Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty

Thomas Rowe,Alex Voorhoeve

doi:10.1111/papa.12121

Abstract

In the spring of 2009, a novel strain of the H1N1 influenza virus, containing a never before witnessed combination of gene segments from human influenza, two forms of swine influenza, and avian influenza, 1 was declared a global pandemic. The UK Government had to decide whether to undertake, at a cost of £1.2 billion (USD 1.9 billion at the time, equivalent to 1 percent of that year’s health budget), an extensive set of preparatory measures, including the purchase of both antiviral medication and a novel vaccine in quantities sufficient to cover the entire UK population, or whether instead to take substantially less costly measures, which would involve having only a limited supply of these medicines and vaccines at hand.2 The possible.

Highlights

This article was presented at Erasmus University Rotterdam; George Washington University; the LSE; the universities of Cambridge, Edinburgh, Manchester, Minho, Montréal, Oxford, Pavia, Reading, Salzburg, and Warwick; and the U.S National Institutes of Health
The information about the UK’s decision-making during the H1N1 pandemic in this paragraph is based on Deirdre Hine, An Independent Review of the UK Response to the 2009 Influenza Pandemic (London: The Cabinet Office, 2010), and Adam Oliver, “Ambiguity Aversion and the UK Government’s Response to Swine Flu,” in Behavioural Public Policy, ed
Following seminal work by Daniel Ellsberg, this form of uncertainty is commonly referred to in the economic literature as “ambiguity.”[4] An uncertain situation so defined contrasts with a merely risky situation in which the decision-maker is in a position to assign precise probabilities to all relevant potential outcomes of the alternatives they have to choose between

Summary

MORAL DECISIONS UNDER SEVERE UNCERTAINTY

In the spring of 2009, a novel strain of the H1N1 influenza virus, containing a never before witnessed combination of gene segments from human influenza, two forms of swine influenza, and avian influenza,[1] was declared a global pandemic. Following seminal work by Daniel Ellsberg, this form of uncertainty is commonly referred to in the economic literature as “ambiguity.”[4] An uncertain (or ambiguous) situation so defined contrasts with a merely risky situation in which the decision-maker is in a position to assign precise probabilities to all relevant potential outcomes of the alternatives they have to choose between. Uncertainty we use these terms, both “risk” and “uncertainty” are subjective notions— they pertain to the beliefs about the chances of all relevant outcomes of their decisions that a rational decision-maker is in a position to form on the basis of their prior beliefs and the evidence available to them Uncertain situations in this sense are common. This approach allows us to focus squarely on unexplored issues involved in confronting uncertainty

EGALITARIANISM UNDER RISK

A CAUTIOUS CRITERION FOR DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY

WHEN REDUCING UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITING INEQUALITY ARE CONGRUENT

WHEN REDUCING UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITING INEQUALITY ARE AT ODDS

Findings

CONCLUSION