International Crisis Group Research Articles

Political Islam and Social Movement Theory: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgement The author would like to thank Professor Clark McCauley for his insights regarding the issues addressed in this article and the University of Pennsylvania's Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict for its financial support for this research. Notes See, for example, ICG, 2003 ICG 2003 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir (Osh, ICG Asia) [Google Scholar] and Rashid, 2002 Rashid A 2002 Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (London, Penguin) [Google Scholar]. Only 1.3 per cent of the adult population is illiterate (UNSK, 2001 UNSK 2001 The United Nations System in the Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz Republic: Common Country Assessment (Bishkek, United Nations) [Google Scholar], p.76). According to the Kyrgyz intelligence services, a meeting was held in Kabul in early September 2000 between the Taliban, the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir to discuss the plans of the latter to cooperate with a wide range of movements in calling the umma to struggle against the kufr (non-believers) (Knyazev, 2000 Knyazev A 2000 Pod znamenem “zelenogo internatsionala” Nezavisimaya gazeta 11 November [Google Scholar]). See, for example, Zubaida, 1993 Zubaida S 1993 Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East (London, I. B. Tauris) [Google Scholar], Tessler, 1997 Tessler M 1997 The origins of popular support for islamist movements: a political economy analysis in J. P. Entelis (ed.), Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press) [Google Scholar] and Wyatt, 2000 Wyatt C 2000 Islamic militancies and disunity in the Middle East in K. Dark (ed.), Religion and International Relations, (London, Macmillan) [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]. Officially the Soviet authorities listed the casualties at 200 killed and some 300 injured, but local sources put the death toll at more than 1000 (Rashid, 2002 Rashid A 2002 Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (London, Penguin) [Google Scholar], p. 68). The major regions of the country are the north, which includes the capital Bishkek and Chui, Issyk-Kul and Talas provinces, and the south, consisting of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken provinces. The Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (CPK) was dominated for nearly 25 years by leaders from the north. The northern domination almost came to an end with the promotion of Absamet Masaliyev, a southerner, but the balance of power soon shifted again in favour of the north; Askar Akayev was elected president in October 1990, while Masaliyev was removed from the position of CPK first secretary in April 1991 (Akbarzaden, 2001 Akbarzaden, S. 2001. Political Islam in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Central Asian Survey, 20, 4: pp. 451 – 65 [Google Scholar], p. 455). In 2002 317 citizens of Kyrgyzstan were studying in religious educational institutions in Pakistan (Ibraimov, 2002 Ibraimov B 2002 Nastupayet li islamsky ekstremizm? Vecherni Osh 15 June [Google Scholar]).

A2. International Crisis Group, ““After Arafat? Challenges and Prospects,”” Amman and Brussels, 23 December 2004 (excerpts).

The International Crisis Group's Middle East Briefing surveys the Palestinian political scene in the wake of Arafat's death and on the eve of the PA presidential elections. The sections reproduced below looks at various aspects of Arafat's legacy and catalogue the key posts Arafat held in Palestinian institutions. Footnotes have been omitted for reasons of space. The briefing can be found in its entirety at www.crisisgroup.org.

A1. International Crisis Group (ICG), Report on the Palestinian Authority under Israeli Occupation, Amman and Brussels, 28 September 2004 (excerpts)

The ICG's 36-page report, ““Who Governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation,““ is based on months of research in the West Bank by a team of analysts. It covers not only the Palestinian Authority and its affiliated institutions and forces, but also the informal networks, political parties and movements, and the issues of law and order and the prospects for local and national elections. The following excerpts concern the PA and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Footnotes have been omitted for reasons of space. The entire report can be found at www.icg.org.

The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West

THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS Islam and the West Gilles Kepel Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 336pp, US$23.95 cloth (ISBN 0-674-01575-4)GLOBALIZED ISLAM The Search for New Ummah Olivier Roy New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. xii, 351pp, US$29.50 cloth (ISBN 0-231-13498-3)WAHHABI ISLAM From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad Natana J. Delong-Bas New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix, 37opp, $56.00 cloth (ISBN o19-516991-3)UNDERSTANDING ISLAMISM Middle East/North Africa Report 37 Cairo and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2 March 2005. 20pp, www.crisisgroup.orgSince 9/11, Muslim jihadist groups have proven to be an elusive bunch, following up their attacks in New York and Washington with strikes in numerous other countries, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 2005 turned out to be particularly active year, with bombings in London, Bangladesh, and Jordan in addition to the ongoing jihadist contributions to the insurgency in Iraq. While all of these pale in political comparison to the catastrophic events of 9/11, they nonetheless make clear that Islamic extremist networks have not only shown their resiliency in the face of ongoing security efforts to thwart their activities, they have also spread globally. Gilles Kepel, an eminent French scholar on global Islamism, writes of the growing localization and decentralization of Islamist terrorist networks, comparing them to cancerous cells that were metastasizing throughout the world (149). Writing of al in particular, he suggests that it has become like a franchise with bin Laden merely the logo for small time operations managed by independent micro-entrepreneurs working under license to purvey terrorism (141). In similar fashion, Olivier Roy, another leading French scholar on global Islamism, describes these groups as subcontractors, made up of radicalized young denizens of run-down inner cities and suburbs who are trying to make an impression by identifying with Al Qaeda (320).Why the continued grassroots appeal of small but deadly al franchises? And what can be done to thwart their continued and seemingly invisible proliferation? The following review of three recent books and one article on the ideology and practice of global Islamist networks provide extremely useful insights. This review is divided into three sections: first, it will outline and compare some of the main arguments used to explain the general rise of global Islamism; second, it will focus on efforts by the various authors to provide more accurate typology of the various Islamist tendencies, examining in particular those groups that fall within what Roy calls neo-fundamentalism; and third, it will review recommendations aimed at thwarting radical Islamism's continued proliferation and development.UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF GLOBAL ISLAMISMKepel and Roy are at their strongest in providing explanations-or root causes-for the rise and continued relevance of global Islamism, including its jihadist tendency. Their focuses, however, provide the reader with dramatically different, though not mutually exclusive, approaches. Whereas Kepel privileges the geostrategic realm with its greater emphasis on the mobilizing influences of the debacles in Palestine and Iraq and the counterproductive agenda of the neoconservative networks in Washington, Roy delves into the underlying sociological processes that have disrupted both the material location and identity of Muslims in the modern world.Kepel's tightly knit narrative about the origins of radical Islamism and al is well-known. At its core are political developments in three crucial arenas: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq. It was in Afghanistan, for example, where the seeds of a complex web of more globally oriented jihadist networks were sown under the banner of al (89); in Palestine, where the deterioration of the peace process in the 1990s and the rise of Palestinian suicide bombings created an opportunistic advantage for al to launch its own spectacular act of martyrdom in September 2001 (103); and in Iraq, where the misguided decision by American neoconservatives to topple the Ba'athist regime has served to reenergize the global spread of al Qaeda-like networks and create the very clash of civilizations dynamic that the neoconservatives in Washington had hoped the invasion would help to destroy (111). …

When is it Right to Fight?

Gareth Evans is President of the International Crisis Group, a Member of the UN SecretaryGeneral’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and was Co-Chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001. He was Foreign Minister of Australia from 1988 to 1996. This article is based on the 2004 Cyril Foster Lecture, delivered at Oxford University on 10 May 2004.

A1. International Crisis Group, ““Identity Crisis: Israel and Its Arab Citizens,”” Amman and Brussels, 4 March 2004 (excerpts).

International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, nonprofit, multinational organization based in Brussels, with branches throughout the world. The thirty-five-page report, the ICG's twenty-fifth on the Middle East, provides an overview of the situation of Israel's Palestinian minority, including historical and political context, areas of particular discrimination (resources, land and planning, education), mutual Jewish and Arab Israeli perceptions, and recent developments and trends. Reproduced below is the subsection dealing with land and planning. The extensive informational footnotes have been omitted for space reasons; only the reference footnotes have been retained. The entire report can be found online at www.crisisweb.org

Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?

With home-bred hordes the hillsides teem The troopships bring us one by one, At vast expense of time and steam To slay Afridis where they run The 'captives of the bow and spear' Are cheap alas! as we are clear. --Rudyard Kipling, Arithmetic on the Frontier American policy in is at crossroads, or so it appears. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested in May 2003 that the war on terror in was in cleanup or mop phase. (1) Overshadowed by the swift American military victory in Iraq, the images of airmobile troops and special operations forces rooting out al Qaeda in remote mountains took back seat to images of M1A1 Abrams tanks sweeping through the desert destroying Iraq's Republican Guard. Indeed, by the end of 2003, the problematic aspects of the American-led reconstruction effort in Iraq continued to dominate discourse. At the same time, critics darkly hinted that was Vietnam when aspects of the ongoing but low-level Taliban terrorist activities popped up in the media in the fall of 2003. Those seeking to attack American reconstruction policy in Iraq point to and claim that it is somehow failed prototype, that the credibility of the American reconstruction effort in Iraq is somehow linked to the credibility of the American-led effort in Afghanistan. These are dangerous and simplistic arguments. is complex place in its own right: it has unique ethnic makeup, geography, social structure, economics, and military factors. It is by no means analogous to Iraq in any way. Imprecise perceptions, some deliberately constructed, could distort the reality of the situation in and where the United States stands after two years of operations there. If we are not clear about what the issues are, we may create unrealizable expectations about what can be accomplished, with the kind of subsequent media backlash which is extant in Iraq. The Critics Criticism of American policy can best be characterized as reflexive reactions based on obsolete worldviews combined with juvenile demands for instantaneous success. If it is not successful by now, it therefore must be failure. Some examples: When describing necessarily violent activities undertaken by American-supported anti-Taliban factions, anti-American journalist Robert Fisk in the Independent (UK) uses phrases like This is just how the Americans began in Vietnam, and asserts that Afghanistan is on the brink of another disaster. Of course, in this view, America is to blame. (2) Analyst Jim Lobe penned an article entitled Afghanistan Quagmire, in which he shrilly stated that Afghanistan is beginning to look like quagmire rather than victory, with echoes of the confusion and uncertainty and persistent blood-shedding of Vietnam. (3) In other cases, organizations with specific interests in the situation have raised criticisms to bolster their proposed policies (and perhaps potential involvement) without taking into account the wider view necessary to take in the magnitude of the problems in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch demands that the UN-mandated but now NATO-led Kabul stabilization mission, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), (4) should be expanded into other urban centers to provide greater security for reconstruction, the protection of women's rights, the return of refugees, and to reign in regional warlords. (5) Josh Pollack in DFI International's Current Defense Analyses argues that heavy weapons must be stored, and combatants must be demobilized and then be reintegrated into society. ISAF, therefore, should be expanded and provided with the capability to stop any Afghan faction from playing spoiler role while at the same time building up a capable, centralized, and balanced indigenous military force. (6) The International Crisis Group, like the others, argues that the international community must increase ISAF to 25,000 to 30,000 troops and expand it to other population centers to monitor potential disputes which could disrupt the political process. …

REHABILITATION, RESISTANCE, AND RETURN: SERVICE LEARNING AND THE QUEST FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOSNIA

In 1996, shortly after termination of the Bosnian civil war and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the University of Denver established a service learning program in the Balkans. Now, about to enter its eighth consecutive year of operation, “Project Bosnia” has become the university's longest‐running service learning/field school initiative. Each summer, from ten to 15 students (representing disciplines as diverse as anthropology, international relations, and law) participate in on‐site, agency‐based activities that allow them to hone both their community outreach and applied research skills. Some serve as summer school teachers in the small town of Vares. Many work with refugees and internally displaced persons in Sarajevo, the capitol. Placement agencies include the International Commission on Missing Persons, America's Development Foundation, the International Crisis Group, World Vision, the Mine Action Center, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. In‐class, academic work directed by the author complements each student's fieldwork.

THE GENEVA ACCORD

THE GENEVA ACCORD

Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent Developments in Southeast Asia

Introduction In the 1960s, the renowned American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in his seminal work, Integrative Revolution concluded: havoc wreaked both upon themselves and others by those modern (or semi-modern) states that did passionately seek to become primordial rather than civil political communities... have only strengthened the reluctance publicly to advance race, language, religion and the like as bases for the definition of a terminal community. (1) Yet, contrary to that conclusion, and forty years later, the Southeast Asian region contains a plethora of groups who profess a commitment to separatism, or the establishment of states on an ethno-religious basis. In accounting for the present rise or decline of ethno-religious conflict in Southeast Asia, this overview will focus on the following factors: * the character of the state and its role and capacity in ameliorating or exacerbating such conflict; (2) * the role of local factors (ethnicity, religion, and the distribution of resources) in the durability of conflict; and * the significance of the external dimension, particularly the challenge emanating from Islamic religious revivalism in the persistence of conflict. Indonesia In all its reports, the International Crisis Group (IGC) (3) has emphasized how the burgeoning separatist and ethno-religious conflicts in Indonesia are inextricably linked to Indonesia's chronic ongoing crisis -- in essence, the weakness and incapacity of the state. It notes that Indonesia is: state crippled by economic crisis; radical decentralization that has shaken up government structures but is not working well; a military whose cohesion and discipline have declined and a bureaucracy and legal system riddled with massive corruption. (4) A brief survey of the conflicts in Aceh, West Irian, Maluku, and Kalimantan will highlight the linkage between them and Indonesia's broader crisis and the prospects (or not) of their resolution. Aceh Since April 2001 when the Indonesian military began an operation to quell the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), about 1,000 people have been killed in Aceh. (5) In her first state of the nation address, President Megawati Sukarnoputri apologized for the decades of human rights abuses in Aceh and Irian Jaya but rejected outright the option of independence for either province. Instead, Jakarta is attempting to woo back the people of those provinces by offering special autonomy to both. In the case of Aceh, autonomy will mean that 70 per cent of oil and gas revenues will go to the Acehnese authorities for the next eight years, and the province, whose population is 97 per cent Muslim, will also have the right to base its legal system on Shariah or Islamic law. If autonomy reduces poverty and brings the Acehnese a greater sense of justice and identification with their province then support for independence may gradually diminish, but considerable obstacles remain in the way. The first obstacle is that Indonesia's armed forces remain committed to destroying the armed wing of GAM. However, as the ICG has concluded, further conflict between the military and GAM will only result in a stalemate, and abuses by the security forces will further alienate ordinary Acehnese. (6) Secondly, although autonomy is the only alternative at present to prolonged conflict, there are serious divisions among the Acehnese on the merits of autonomy or independence. (A major stumbling bloc is the GAM, which controls about 80 per cent of Aceh's territory and insists on independence.) Thirdly, elements on both sides, in the military and GAM, have vested interests in prolonging the conflict. In that regard, the ICG notes that, continued engagement in Aceh allows the military to portray itself as the only force capable of preventing the disintegration of Indonesia and thereby helps it to preserve its political influence. …

Peace Building in the Balkans: Is There a Need to Stay the Course?

A year ago, Thomas L. Friedman published an already-famous article in which he claimed that democracy was sprouting tentatively in the ethnically pure states of the former Yugoslavia, whereas in multi-ethnic Bosnia, democratic development was farther from the goal set by the Dayton Accords than ever. Mr. Friedman’s thesis is that Dayton’s provisions should be abandoned, Bosnians (whatever their constituency) should decide for themselves where they want to live, and then let democracy take hold after the populations have “parted.” Only this, Friedman feels, can help Bosnians to think beyond tribal interests, concluding that it is “not an accident McDonald’s still refuses to operate [there].”2 These calls to abdicate any responsibility for promoting the ideal of multiethnic coexistence as framed by the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) are not infrequent. The International Crisis Group pointed out in its December 2000 report that elections were only helping to dig deeper divisions between communities by allowing extremists to perpetuate their strangle hold on power.3 The ICG believes that it is time to rethink the DPA’s strategy of elections as a means of speeding up democratic development and allowing a NATO pullout. It advocates that the international community take all the measures allowed by the Dayton Accords to enforce compliance by the parties, instead of putting its faith blindly in a democratic ethos that is simply not emerging. Implicit in this assessment is the notion that, since the implementation of Dayton seems too difficult, its usefulness comes into question as a matter of consequence. By extension, amendment of the DPA or its eradication would nullify the possibility of multi-ethnicity. The ICG’s position is tantamount to revisionism. These positions are similar, but there are nuances. Mr. Friedman would have the international community preside over a more or less formal “population exchange” that would see Croatia and Serbia inherit a form of “sphere of influence” over their respective populations in Bosnia, while NATO would take on the spon-

Constantinople’s Last Hurrah

Research Article| June 01 2001 Constantinople’s Last Hurrah: Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate Whit Mason Whit Mason Whit Mason spent two and a half years in Istanbul as a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs. He is now based in Kosovo as a political analyst for the International Crisis Group. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google World Policy Journal (2001) 18 (2): 55–64. https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-2001-3003 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Whit Mason; Constantinople’s Last Hurrah: Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. World Policy Journal 1 June 2001; 18 (2): 55–64. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-2001-3003 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter Books & JournalsAll JournalsWorld Policy Journal Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2001 World Policy Institute2001 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Lessons from western Kosovo for the documentation of war crimes

Based upon experiences of the International Crisis Group's Humanitarian Law Documentation Project in Western Kosovo, the author advances a series of recommendations for effective intervention by aid workers in areas where considerable trauma has been inflicted upon civilians. In particular, she argues that in documenting war crimes, the primary responsibility of the interviewer is to the wellbeing of the witness. This includes not only emergency survival needs such as adequate shelter, food and clothing; it means taking care of their mental health needs. This should be done by training interviewers in recognising symptoms of mental disorders and providing immediate assistance for those who need it as well as ensuring that there are facilities available in the longer term to address the inevitable consequences of mass violence. For people documenting war crimes, it is not enough simply to go in, take a statement and leave. In order to be able to provide this type of assistance, the mental health needs of humanitarian workers themselves must also be addressed. There must be adequate facilities staffed by experienced people to help both local and international workers deal with the type of work they are doing. In both of these situations, the persons providing training and treatment must themselves be trained in post‐conflict situations and issues arising as a result of mass trauma If possible, it is best to tap into local mental health structures that already exist.