Theories Of Distributive Justice Research Articles

A DEFENSE OF HUMEAN PROPERTY THEORY

ABSTRACTTwo rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.

More Cops, Less Trust? Disentangling the Relationship between Police Numbers and Trust in the Police in the European Union

Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between number of police officers per inhabitant and trust in the police in the EU. By compiling data sources from the Eurobarometer, the Eurostat and the Corruption Perception Index, we test whether the number of police officers per inhabitant is a robust predictor of trust in the police on the country level. While there is a strong negative correlation between the two variables that justifies stating that the police are trusted most in countries where the number of police is minimal, controlling for relevant covariates reveals that the correlation is technically spurious. In line with distributive justice theory, perceptions of corruption in the respective countries explain most of the variation in trust in the police, which completely levels the influence of number of police officers per inhabitant. Implications for research and policy are discussed at the end of the paper.

Scanlon Against Desertist Theories of Justice

In his 2018 book Why Does Inequality Matter? T. M. Scanlon discusses the question how significant differences of economic advantage can be justified. He surveys a variety of possible justifications. In Chapter 8—‘Desert’—he focuses on the idea that a desertist theory of justice might attempt to justify such differences in certain cases by claiming that those who have more in those cases deserve to have more; while those who have less deserve to have less. Scanlon rejects this sort of attempted justification. Scanlon claims that desert ‘plays no role in distributive justice’. He seems to think that in order to explain how it could be just for people to receive unequal benefits, we will need to appeal to some conception of distributive justice that does not involve desert. In my 2016 book Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve from Our Country I presented what I took to be a thoroughly desertist theory of distributive justice—apparently a theory of precisely the sort Scanlon means to reject. Scanlon does not mention my theory. My aim in the present paper is to explain how my desertist theory avoids Scanlon’s objections. First I explain the conception of desert that Scanlon has in mind; then I present the core of Scanlon’s objections to desertist theories of distributive justice. Finally, I show that his objections have no application to the form of desertism that I proposed.

Fairness in Transport Policy: A New Approach to Applying Distributive Justice Theories

The transport system influences everyone’s wellbeing on a daily basis. These impacts are both positive and negative and are borne directly and indirectly at a range of spatial and temporal scales and across different groups in society. Furthermore, they are often distributed unfairly and the people who are least able to use transport networks frequently bear the greatest costs. People also have various transport needs and these needs change throughout their lives. Due to these complexities, there is no straightforward answer as to how we should provide transport fairly. Policies and actions to decarbonise the transport system are urgently needed, but their equity effects are also important. We give a brief overview of distributive justice and equity in transport literature. We then develop a conceptual framework of distributive justice and a set of four principles to guide the application of the framework to transport policy. We then apply these to recent transport policies in Aotearoa/New Zealand, a country that shares common features with most highly motorised countries. We apply the Capabilities Approach to transport policy in a novel way that conceptualises transport policy as a social conversion factor which influences people’s ability to convert resources and opportunities into the things (‘beings and doings’) that they have reason to value. The consideration of transport policy as a conversion factor, rather than focusing on a specific capability, emphasises the role of transport policy as a promoter of a wide range of capabilities and highlights the inequitable distribution of positive and negative effects on people’s health and wellbeing. It also illuminates issues of power structures and procedural fairness in transport policy that are otherwise not covered by distributive justice approaches. Taking a broader view of distributive justice theory in transport provides a clearer picture of the impacts of transport on wellbeing and provides theory-based guidance on the actions to improve transport justice that can be readily integrated into existing policy institutions.

Exploring the Fairness and Development Plan of College Entrance Screening System based on John Rawls' Theory of Distributive Justice

Exploring the Fairness and Development Plan of College Entrance Screening System based on John Rawls' Theory of Distributive Justice

Justice, ethical dispositions, and liberal socialism

ABSTRACT Social institutions that seek to realize justice must foster the moral disposition to act on the norms of justice. In order to spell out this claim, the paper turns to Hegel’s idea of Sittlichkeit (ethical life). In Hegel’s framework, the institutions of ethical life have the task of nurturing the ‘ethical disposition’, something akin to what Rawls calls the ‘sense of justice’. This task places particular constraints on institutions. The formation of ethical dispositions requires what I call an ‘internal’ transformation of the economic sphere, allowing individuals to develop their moral capacities. This stands in contrast to many theories of distributive justice, including Rawls’s, which treat the market as a ‘black box’, whose main virtue is seen in maximizing economic output. By reconstructing Hegel’s institutional suggestions systematically, it turns out that Hegel’s social philosophy offers convincing arguments for a liberal socialism.

The Foundations of Distributive Justice: A Morphogenetic Analysis of Gomberg and Fraser

This article applies Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic analytical dualism framework to critically compare the sociological foundations underpinning the work of two key American political philosophers: Paul Gomberg and Nancy Fraser. First, I focus upon Gomberg’s ideas for reforms to the division of labour and their impact upon race relations in the USA. I argue that, while Gomberg offers a radical egalitarian vision, it is flawed by its weak understanding of the relationships between structure and agency and between culture and economy. Following this, I consider Fraser’s theory of two-dimensional participatory justice premised upon distributive and recognition justice. I argue that, due to a more sociologically nuanced approach, her theory avoids the conflationism and epiphenomenalism that Gomberg lapses into. I conclude by noting that these conceptual issues have pertinence beyond these two authors and have implications for theories of distributive justice more generally.

Notes on Contributors

Previous article FreeNotes on ContributorsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJacob M. Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California. [email protected]Grant J. Rozeboom is assistant professor of business ethics and corporate responsibility at Saint Mary’s College of California. His research concerns a range of issues in normative and applied ethics, including published work on the basis of moral equality, the viciousness of vanity, and the nature of morally creditworthy motivation. [email protected]Patrick Tomlin is a reader in philosophy at the University of Warwick. [email protected]Jeppe von Platz is assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Richmond. His work on economic justice can be found in Theories of Distributive Justice: Who Gets What and Why (2020) and in articles published by Politics, Philosophy and Economics; the Journal of Value Inquiry; Public Affairs Quarterly; and the Journal of Social Philosophy. [email protected]Alec Walen is professor of law, philosophy, and criminal justice at Rutgers University. He recently published The Mechanics of Claims and Permissible Killing in War (2019). [email protected] Previous article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 131, Number 1October 2020 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/709978 © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

A legal consideration of distributive justice and rights to health in the COVID-19 era

Objectives: This study examined the theory of distributive justice and discussed its implications in terms of health rights. Methods: This study reviewed current distributional theories in terms of liberal distributive justice. Results: As a criterion for distribution, merit is appropriate in the sense that individual choice, effort, or ability can result in legitimate inequality, and merit-based distribution of the results can account for individuals with merit. Based on the difference principle enunciated by Rawls, the distribution occurs first in order to resolve unfair inequalities. According to the priority theory, distributions are intended for those who are poorer. According to the theory of hypothetical insurance by Dworkin, the distributions move according to need based on sufficientarianism, to ensure basic living standards to compensate for inherent disabilities and allow people to pursue their own preferences. Conclusion: Because of a diverse range of social aspects in reality, a just and perfect distribution theory is impossible. Nonetheless, we can gauge feasibility of each method by coherently examining the method of distribution combined with the objects of distribution.

The belief in innate talent and its implications for distributive justice

Although the commonly accepted view is that there are such things as natural talents, more than 20 years of research suggests the opposite. What passes for talented is attributable to a combination of social andenvironmental factors. If the current research on this topic holds true, then there are implications not only for various theories of distributive justice, but there are also serious implication for real world distributions. In this article I will argue that talent is not innate and that our belief in its innateness has serious theoretical and practical implications for distributive justice. Many of these implications can be seen in the ways resources and opportunities are distributed; particularly in the way they affect distributions to children.

Employment mismatch from a distributive justice perspective

PurposeEmployment mismatch is a significant problem in many countries. However, little conceptualization research has been conducted on employment mismatch from a social justice perspective. The purpose of this study is to shed light on social justice issues that have been obscured in the human resource development (HRD) literature through the lens of the distributive justice theory.Design/methodology/approachThis study first reviews the literature to identify the gaps in employment mismatch research by reviewing three relevant bodies of literature: education mismatch, immigrant mismatch and disability mismatch. It then provides a new conceptualization of employment mismatch by examining employment mismatch through the lens of Rawls’ (1971) distributive justice theory.FindingsThe author proposed a framework of healthy employment relations using the constructs of social system design, moral guidance, education reform and individual development. Implications were proposed for research and practice.Originality/valueThe new framework of healthy employment approaches employment mismatch from four aspects embraced by the distributive justice theory. This model can assist HRD professionals and policymakers in responding to the employment mismatch of different populations.

Penyelesaian Perundingan Perjanjian Kerja Bersama (Pkb) Yang Tidak Menemui Kesepakatan (Studi Kasus di PJT I Malang)

The Collective working Agreement (PKB) is regulated in Article 1601 of the Civil Code (Civil Code), which is an agreement between two parties, an employee or laborer and a company, both bound together. Workers commit themselves to employers for a certain time. A bond to do work by receiving wages. Another understanding of collective working agreements is regulated in Law Number 13 of 2003 concerning labor. Working agreements are agreements between employers and employees, or laborers who have conditions of employment, rights and obligations of both parties. There are two research questions, fi rst what is the meaning of the settlement of collective bargaining agreements that do not meet the agreement and, how do we formulate a joint working agreement negotiation solution without finding a deal. The method used to answer research questions is a type of normative and empirical legal research. Theories used are certainty theory, hierarchical theory of law and distributive justice theory. The results achieved. First, the meaning of the deadlock negotiation agreement to formulate a co-operation agreement. Two, settlement of collective working agreement negotiations that did not meet the agreement, can be completed with three mechanisms. The fi rst is done through bipartite negotiations, through conciliation and mediation mechanisms.fi nally the dispute mechanism can be carried out in industrial relations courts.

Better in theory than in practise? Challenges when applying the luck egalitarian ethos in health care policy

Luck egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice, holds that inequalities which arise due to individuals’ imprudent choices must not, as a matter of justice, be neutralized. This article deals with the possible application of luck egalitarianism to the area of health care. It seeks to investigate whether the ethos of luck egalitarianism can be operationalized to the point of informing health care policy without straying from its own ideals. In the transition from theory to practise, luck egalitarianism encounters several difficulties. We argue that the charge of moral arbitrariness can, at least in part, be countered by our provided definition of “imprudent actions” in the health area. We discuss the choice for luck egalitarianism in health care between ex ante and ex post policy approaches, and show how both approaches are flawed by luck egalitarianism’s own standards. We also examine the problem of threshold setting when luck egalitarianism is set to practise in health care. We argue that wherever policy thresholds are set, luck egalitarianism in health care risks pampering the imprudent, abandoning the prudent or, at worst, both. Furthermore, we claim that moves to mitigate these risks in turn diminish the normative importance of the ethos of luck egalitarianism to policy. All in all, our conclusion is that luck egalitarianism cannot be consistently applied as a convincing and relevant normative principle in health care policy.

Taxing Parents: Welfarist Theories

The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) taxes parents inequitably. Couples with a sole earner are under-taxed compared to couples with dual earners or single parents. Previous scholarship has identified these inequities and then argued that this sole earner bias should be eliminated. These arguments, however, have often been incomplete. Simply establishing that an inequity exists does not create a full argument for legal reform. After all, the Code plays favorites all the time. Scholars have traditionally turned to theories of distributive justice when evaluating whether tax preferences are warranted. These theories offer competing visions about the way resources should be allocated. Rather than advocating blanket equality, these theories identify higher order principles that justify preferential-ism. But scholars who have asked Congress to eliminate the Code’s preference for sole earners have often failed to connect their arguments with this distributive literature. This Article, the first in a series, begins to connect traditional theories of distributive justice with the debate surrounding the Code’s inequitable taxation of parents. To do so, it focuses on welfarist theories — a body of distributive theories that seek to maximize social welfare — because of the dominant influence they have exerted over tax debates. It reaches the surprising conclusion that welfarism may, in many cases, support the Code’s sole earner bias. But the reasons for this prescription are revealing — sole earners have fewer costs and time constraints than single parents and dual earners and may, therefore, be better positioned to use their income to achieve well-being. Many will find it counter-intuitive to favor sole earners just because they have more choices than other parents. For them, the analysis may reveal the limitations of relying too heavily on welfarism to analyze the taxation of parents. This Article concludes with a call for sustained consideration of other non-welfarist theories that have been largely overlooked in the legal tax scholarship.

Luck, Nature and Institutions

AbstractIn addition to having an institutionalsiteorscope, a theory of distributive justice might also have an institutional‘reach’orcurrency. It has the first when it applies to only social (and not natural) phenomena. It has the second when it distributes only socially produced (and not naturally occurring) goods. One objection to luck egalitarianism is that it has absurd implications. In response, Tan has defended a luck egalitarian account that has a strictly institutional reach. I argue, first, that Tan’s view contains two fatal ambiguities and, second, that, to be sound, it requires an institutional currency. This second argument implies that virtually all extant luck egalitarian currencies are incompatible with his approach. I argue, third, that the alleged absurd implications often have little to do with the extent of luck egalitarianism’s reach.

LİBERALİZME KÜLTÜREL FARKINDALIK AÇISINDAN ELEŞTİREL BİR BAKIŞ

In this study, the question of what are the contributions of contemporary liberalism in terms of cultural awareness is investigated. The subject of the study is examined through John Rawls’s theory of distributive justice and Will Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism, who are the important names of contemporary liberalism. In the study, concept analysis method, one of the qualitative research methods, is used. In the article, it was concluded that Rawls created awareness in terms of disadvantaged individuals and Kymlicka created awareness in terms of the rights of minority groups.

Needs and cost-effectiveness in health care priority setting

How to balance the maximization of health and concerns for the worse off remains a challenge for health care decision makers when setting priorities. In regulatory guidelines these concerns are typically specified in terms of priority setting according to needs and priority setting according to cost-effectiveness. Still, it is often unclear when and why needs and cost-effectiveness diverge or overlap as guiding priority setting principles in practice. We conduct a comparative analysis of need and cost-effectiveness in the context of health care priority setting. Based on theories of distributive justice we specify three normative interpretations of need and explicate how these relate to the normative basis for cost-effectiveness analysis. Using priority-setting dilemmas we then move on to explicate when and why need and cost-effectiveness diverge as priority-setting principles. We find that: (i) although principles of need and cost-effectiveness may recommend the same allocation of resources the underlying reason for an allocation is different; (ii) while they both may give weight to patients who are worse off they do so in different ways and to different degree; and (iii) whereas cost-effectiveness clearly implies the aggregation of benefits across individuals principles of needs give no guidance with regard to if, and if so, how needs should be aggregated. Priority setting according to needs or cost-effectiveness does not necessarily recommend different allocations of resources. Thus, the normative conflict between them, often highlighted in practice, seems exaggerated. For health policy this is important knowledge because unclear conceptions may obstruct an informed public discussion. Moreover, if decision-makers are to properly account for both principles they need to recognize the inconsistencies as well as similarities between the two.

«Según lo require la justicia distributiva»: negociando imperio y órdenes locales en la Nueva España, siglos XVI y XVII

Las teorías de la justicia distributiva desempeñaron un papel importante en las negocia­ciones entre la corona española y los habitantes de las Indias. Mientras que los historiadores a menudo equiparan la noción de justicia distributiva con el derecho invariable de un vasal­lo a ser recompensado por su señor por los servicios prestados, los contemporáneos usaron estas teorías en maneras distintas para reflexionar sobre la distribución “justa” de oficios, privilegios y honores de una sociedad jerárquicamente ordenada. Este trabajo examina cómo las ideas sobre qué la justicia distributiva requiere cambiaron en el proceso de alinear las necesidades cambiantes de la corona a la de diferentes grupos en el virreinato de la Nueva España durante el siglo XVI y principios del XVII. En este artículo, argumento que estas teorías, por un lado, despertaron un interés común en el mapeo del virreinato y sus habitantes, así como en la creación de un archivo de personas beneméritas. Por otro lado, sostengo que el significado cambiante de la justicia distributiva hizo visible una paradoja que contribuiría a un cambio importante en el uso de este archivo en el proceso de negociación del imperio y las órdenes locales.

Where the Action Is: Macro and Micro Justice in Contract Law

AbstractIn contemporary private law theory the relationship between ‘macro’ theories of distributive justice and the ‘micro’ site of interpersonal transactions remains under‐explored. In this paper, I draw on the ‘macro’ theory of justice articulated by John Rawls and offer an account of ‘micro contractual justice’ that helps us understand how the micro domains of contracting introduce particular relational constraints on the infusion of distributive considerations into contract law, resulting in constrained conception of ‘relational Rawlsianism’ operating in contractual domains. My framework provides a bridge between the macro and micro, helping us understand how they are in various senses separate yet interlocking, and also provides a ‘third way’ between all or nothing positions on the place of distributive justice in contract.

Uncertainty > Risk: Lessons for Legal Thought from the Insurance Runoff Market

Insurance ideas inform legal thought: from tort law, to health law, to theories of distributive justice. Within legal thought, insurance is often conceived as an ideal type in which insurers distribute determinable risks through contracts that fix the parties’ obligations in advance. This ideal type has normative appeal, among other reasons because it explains how tort law might achieve in practice the objectives of tort theory. Significantly for tort theory, this ideal type supports a restrictive vision of liability-based regulation, on the grounds that uncertainty poses an existential threat to insurance markets. Prior work has criticized this restrictive vision on normative grounds. This article criticizes that vision on empirical grounds. The article describes an emerging secondary insurance market – the insurance runoff market – that transfers liabilities under insurance policies issued many years in the past. Having started with old asbestos and hazardous waste liabilities, the market now extends to other liabilities that have not worked out well for the companies that insured them, including workers compensation, savings-linked life insurance, pension and annuity guarantees, and long term care insurance. Runoff specialists reprice these legacy insurance liabilities with hindsight, consolidate them, and take calculated risks that encourage capital to enter the runoff market. That market transforms the uncertainties of the past into today’s tradeable risks, bringing into the open a dynamic that pervades insurance markets: namely, the promises that are made in all insurance policies get bundled and reconceptualized into sets of liabilities that are valued and revalued, further combined and redefined over time. Through the lens of the runoff market we can see many ways that insurance organizations manage uncertainty, revealing the resilience in insurance markets and the flexibility and innovation that produce that resilience. The runoff market counsels us to give much less weight to arguments that expanding liability will undermine insurance markets. Insurance already involves so much uncertainty, and insurers have so many ways to manage it, that the most likely result will always be that they will continue to muddle through.