ingredients of its evolving nuclear strategy, China has been consistent with its small number of deterrent forces, an official no-first use doctrinal option, and policy of assured retaliation. This article argues that although China modernizes some parts of its key deterrent capability to enhance the credibility of its force precision, ranges and penetrability, this may not be considered a dramatic transformation in Chinese nuclear strategy. Modernization, which enhances the credibility and survivability of China’s deterrence forces, is an essential part of minimum deterrence conceptualized here. However, the possible greater transformation within doctrinal option of no-first use, increase of its deterrent forces including that of tactical nuclear weapons, and rescinding its strategy of assured retaliation would become inconsistent with what is conceptualized here.

The case for US nuclear weapons in the 21stcentury. By Brad Roberts: Nuclear strategy in the modern age: regional powers and international conflict. By Vipin Narang

The case for US nuclear weapons in the 21^stcentury. By Brad Roberts: Nuclear strategy in the modern age: regional powers and international conflict. By Vipin Narang

오바마 독트린과 미국의 대북 정책 프레임: 지정학, 핵전략, 불량국가

오바마 독트린과 미국의 대북 정책 프레임: 지정학, 핵전략, 불량국가

Storage of thermal reactor fuels – Implications for the back end of the fuel cycle in the UK

Fuel from UK's Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors (AGRs) is being reprocessed, however reprocessing will cease in 2018 and the strategy for fuel that has not been reprocessed is for it to be placed into wet storage until it can be consigned to a geological disposal facility in around 2080. Although reprocessing of LWR fuel has been undertaken in the UK, and this option is not precluded for current and future LWRs, all utilities planning to operate LWRs are intending to use At-Reactor storage pending geological disposal. This strategy will result in a substantial change in the management of spent fuel that could affect the back end of the fuel cycle for over a century. This paper presents potential fuel storage scenarios for two options: the current nuclear power replacement strategy, which will see 16 GWe of new capacity installed by 2030 and a median strategy, intended to ensure implementation of the UK's carbon reduction target, involving 48 GWe of nuclear capacity installed by 2040. The potential scale, distribution and timing of fuel storage and disposal operations have been assessed and changes to the current industrial activity are highlighted to indicate potential effects on public acceptance of back end activities.

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. By Vipin Narang. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. 360p. $95.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. By Vipin Narang. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. 360p. $95.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.

RTRB-10TYROSINE KINASE RECEPTOR TIE2 REGULATES DNA REPAIR THROUGH THE PROTO-ONCOGENE ABL1 IN BRAIN TUMOR STEM CELLS

Glioblastoma is the most common and aggressive primary brain tumor in adults with a median survival of 9-15 months. This tumor invariably recurs after therapy, which is largely caused by the striking radioresistance. In gliomas, we found the tyrosine kinase receptor TIE2 is overexpressed in brain tumor stem cells (BTSCs) and in human surgical glioma specimens in relation to malignancy. Here we find that ionizing irradiation (IR) treatment of mice bearing intracranial BTSCs-derived xenografts resulted in an unexpected TIE2 nuclear localization and increased level of its natural ligand, ANG1. These data was corroborated in BTSCs and glioma cultures upon IR or Ang1 stimulus, using immunofluorescence and confocal analysis, and subcellular fractionation followed by Western blot. Of clinical interest, nuclear TIE2 is associated with radioresistance of glioma cells, which was reverted by using Tie2 soluble receptor (which inhibits ANG1/TIE2 interaction) and after genetic Tie2 mutation of a newly discovered nuclear localization signal. At the molecular level, we also found that after IR treatment, TIE2 localized in the DNA-repair foci and complexed with gH2AX, suggesting a role of TIE2 in the DNA repair machinery. To validate our hypothesis, we used a fluorescent reporter construct in which GFP gene was reconstituted following a non-homologous end joining (NHEJ) event, and we observed that TIE2-expressing cells showed more efficient NHEJ repair than non-expressing TIE2 cells. Based on the recently reported role of ABL1 (cAbl) in the ATM and KAT5 mediated DNA damage repair, we explored the relationship between ABL1 and the TIE2-mediated radioresistance. Our data clearly showed that DNA repair efficiency significantly and specifically decreased by using ABL1 inhibitors or ABL1 siRNAs, but not after ABL2 inhibition. Collectively, our results should propel the development of preclinical studies on the combination of nuclear TIE2-targeting strategies and inhibition of ABL1 with radiotherapy for patients with glioblastomas.

A Post-colonial Analysis of India–United States Nuclear Security: Orientalism, Discourse, and Identity in International Relations

This article uses Edward Said’s post-colonial framework to analyze India–United States (US) nuclear security relations in the post-Cold War period as a clash of US Orientalism and India’s nuclear sovereignty as a key marker of India’s post-colonial essence. Through an analysis of the discourses of India and the US with regard to India’s May 1998 detonation and the 123 Agreement, it explores the following questions: To what extent has America’s security relationship with India been characterized by Orientalist discourses? Does the revision of the US post-9/11 security relationship with India as evidenced through the 123 Agreement indicate continuity or change in America’s Orientalist discourses vis-à-vis the nuclear policies of the Indian state? How has this shaped India’s nuclear nationalism? In exploring these questions, it will be argued that US security discourses reflective of Orientalism have constructed India along Orientalist lines; have structured US security policies towards the nuclear strategies of the Indian state (thereby consolidating India’s nuclear nationalism); and, that the revision of the US security relationship with India post-9/11 shows a continuity of America’s Orientalism towards the Indian state and its nuclear program. The article concludes with an analysis of the implications of Orientalism on South Asian security/International Relations.

Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability

Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China's effort to maintain its strategy of assured retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.

Posturing the Bomb

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. By Vipin Narang. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. 341 pp., $29.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-691-15983-6). Vipin Narang's Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era is the best political science book published on nuclear strategy in more than two decades. This is mostly because it is an excellent book and partly because nuclear strategy has not received the attention it deserves in recent years. During the Cold War, International Relations (IR) scholars flocked to questions of nuclear deterrence, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, classic works on the subject were published by leading lights, such as Richard Betts (⇓), Charles Glaser (⇓), Robert Jervis (⇓), Robert Powell (⇓), and others. For better or worse, however, the scholarly study of IR tends to follow real-world events, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War scholarship on nuclear deterrence slowed to a trickle. The United States principal foes, such as Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Libya, did not possess nuclear weapons, and The United States nuclear forces were of little utility against the unconventional challenges these adversaries posed. Policymakers certainly worried about nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist networks, and scholars continued to design rigorous research to analyze these questions, but traditional questions of nuclear deterrence and strategy remained overlooked. In the real world, however, the specter of nuclear confrontation is reemerging. The United States adversaries, including North Korea and Russia, have moved nuclear weapons to the center of their national security strategies, in part as an effort to offset The United States conventional military dominance. India and Pakistan are engaging in the most intense arms race the world has seen since the end of the Cold War, and Iran appears determined to earn admission into the club of nuclear …

Strategic Dilemmas of WMD Operators

The increase in nuclear clients appears to be forthcoming, and with it a possible increase for nuclear use. Deterrence must focus on targeting nuclear decision makers and tailoring a strategy toward all levels of nuclear command and control, including tactical levels of decision making. What can be learned from historical examples of WMD dilemmas and the consequential role of a WMD operator in nuclear decision-making? Namely, that operators are in fact decision makers and not simply executers. The article analyzes the role of WMD operators as such decision makers by reflecting on three case studies that demonstrate operator dilemmas in light of standard operating procedures at critical moments of WMD engagement, and their results. It concludes by laying out an effective base on which to include operators in tailored deterrence efforts, as well as filling a need for creative and practical nuclear strategy efforts.

Atomic Ayatollahs: Explaining Iran’s post-revolutionary nuclear path

Iran is generally considered to be seeking nuclear weapons, a view based on the country’s adoption in the mid-1980s of an increasingly covert nuclear acquisition strategy combining clandestine activity with a rise in sensitive assistance from states and black market providers. Why Iran chose an uncompromising nuclear path under the global radar remains contentious. This article re-examines changes in Iran’s nuclear behavior since 1985 and argues that the change of course toward secrecy was influenced by factors other than a possible nuclear weapons aspiration. Important but sometimes neglected explanatory factors include the isolation of post-revolutionary Iran from the international nuclear marketplace and the move toward stricter export controls in the international non-proliferation regime. By emphasizing these factors, this article aims to create a more nuanced understanding of a crucial phase in Iran’s nuclear past while providing alternative explanations that challenge the prevailing Western view of Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions.

Abstract 3298: ABL1 is required for Tie2-mediated DNA repair in brain tumor stem cells

Abstract Glioblastoma is the most aggressive primary brain tumor and, in spite of surgery and chemoradiotherapy, invariably recurs. The poor prognosis associated with this disease, with a median survival of 15 months, is largely caused by the striking radioresistance of these tumors. The development of new therapeutic strategies for patient with brain tumors requires the identification of key molecular pathways regulating their resistant phenotype. The abnormal function of tyrosine kinase receptors (TKRs) is a hallmark of malignant gliomas. We previously reported the expression of the TKR Tie2 in brain tumor stem cells (BTSCs) and in human surgical glioma specimens in relation to malignancy. In in vivo experiments, consisting of ionizing irradiation (IR) of mice bearing intracranial BTSCs-derived xenografts showed unexpected Tie2 nuclear localization. These results were confirmed by using immunofluorescence studies using confocal microscope and subcellular fractionation followed by Western blots. Of clinical interest, the presence of Tie2 in the nucleus is associated with radioresistance, as observed after mutagenesis of a newly discovered nuclear localization signal. In addition, upon IR, we detected increased levels of Tie2 natural ligand, Angiopoietin1 (Ang1). The blocking of the Ang1/Tie2 interaction, by the use of a soluble receptor, modulated the IR-mediated Tie2 nuclear translocation, indicating Tie2 intracellular trafficking was ligand dependent. Additionally we also found that after IR treatment, Tie2 localized in the DNA-repair foci and complexed with the H2AX, the key DNA repair protein. The data presented here clearly suggested a role of Tie2 in the DNA damage repair machinery. To test our hypothesis, we used a fluorescent reporter construct in which a functional GFP gene was reconstituted following a non-homologous end joining (NHEJ) event (gift from Dr. Gorbunova, University of Rochester), and we observed that Tie2-expressing cells displayed a more efficient NHEJ repair than Tie2 negative counterparts. Based on the recently reported role of ABL1 (cAbl) in the ATM and KAT5 mediated DNA damage repair, we explored the relationship between ABL1 and the Tie2-mediated radioresistance. Our data clearly showed that DNA repair efficiency significantly and specifically decreased by using ABL1 inhibitor but not by knocking down ABL2 expression. We further analyzed the interactions between Tie2 and chromatin and, interestingly, observed that Tie2 complexes with core histones. Collectively, our results should propel the development of preclinical studies on the combination of nuclear Tie2-targeting strategies with radiotherapy for patients with glioblastomas. Citation Format: Mohammad B. Hossain, Rehnuma Shifat, David G. Johnson, Mark T. Bedford, Mien-Chie Hung, Nahir Cortes-Santiago, Konrad Gabrusiewicz, Joy Gumin, Ravesanker Ezhilarasan, Erik P. Sulman, Frederick Lang, Raymond Sawaya, W.K. Alfred Yung, Juan Fueyo, Candelaria Gomez-Manzano. ABL1 is required for Tie2-mediated DNA repair in brain tumor stem cells. [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Association for Cancer Research; 2015 Apr 18-22; Philadelphia, PA. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Res 2015;75(15 Suppl):Abstract nr 3298. doi:10.1158/1538-7445.AM2015-3298

Living with nuclear hedging: the implications of Iran's nuclear strategy

For the past decade, much attention has been devoted to the potential consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet the binary ‘acquisition/restraint’ lens through which the Iranian nuclear issue is frequently viewed is limiting. There is now much evidence to suggest that Iran is engaged in a strategy based on nuclear hedging, rather than an outright pursuit of the bomb. This does not change the need to contain Tehran's proliferation potential, yet it does add another layer of complexity to the challenge. Iran will retain a low level of latency whatever the final outcome of longstanding diplomatic efforts to constrain the scope and pace of its nuclear efforts. This article will explore the implications of Iranian nuclear hedging and consider how regional rivals might interpret and respond to Tehran's nuclear strategy. On a larger scale, the article will explore the potential impact of the international community's approach to the Iranian case—implicitly recognizing, even giving legitimacy to, hedging—both in terms of the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the ability of the international community to limit the negative effects of this form of proliferation behaviour