If de-colonization and American independence were justified, then it must be that there are certain cases in which secessionist groups have a valid claim to territory. The present paper is a novel attempt at devising a theoretical framework that can successfully make sense of these. Building on Primary Right Theories (Ascriptivist and Plebiscitary) as well as Just Cause Theories (Two-Conditions and Less- Limited), I find their main lacunae to be twofold: an excessively minimal consideration of distributive justice issues in secession cases, and a systemic vulnerability in theory to the threat of secession on economic grounds. To begin filling these gaps in the literature, I propose an original theory on the broader principle of self-determination that goes beyond the secessionist context, grounding my views in a liberal theory of territorial jurisdiction and group rights. What emerges is a nuanced account that can better grapple with the complex and controversial cases of secession that exist in the world today.