The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West

Abstract

THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS Islam and the West Gilles Kepel Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 336pp, US$23.95 cloth (ISBN 0-674-01575-4)GLOBALIZED ISLAM The Search for New Ummah Olivier Roy New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. xii, 351pp, US$29.50 cloth (ISBN 0-231-13498-3)WAHHABI ISLAM From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad Natana J. Delong-Bas New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix, 37opp, $56.00 cloth (ISBN o19-516991-3)UNDERSTANDING ISLAMISM Middle East/North Africa Report 37 Cairo and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2 March 2005. 20pp, www.crisisgroup.orgSince 9/11, Muslim jihadist groups have proven to be an elusive bunch, following up their attacks in New York and Washington with strikes in numerous other countries, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 2005 turned out to be particularly active year, with bombings in London, Bangladesh, and Jordan in addition to the ongoing jihadist contributions to the insurgency in Iraq. While all of these pale in political comparison to the catastrophic events of 9/11, they nonetheless make clear that Islamic extremist networks have not only shown their resiliency in the face of ongoing security efforts to thwart their activities, they have also spread globally. Gilles Kepel, an eminent French scholar on global Islamism, writes of the growing localization and decentralization of Islamist terrorist networks, comparing them to cancerous cells that were metastasizing throughout the world (149). Writing of al in particular, he suggests that it has become like a franchise with bin Laden merely the logo for small time operations managed by independent micro-entrepreneurs working under license to purvey terrorism (141). In similar fashion, Olivier Roy, another leading French scholar on global Islamism, describes these groups as subcontractors, made up of radicalized young denizens of run-down inner cities and suburbs who are trying to make an impression by identifying with Al Qaeda (320).Why the continued grassroots appeal of small but deadly al franchises? And what can be done to thwart their continued and seemingly invisible proliferation? The following review of three recent books and one article on the ideology and practice of global Islamist networks provide extremely useful insights. This review is divided into three sections: first, it will outline and compare some of the main arguments used to explain the general rise of global Islamism; second, it will focus on efforts by the various authors to provide more accurate typology of the various Islamist tendencies, examining in particular those groups that fall within what Roy calls neo-fundamentalism; and third, it will review recommendations aimed at thwarting radical Islamism's continued proliferation and development.UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF GLOBAL ISLAMISMKepel and Roy are at their strongest in providing explanations-or root causes-for the rise and continued relevance of global Islamism, including its jihadist tendency. Their focuses, however, provide the reader with dramatically different, though not mutually exclusive, approaches. Whereas Kepel privileges the geostrategic realm with its greater emphasis on the mobilizing influences of the debacles in Palestine and Iraq and the counterproductive agenda of the neoconservative networks in Washington, Roy delves into the underlying sociological processes that have disrupted both the material location and identity of Muslims in the modern world.Kepel's tightly knit narrative about the origins of radical Islamism and al is well-known. At its core are political developments in three crucial arenas: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq. It was in Afghanistan, for example, where the seeds of a complex web of more globally oriented jihadist networks were sown under the banner of al (89); in Palestine, where the deterioration of the peace process in the 1990s and the rise of Palestinian suicide bombings created an opportunistic advantage for al to launch its own spectacular act of martyrdom in September 2001 (103); and in Iraq, where the misguided decision by American neoconservatives to topple the Ba'athist regime has served to reenergize the global spread of al Qaeda-like networks and create the very clash of civilizations dynamic that the neoconservatives in Washington had hoped the invasion would help to destroy (111). …