Nuclear Strategy Research Articles

Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis: The Kennedy Administration's Approach to British and French Strategic Nuclear Policies in 1962

The speech delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on 16 June 1962 at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor is often cited for its significance in the enunciation of U.S. nuclear strategy, but the speech also featured passages decrying the existence of separate, national nuclear forces within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This article concentrates on the latter dimension of the speech by examining the context of McNamara's remarks and the reactions they provoked, particularly in Great Britain. A vociferous political debate erupted in the United Kingdom over the country's independent nuclear deterrent. The article presents new evidence about McNamara's thinking on independent nuclear forces during this period and shows that the speech had the unintended consequence of complicating Britain's attempts to enter the European Economic Community. The speech and the resulting debate were a crucial part of the sequence of events that produced the Skybolt crisis at the end of 1962.

Grappling with Dr. Strangelove’s “Wargasm” Fantasy

AbstractDr. Strangelove continues to be viewed as one of the most acclaimed films of all-time. Likewise, international relations (IR) experts commonly list the film among the most essential IR-themed movies. The IR scholars who discuss Dr. Strangelove as a text or recommend it for courses generally claim that it can be used to explain nuclear deterrence, the security dilemma, mutually assured destruction, Cold War competition, and various other traditional serious concerns of the field. They also recognize that the satirical film is critical of nuclear strategy. This article considers Dr. Strangelove’s sexual subtext, involving important metaphors and symbols that IR scholars characteristically ignore. Yet, for decades, film critics and scholars from other disciplines have identified and emphasized the importance of the film's comedic “sexual framework” and concluding “wargasm.” Director Stanley Kubrick even acknowledged these key elements in private correspondence. The film suggests that the national security establishment's masculine view of the utility of nuclear weapons and deterrence are comparable to absurd male sexual fantasies. Feminist IR scholars frequently note that mainstream scholars largely ignore their critique of masculine views of the discipline and nuclear strategy. The article concludes that scholars in the field should both prioritize Dr. Strangelove’s sexual subtext and rely upon feminist contributions to help understand those elements.

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

Kroenig, M. (2018). The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy. Why Strategic Superiority Matters

Kroenig, M. (2018). The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy. Why Strategic Superiority Matters

India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities

Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.

Jon Wolfsthal on the link between nuclear strategy and the nuclear modernization budget

ABSTRACTIn this interview with Bulletin editor-in-chief John Mecklin, nuclear arms control and nonproliferation expert Jon Wolfsthal provides his wide-ranging views on the current nuclear situation, how the new Congress might deal with US plans for a $1 trillion-plus modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and ways the inordinate cost of that modernization program might be reduced.

The SAIS Review Interviews Sharon Weiner

The SAIS Review Interviews Sharon Weiner Sharon Weiner (bio) October 11, 2019 SAIS Review: What initially got you interested in nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy? Dr. Sharon Weiner: I always thought I would study the defense budget and how to better allocate money between defense and social needs. But there aren't a lot of courses on that. I was getting my master's degree in Europe, and, at my university, people were having a Hiroshima Day protest, where people were outlining people's bodies on the sidewalk and walls in black paint—basically the ash residue of someone after a nuclear flash. That just made me think more about things I had always ignored. Coming from a part of the Midwest that was definitely in the middle of the nuclear weapons zone, I started thinking about nuclear issues. The more I studied deterrence and nuclear weapons strategy, the more it seemed like a story people were telling themselves instead of a rational way to deal with threats. So, I thought, "This would be fun to study." So I did, and I still am. SAIS Review: And what exactly do you mean when you say "story?" Dr. Sharon Weiner: Think about deterrence. Deterrence in some ways is like a psychological relationship that surrounds us all. For instance, parents deter their kids: "Don't touch that or you'll get in trouble." But when it comes to nuclear weapons, we somehow assume people are going to treat these threats rationally, despite the fact that throughout the history of international relations, misperception has brought about war many times. And a misperception in a nuclear relationship could easily bring about the end civilization. This lack of critical thinking about deterrence has actually gotten worse over time, as if deterrence as a strategy is a fully vetted, completely known, [End Page 159] solid set of truths when, in fact, it's not. It's a psychological relationship with people that involves a whole lot of perception and a lot of assumptions about uncertainty. In the nuclear weapons community and actually in a fair amount in scholarship, there's a lack of attention to things that we assume, and we talk about them as if they are unquestionably true. But they're not. They're assumptions and there are other assumptions that in many cases are equally rational. Well why did we make these assumptions and sort of deify them until they are unquestionable? Additionally, this type of thinking seems to be prevalent in government. For example, when I worked in the government, I found that many people in the nuclear weapons community had no memory of the Cold War. They were taught that deterrence works and they never seemed to question that assumption. They didn't learn the debates between shelling and deterrence. I think that's dangerous because it assumes that deterrence will always work as its outlined in a textbook. But if our adversaries don't agree on that, then we're in trouble. SAIS Review: So, because there hasn't been a nuclear war, do you feel that we have, for lack of a better term, gotten lucky? Dr. Sharon Weiner: In some ways I think we have gotten lucky. We've gotten lucky that states with disagreements have chosen not to solve them by force, and the states that have chosen to solve them by force have not had nuclear weapons. Indeed, they've chosen genocide and a whole bunch of other horrible things we would like to avoid. But in the end, I don't think you can attribute this to just luck. There is some sobering aspect to nuclear weapons. That said, I think that that sobering overlay over deterrence is getting less and less because now people are talking about nuclear warfighting strategies (the idea that you can have small nuclear weapons and control escalation). Well the notion that you can control escalation is a fairytale. SAIS Review: What has your experience been working with Congress and in the Pentagon? Dr. Sharon Weiner: By and large, the amount of attention that most members of Congress give to nuclear weapons is close to zero. And I think that...

Climate Change and Nuclear Developments: A Growing Security Nexus

Climate and nuclear trends are intertwining around the world in myriad ways. This article explores the growing nexus by highlighting classic nuclear weapons states, emerging nuclear power programs, and the changing geostrategic nuclear supplier set. In each of these examples, there are climate impacts that add a multifaceted layer to regional geopolitical dynamics. In many cases, such countries are already grappling with rapid population growth, political turmoil, technological changes, and resource insecurity. Nuclear strategies that include a climate dimension are critical to mitigate the confluence of stressors that could drastically increase the risk of instability, nuclear miscalculation, and other devastating disasters. It would be reckless not to consider the potential dangers such pathways could present to global security.

Understanding Putin's Nuclear "Superweapons"

Peculiar as they may appear to Westerners, the novel nuclear delivery systems announced by Vladimir Putin on March 1, 2018 complement Russia's overall nuclear strategy. These weapons can be divided into two groups that serve different purposes. The novel "assured retaliation" weapons such as the Poseidon intercontinental nuclear-powered torpedo and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered ground-launched cruise missiles appear to be a component of a dissuasion strategy aiming to convince US decisionmakers to forgo strategic missile defenses. Russian leaders may believe that the extreme nature of these systems signals their resolve and determination to neutralize any possible threat to their retaliatory capability posed by future advances in counterforce targeting and missile defenses. The theater-range hypersonic missiles such as Kinzhal and Tsirkon, by contrast, serve a more quotidian purpose: increasing the complexity of integrated air and missile defense for potential adversaries. Armed with conventional warheads, these weapons can help attain practical military objectives in subnuclear conflict.

The SAIS Review Interviews Fiona Cunningham

The SAIS Review Interviews Fiona Cunningham Fiona Cunningham (bio) November 22, 2019 SAIS Review: Would you be able to provide us a brief summary of your background—as it relates to China and nuclear weapons—and how you got interested in the topic? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: I started researching China and nuclear weapons issues a long time ago when I was a research associate for the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. At the time, President Obama had just given a speech expressing his desire for a nuclear-weapon-free world to occur at some point, which triggered a lot of interest, obviously, in the Australian government, the Japanese government, and the think tank community about how that could be achieved, particularly in Asia. I was involved in a project that was looking at the future of extended nuclear deterrence—or extended deterrence I should say—as one moved towards a world with a lesser role for, and eventually no, nuclear weapons. Over the course of the two years that that project ran, it became quite obvious that the conventional military balance in Asia was changing in ways that was going to make that a very difficult objective. Through the course of this project, I started to look at questions about the China and its nuclear weapons program—what its ambitions were in the region, what its nuclear weapons were good for, how its nuclear strategy worked—and realized that there were some unanswered questions I thought needed more interrogation, specifically about what China wanted, the nature of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, and what nuclear weapons could provide to different countries. It was this line of inquiry that guided my entrance into [End Page 181] graduate school. Ultimately, I ended up looking at a broader range of issues about China and strategic deterrence than what I started with. SAIS Review: In researching Chinese nuclear weapons, did you have any trouble conducting your research in China? What was it like doing your research in China? Were Chinese officials forthcoming? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: It's obviously a sensitive topic and it isn't an easy one to research. On the one hand, because nuclear weapons are one of those capabilities from which statesmen derive much more utility if they aren't used, China wants its nuclear deterrence policies to be understood. On the other hand, probing at some of the more difficult and sensitive issues can get a little tricky. My sources have consisted of interviews with members of China's expert community who weren't actually serving officials and doing a lot of documentary research with materials that are available in both the United States and in China that I was able to collect to try to understand the decision-making and the mentality behind China's approach to nuclear weapons versus other military tools of strategic leverage, including its space weapons, cyber capabilities, and conventional missile program. I will say that there is an expert community in China that is much better developed on the nuclear side than on the other tools, so it is much easier, in many ways, to research nuclear weapons than the other tools. But there are, of course, sensitive parts, and there are questions that can't be asked in interviews that have to be answered in other ways. But I would say just generally speaking, that China's expert community welcomes the opportunity to exchange and to understand what Western analysts find surprising and concerning about China's nuclear strategy, as well as the opportunity to help China's policies to be a little better understood abroad. SAIS Review: The American nuclear process—how it launches nuclear weapons with the president and the "nuclear football," the American nuclear apparatus—is fairly well known by the public and is relatively easy to research and learn about. What is the process in China, in terms of how they launch nuclear weapons? What is the political and military structure governing a Chinese nuclear weapons launch? How many checks and balances are there? And is there a debate about whether these kinds of processes should be reformed? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: These are really hard topics...

Old Problems in New Posture Reviews? The Lessons of Flexible Response for Today

Foreign and domestic perceptions of the rate of change in the US nuclear force structure and posture far outpace the changes themselves. This is contributing to a potentially dangerous gap between US declaratory nuclear policy—what is said publicly about nuclear strategy and forces—and "action policy "—the guidelines governing those forces in practice. A similar gap developed in the early 1960s as the Kennedy administration pursued its "flexible response" strategy. This article compares similarities and differences between today and the Kennedy era to argue that the decoupling of the rhetoric from the reality of US nuclear policy risks encouraging nuclear proliferation, intensifying strategic instability between the great powers, and weakening US alliances.

Current State of the Russian and US Nuclear Weapons Policies

This article is devoted to the analysis of interaction of the nuclear policy of Russia and the United States in the context of a crisis in bilateral relations, the collapse of the arms control system and the undermining of global strategic stability. First, the authors examine the current state of US-Russian relations in the sphere of arms control. As a result of the US withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the dim prospects of extending the New START, the authors conclude that the arms control and strategic stability system that was being put together over the course of four decades is in a deep crisis. Second, the authors examine the U.S. nuclear policy and Washington’s efforts to build up and modernize its nuclear capabilities. The 2018 Nuclear Policy Review points to the United States moving away from the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use and the desire to maintain options to end conflicts at any stage on terms favorable to the U.S. without a significant risk of starting a general nuclear war. In addition, the authors describe plans of the U.S. military to modernize the nuclear triad. When analyzing the 2019 Missile Defense Review, it is noted that the U.S. desire to ensure its absolute invulnerability to any missile threats, “left of launch” measures to provide missile defense before missile are launched by the enemy, and the integration of defensive and offensive capabilities of missile defense systems confirm the fears of Russia and other countries regarding maintaining their capabilities to conduct a nuclear retaliatory strike. Then the Russian nuclear doctrine is analyzed. The authors reject Western accusations that Russia has the concept of “escalate to de-escalate”, describe the conditions for Russia’s first nuclear use and the specifics of the “retaliatory counterstrike” concept, and also cite Russia's main concerns regarding threats from the US nuclear doctrine and nuclear modernization. We are also talking about the development of new nuclear weapons systems, such as hypersonic weapons, unmanned vehicles and cruise missiles. In conclusion, it is said that the U.S. doesn’t intend to try to maintain strategic stability any longer, Washington’s nuclear strategy has features that are dangerous to international security, which he blames Russia and that Russian fears regarding US nuclear policy are all but legitimate.

Does Nuclear Superiority Matter?

Does Nuclear Superiority Matter? Alia Awadallah (bio) Review of Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, author Matthew Kroenig promises to deliver a novel theory on why American nuclear superiority matters. Kroenig focuses on numerical superiority, arguing that a nation's warhead count is a decent enough proxy for overall superiority. His objective is to settle a longstanding question in the nuclear community: if numerical superiority makes no difference in nuclear war, why do American policymakers pursue it relentlessly? Kroenig argues that numerical superiority does in fact matter and provides compelling evidence to back up his argument. His findings, while limited in scope, represent an important contribution to nuclear strategy and have major policy ramifications for both nuclear and non-nuclear states. Kroenig's background is well-suited to answering this question, given his mix of academic expertise and policy experience. Kroenig is a tenured professor at Georgetown University and formerly served in the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, in addition to advising a number of presidential candidates on foreign policy. In the first chapter, Kroenig introduces his "superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory," which argues that nuclear superiority increases a state's willingness to take risks in international disputes. This appetite for risk strengthens the resolve of state leaders, allowing them to play games of nuclear brinkmanship and ultimately coerce their adversaries. The author is clearly aware that his theory will face sharp scrutiny, specifically from academics who believe that once states possess second strike capability, numerical superiority no longer matters. Kroenig spends the rest of the book rigorously testing his theory and preempting criticism. The first few chapters test the cost of nuclear exchanges in terms of human casualties and the destruction of military targets or major cities. In all cases, the tests reveal that numerical superiority would enable a state to inflict significantly greater damage on its adversary. Kroenig also maintains that nuclear superiority also matters for international political crises by allowing the superior state to demonstrate greater resolve. [End Page 193] Kroenig then examines historical standoffs between nuclear-armed states, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kargil Crisis, the Sino-Soviet Border War, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The main purpose of these case studies is to illustrate that decision-makers were conscious of the nuclear balance of power and based their actions at least partly on that balance. The second half of the book seeks to dismantle arguments against nuclear superiority, such as the perception that it is too expensive and the fear that nuclear superiority will lead to a bilateral arms race or widespread nuclear proliferation. The book's greatest strength and weakness is that it attempts to explain what most policymakers may not even understand themselves. Kroenig is adamant that US policymakers know intuitively what his tests prove empirically: the size of our nuclear force matters, even beyond the ability to retaliate against a first strike. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides the best evidence for this argument, as historical records suggest the Soviet Union's leaders were keenly aware of the Soviet Union's inferiority during the conflict.1 The other cases are not as convincing. Kroenig is correct that the perceptions and resolve of policymakers matters a great deal. However, further examination in the form of interviews and analysis of contemporary crises would go a long way in strengthening his argument. So would a more thorough examination of policymaker perceptions on the importance of relative versus absolute vulnerability to nuclear war. Kroenig effectively demonstrates why new states will not necessarily acquire nuclear weapons in response to a US nuclear build up. He is less successful in arguing that a build-up will not lead other major nuclear powers, such as Russia, to expand their own arsenals. Kroenig asserts that Russia and others will seek to acquire more warheads regardless of US actions. In this case, the Cuban Missile Crisis contradicts Kroenig's theory since the standoff did in fact lead Khrushchev to acquire additional nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, for the explicit purpose of not losing a similar confrontation...

Ядерные силы США и перспективы их развития

This article analyzes the current state of the US nuclear forces and assesses the prospects of their development, based on the provisions of the new US nuclear strategy promulgated on February 2, 2018 in the Nuclear Posture Review.

The Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Strategy of the People’s Republic of China

The focus of the Chinese nuclear strategy is still unclear and the actual size of nuclear arsenals of the PRC has never been published officially. According to the official Chinese nuclear policy, the PRC can use nuclear weapons only as means of “effective retaliation“ in the credible second strike. Despite the official Chinese stance, we have to recognize that the PRC now is the third nuclear power in the world. That follows from the pragmatic assessment of the size of its nuclear arsenals and the variety of nuclear weapons, which China managed to design and deploy. Note that China is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council which has been actively improving and expanding its nuclear arsenals after the demise of the bipolar world. For many years the development of the Chinese nuclear forces had lagged behind the pace of the arms race set by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The things had changed since the 1990s. Against the background of the superpowers’ deep cuts of nuclear weapons the PRC managed the radical modernization of its nuclear forces, and their shape has changed drastically. A full-scale deployment of the improved mobile solid-propellant IRBM, SLBM and ICBM raises the Chinese nuclear forces to a new level. According to some assessments, China may work to achieve strategic parity with the U.S. and Russia. At the same time, the PRC is almost not bound by obligations of the international arms control regimes, apart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Intense modernization of the strategic nuclear forces and lack of obligations are raising an issue of China’s involvement in international arms control regimes. It seems reasonable to conduct the pilot trilateral negotiations (China, Russia, and U.S.) on precision-guided hypersonic weapons, boost-glide in particular.

Israel’s Nuclear Programme

Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, but has never confirmed the existence of its nuclear program. Historians have for a long time largely relied on limited access to U.S. government documents and on the oral histories of those with inside knowledge of Israel’s nuclear program. However lately declassified documents demonstrated a semi-official recognition by the US Department of Defense that Israel a de facto acknowledgement by the US as a nuclear power. While the documents confirm what is already known regarding Israel’s nuclear arsenal, the political implications are potentially far-reaching, particularly in relation to Israeli’s negative attitude to Iran’s alleged nuclear program. Israel nuclear program is an essential part of long-term Israeli national security strategy and a security doctrine. National security has been at the forefront of the Israeli experience for seven decades, with threats ranging from terrorism, to vast missile arsenals, and even potential existential nuclear dangers. Israel state’s national security doctrine, in its broadest sense intended to protect and promote the state’s national security interests. One of the main features of this nuclear program development is the specifically nuclear relationship between Israel and US which acting as official guarantor of Israel security and consider it as the main recipient of American protection. The aim of this article is to describe and analyze nuclear strategy’s concept from a historical perspective-that is, to trace its evolution. Israel has long enforced a policy of opacity with regards to its nuclear program even though its existence is a common knowledge throughout the world. Today Israel considers Iran as the main geopolitical enemy. Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, it would be a “game changer” in the region and spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Israel faces a threat to its national interest in that Iran could become a greater relative regional power. Israel has been particularly outspoken in the opposition to the JCPoA signed in 2015 as it concern was that even if Iran acts rationally according to realist understandings of national interest, it still may not be receptive to diplomatic efforts to stop its nuclear program.

21세기 안보환경 변화와 미국의 핵전략 : 제한핵전쟁에 대한 미국의 정책변화를 중심으로

21세기 안보환경 변화와 미국의 핵전략 : 제한핵전쟁에 대한 미국의 정책변화를 중심으로

The Severe Spontaneous Bleeding Phenotype in a Novel Hemophilia a Rat Model with an Inversion Mutation Is Rescued By Platelet-Targeted FVIII Expression

Previous studies by our group and others have demonstrated that platelet targeted FVIII expression can rescue the bleeding phenotype in hemophilia A (HA) mice in both the inhibitor and non-inhibitor models. The clinical efficacy has been further proven in a dog HA non-inhibitor model. While these are informative, neither the canine nor mouse model entirely mimic human disease because 1) neither HA mice nor dogs exhibit the frequent spontaneous bleeding in severe HA patients, and 2) canine platelets do not contain FVIII carrier protein VWF and therefore store and release FVIII differently, thus precluding examining the efficacy of platelet gene therapy in the presence of inhibitors.The efficacy of platelet-FVIII gene therapy, therefore, needs to be examined in an animal model more representative of human disease. Since the inversion of FVIII gene is the most common mutation that causes severe HA in patients, using a CRISPR/Case9 strategy we generated a novel HA rat model in a Dahl/Salt Sensitive (Dahl) inbred congenic background (Dahl-F8KO) with the nearly entire murine FVIII gene inverted causing a translational stop 6 amino acids after the signal sequence of FVIII. There is no detectable FVIII in plasma in Dahl-F8KO rats (LOD is 1 U/dL). Spontaneous bleeding in the soft tissue, muscles, or joints occurred in 56.5% of homozygous affected animals (n=46) by the age of 8-weeks and up to 82.6% by the age of 32-weeks. This was significantly higher (P<0.0001) than the occurrence of spontaneous bleeding in another colony in Sprague Dawley (SD) background developed by Nielsen et al. using zinc finger nuclear strategy (J Thromb Haemost 2014) with a 13-bp deletion in exon 16 of FVIII. In SD-F8KO rat model, spontaneous bleeds occur in 23.3% and 42.1% of homozygous affected animals (n=85) that were housed in our facility by the age of 8- and 32-weeks, respectively. Likewise, the percentages of homozygous affected animals with 2, 3, or 4 bleeding episodes in the Dahl-F8KO colony were significantly higher than those in the SD-F8KO colony. In contrast, none of the heterozygous (F8+/-) animals ever have a spontaneous bleed. Similar to SD-F8KO rats, Dahl-F8KO rats can develop anti-FVIII inhibitory antibodies after 2 doses of recombinant human FVIII (rhF8) treatment. Thus, our novel Dahl-F8KO rat model is a unique animal model with the severest spontaneous bleeding phenotype yet reported.To investigate if platelet-derived FVIII can rescue the spontaneous bleeding phenotype in HA rats, we generated transgenic rats (2bF8Tg) in both SD- and Dahl-background in which FVIII expression is under control of the platelet-specific αIIb promoter (2bF8) using lentivirus-mediated oocyte transduction transgenesis. Bone marrow (BM) mononuclear cells were isolated from femurs of 2bF8Tg rats and transplanted into F8-/- rats preconditioned with 950 R TBI. Animals were closely monitored after BM transplantation (BMT), and blood samples were collected for FVIII assays and whole blood thrombin generation assay (wbTGA). After BMT from SD-2bF8Tg rats, no spontaneous bleeding was observed in SD-F8KO recipients within the entire study course (1 year at the time of this report) with a sustained platelet-FVIII expression of 20.9±8.1 mU/108 platelets (n=3). Similarly, we performed BMT from Dahl-2bF8Tg rats into Dahs-F8KO and found that 1 of 3 recipients had a bruise at the early stage of BM reconstitution. However, no any other spontaneous bleeding has yet been observed (5 months). To confirm that the bleeding diathesis in F8-/- rats was ameliorated after 2bF8 gene expression, wbTGA was performed. All parameters, including Lag Time, Peak Time, Peak Thrombin, Endogenous Thrombin Potential in 2bF8Tg-BMT recipients were significantly different compared to F8-/- control rats, but were similar to those obtained in WT control animals. Of note, neither detectable levels of plasma FVIII nor anti-F8 antibodies were detected in F8-/- recipients after receiving BMT from 2bF8Tg rats.In summary, we have developed a novel HA rat model with both the pathophysiology and clinical phenotype found in severe HA patients, which could be an ideal model for evaluating the clinical efficacy of new therapeutics. Our studies demonstrated that transplantation of BM cells that are genetically modified to express FVIII only in platelets can efficiently prevent the severe spontaneous bleeding in HA rats with no anti-F8 antibody development. DisclosuresMontgomery:BCW: Patents & Royalties: GPIbM assay patent to the BloodCenter of Wisconsin.

「伝統攻撃に対して核先制使用戦略」及びジレンマが朝鮮半島核危機に与える示唆点

“이핵섭상(以核慑常, Nuclear Deterrent Strategy on Conventional War)”의 목적은 나토에게 핵무기위력을 과시하여 바르샤바 군사집단의 재래적 무기공격을 막고, 전쟁의 폭발 및 확대를 피해서 유럽지역의 전략적인 균형을 맞추기 위해서였다. 그러나 냉전이 종결된 후, 세계의 정세가 급변하여 러시아의 재래식 군사력은 급격히 하락하였다. “이핵섭상”은 나토에게 전략적인 가치가 사라졌다. 하지만, 인도, 파키스탄 그리고 북한 등 군사력이 상대적으로 약한 나라들은 “이핵섭상”을 주목하기 시작했고, 이는 그 나라들의 적국인 재래식 군사공격을 막는 중대한 이론적 무기가 되었다. 예를 들면, 북한이 핵개발을 지속적으로 진행함으로써 한반도 평화는 핵무기 및 미사일실험으로 많은 위협을 느꼈다. 이러한 상황에 접함으로 “이핵섭상” 전략학설에 대한 연구가 필요하게 되었다. 본 논문은 문헌연구를 통해 “공격성 현실주의 시각(进攻性现实主义视角, Perspective of offensive realism)으로 추단 연역(推演, deduction)을 통해 “이핵섭상’의 곤경을 도출하였다. 결과적으로 “이핵섭상”은 전략적 균형 목적을 이룰 수 없고, 전면적인 핵전쟁을 폭발 시킬 수 있다는 점도 도출하였으며 “이핵섭상”은 군비경쟁을 격화시킬 수도 있다.

Russian nuclear “de-escalation” of future war

Putin developed Russia’s nuclear strategy, which allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional war, when he was secretary of the Russian National Security Council Staff. Russian nuclear doctrine allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in “regional or even a local” war. Starting in 1999, Russia began to simulate the first use of nuclear weapons in large, theater-war exercises. Since 2000, all large-scale Russian military exercises have reportedly featured simulations of limited Russian nuclear strikes. Russia characterizes the first use of nuclear weapons as “de-escalation” of aggression. There is an impressive body of evidence going back decades indicating that Soviet/Russia’s threshold of nuclear weapons first use is lower than what was publicly announced. Indeed, in 2014, General of the Army (ret.) Yuri Baluyevskiy, who managed the development of Russia’s nuclear doctrine, said that the “conditions for pre-emptive nuclear strikes…is contained in classified policy documents.” Since 2007, Russia has made numerous high-level overt nuclear threats, including, since 2014, nuclear threats relating to Ukraine and the Baltics. Putin is preparing for a major war with the U.S. and NATO. He clearly hopes the West will capitulate without one. If he miscalculates and a war results, the threat of nuclear strikes, and possibly the strikes themselves, will be a major part of his strategy for victory.