Peace Building in the Balkans: Is There a Need to Stay the Course?

Abstract

A year ago, Thomas L. Friedman published an already-famous article in which he claimed that democracy was sprouting tentatively in the ethnically pure states of the former Yugoslavia, whereas in multi-ethnic Bosnia, democratic development was farther from the goal set by the Dayton Accords than ever. Mr. Friedman’s thesis is that Dayton’s provisions should be abandoned, Bosnians (whatever their constituency) should decide for themselves where they want to live, and then let democracy take hold after the populations have “parted.” Only this, Friedman feels, can help Bosnians to think beyond tribal interests, concluding that it is “not an accident McDonald’s still refuses to operate [there].”2 These calls to abdicate any responsibility for promoting the ideal of multiethnic coexistence as framed by the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) are not infrequent. The International Crisis Group pointed out in its December 2000 report that elections were only helping to dig deeper divisions between communities by allowing extremists to perpetuate their strangle hold on power.3 The ICG believes that it is time to rethink the DPA’s strategy of elections as a means of speeding up democratic development and allowing a NATO pullout. It advocates that the international community take all the measures allowed by the Dayton Accords to enforce compliance by the parties, instead of putting its faith blindly in a democratic ethos that is simply not emerging. Implicit in this assessment is the notion that, since the implementation of Dayton seems too difficult, its usefulness comes into question as a matter of consequence. By extension, amendment of the DPA or its eradication would nullify the possibility of multi-ethnicity. The ICG’s position is tantamount to revisionism. These positions are similar, but there are nuances. Mr. Friedman would have the international community preside over a more or less formal “population exchange” that would see Croatia and Serbia inherit a form of “sphere of influence” over their respective populations in Bosnia, while NATO would take on the spon-