Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent Developments in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Introduction In the 1960s, the renowned American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in his seminal work, Integrative Revolution concluded: havoc wreaked both upon themselves and others by those modern (or semi-modern) states that did passionately seek to become primordial rather than civil political communities... have only strengthened the reluctance publicly to advance race, language, religion and the like as bases for the definition of a terminal community. (1) Yet, contrary to that conclusion, and forty years later, the Southeast Asian region contains a plethora of groups who profess a commitment to separatism, or the establishment of states on an ethno-religious basis. In accounting for the present rise or decline of ethno-religious conflict in Southeast Asia, this overview will focus on the following factors: * the character of the state and its role and capacity in ameliorating or exacerbating such conflict; (2) * the role of local factors (ethnicity, religion, and the distribution of resources) in the durability of conflict; and * the significance of the external dimension, particularly the challenge emanating from Islamic religious revivalism in the persistence of conflict. Indonesia In all its reports, the International Crisis Group (IGC) (3) has emphasized how the burgeoning separatist and ethno-religious conflicts in Indonesia are inextricably linked to Indonesia's chronic ongoing crisis -- in essence, the weakness and incapacity of the state. It notes that Indonesia is: state crippled by economic crisis; radical decentralization that has shaken up government structures but is not working well; a military whose cohesion and discipline have declined and a bureaucracy and legal system riddled with massive corruption. (4) A brief survey of the conflicts in Aceh, West Irian, Maluku, and Kalimantan will highlight the linkage between them and Indonesia's broader crisis and the prospects (or not) of their resolution. Aceh Since April 2001 when the Indonesian military began an operation to quell the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), about 1,000 people have been killed in Aceh. (5) In her first state of the nation address, President Megawati Sukarnoputri apologized for the decades of human rights abuses in Aceh and Irian Jaya but rejected outright the option of independence for either province. Instead, Jakarta is attempting to woo back the people of those provinces by offering special autonomy to both. In the case of Aceh, autonomy will mean that 70 per cent of oil and gas revenues will go to the Acehnese authorities for the next eight years, and the province, whose population is 97 per cent Muslim, will also have the right to base its legal system on Shariah or Islamic law. If autonomy reduces poverty and brings the Acehnese a greater sense of justice and identification with their province then support for independence may gradually diminish, but considerable obstacles remain in the way. The first obstacle is that Indonesia's armed forces remain committed to destroying the armed wing of GAM. However, as the ICG has concluded, further conflict between the military and GAM will only result in a stalemate, and abuses by the security forces will further alienate ordinary Acehnese. (6) Secondly, although autonomy is the only alternative at present to prolonged conflict, there are serious divisions among the Acehnese on the merits of autonomy or independence. (A major stumbling bloc is the GAM, which controls about 80 per cent of Aceh's territory and insists on independence.) Thirdly, elements on both sides, in the military and GAM, have vested interests in prolonging the conflict. In that regard, the ICG notes that, continued engagement in Aceh allows the military to portray itself as the only force capable of preventing the disintegration of Indonesia and thereby helps it to preserve its political influence. …