Abstract
China is one of the recognized nuclear weapons states since it first tested its nuclear capability in 1964. Amongst major ingredients of its evolving nuclear strategy, China has been consistent with its small number of deterrent forces, an official no-first use doctrinal option, and policy of assured retaliation. This article argues that although China modernizes some parts of its key deterrent capability to enhance the credibility of its force precision, ranges and penetrability, this may not be considered a dramatic transformation in Chinese nuclear strategy. Modernization, which enhances the credibility and survivability of China’s deterrence forces, is an essential part of minimum deterrence conceptualized here. However, the possible greater transformation within doctrinal option of no-first use, increase of its deterrent forces including that of tactical nuclear weapons, and rescinding its strategy of assured retaliation would become inconsistent with what is conceptualized here.
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More From: International Journal of Korean Unification Studies
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