Complete Information Static Game Research Articles

NETWORK STRUCTURE IN A LINK FORMATION GAME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In this article, we use an experiment to evaluate the performance of alternative refinements in a Myersonian link formation game with a supermodular payoff function. Our results show that a non‐cooperative refinement, the global games (GG) approach, outperforms alternative cooperative refinements (strong Nash equilibrium, coalition‐proof Nash equilibrium, and pairwise stable Nash equilibrium) in explaining the observed experimental behavior in the static game of complete information with three players. The results are robust to some comparative statics and the GG approach shows a high predictive power under incomplete information. However, under repeated interaction or with a greater number of players, the GG approach loses predictive power, but so do the cooperative refinements. The results illustrate the importance of coordination failure in practice and the need to design mechanisms to reduce this effect in practical decision‐making problems. (JEL C70, C92, D20, D44, D82)

Analysis on Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly Market Based on Static Game Theory

Equilibrium production, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly firms with 2 sub markets by complete information static game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets while discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.

The New Battle of the Sexes: A 2 X 2 Model of Female Alienation

We examine a simple game in which males and females have different preferences over sex and children, and gender-biased asymmetric strategies. We attempt to characterize the fundamental tradeoffs in a static game of complete information. We find that plausible differences in preferences can account for observed time-trends in the so-called happiness gender gap, following the introduction of a single technology which may prevent conception and yields no dis-utility to men. The model suggests that men may have benefitted more than women from the introduction of the Pill, and raises the question of whether alternative forms of family planning might better equalize the relative positions of men and women in sexual partnerships. These findings have particular relevance for feminist critiques of the sexual revolution.

Researches on Data Correctness and Completeness in Cloud Computing Based on Game Theory

Ensuring data correctness and data completeness in cloud computing, in addition to security technologies, many other factors need also be considered, such as the behaviors of participants of cloud computing. This paper discusses the data correctness and completeness in cloud computing based on the perspective of game theory. It built a complete information static game theory frame between a trusted data center and an un-trusted database service provider, and gave the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. It also proposed some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the data security in cloud computing.

Research of Railway Capacity Strengthening Scheme Decision Method Based on Game Theory

Firstly, established the optimization model based on complete information static game theory, which see evaluation index as the participants of a game, capacity strengthening strategies as the strategies of participants, and the strategies contained in the Nash equilibrium of the game as the first step optimization results. Then structure an algorithm to secondary selection, which makes there is only one strategy in the final result. At last given a case study combined with Baoshen railway capacity strengthening scheme decision. The result indicated that the model has good applicability, and can reduce the subjective error effectively.

Research on Design Index of Low-Carbon Highway Route Based on Game Theory

Highway route design indexes are the key factors which can determine the overall performance of highway. They affect not only the economy, safety, function of highway, but also affect the amount of CO2 emissions of highway. In order to find the most reasonable route design indexes, firstly, establish the function relationship between route design indexes and carbon emissions and cost-effectiveness of highway and social environment. Secondly, analyze action strategies of the highway construction main bodies and the social environment main bodies based on game theory. Thirdly, establish the complete information static game model, and solve to get the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in different circumstances. Establish a set of methods of evaluating highway route design indexes. Provide a scientific decision basis for highway construction departments.

Game Analysis of Internal Control and Risk Management

Based on examining links and differences between internal control and risk management from their definition,this paper mainly analyzes their relation with game theory. A complete information static game model isestablished and payoff functions for managers and investors are designed. The result shows that the decrease ofbusiness risk cannot be realized by severe penalties, instead, the frequency of internal control in risk monitoringmust be taken into consideration, and otherwise it will stimulate enterprise risk monitoring paradox. It is aneffective way for enterprises to reduce risk by lowering the cost of internal control in risk monitoring andimproving the ability of risk prevention.

Modeling a Married Couple’s Reciprocal Relationship

A model was developed and a static game of complete information was applied in an examination of a married couple’s reciprocal relationship. Each chose best strategies (i.e., optimal responses) to maximize payoffs (i.e., happiness). Theoretical analysis suggests that the couple’s happiness is endogenously and positively correlated and simultaneously determined. If the wife (or the husband) is not happy with the relationship, it is impossible for the husband (or the wife) to be happy with the relationship.

A Study on Feasibility of Upstream and Downstream Ecological Cooperation - An Example of Game Among Upstream and Downstream Villages

The feasibility of area ecological cooperation without government interaction, and the possibility of building up effective ecological cooperation mechanism are the main questions need to be studied for ecological construction and area harmonious development. This article used the game among upstream and downstream villages as an example, analyzed upstream and downstream village under static game of complete information, single stage game and repeated game model, and stated that the sanction among upstream and downstream ecological cooperation is very low without government interaction, however, this result can be remodeled at certain degree through changing the rules of the game and payoff matrix of both game side.

On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Two Person Discrete Games

We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. We show that, when Best Responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria.

On the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in two person discrete games

We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that, when best responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.

Game Analysis on Local Governments in Combined Management ANP of China

Abstract Based on the characteristics of agricultural non-point pollution(ANP), it is pointed out that local governments plays important roles of in ANP. Complete information static game model was used to analyze the input in the pollution. The conclusion was that when local governments with personal rationality came to Nash equilibrium, the total input was less than that with overall rationality in Pareto optimal state. In order to treat agricultural non-point pollution together and reach Pareto optimal state with overall rationality, the thesis analyzed the power, procession and security mechanism seriously.

Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

In analyses of sponsored search auctions for online advertising, it is customary to model the dynamic game of incomplete information by considering a static game of complete infor mation. This approach is used in Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz (2007) (EOS), Hal R. Varian (2007), and the subsequent literature. Modeling complex interactions in uncertain environments as games of complete information has a long history. For example, the Bertrand model of oligopolistic competition posits that companies know their competitors' costs based on their experience from prior interactions. The use of a static game of complete infor mation often offers important benefits. For one, it is tractable?avoiding complex multi period information sets in a dynamic game. Furthermore, a suitably chosen static game can capture important characteristics of the under lying dynamic game. When a game is repeated over an extended period, there is good reason to think participants will learn many characteris tics of their counterparts?supporting the use of a complete information model. Yet the use of a static game of complete information is also unsatisfying. There is no clear way to identify which (if any) equilibria of the static game of complete information are a relevant approximation of the equilibria of the dynamic game of incomplete information.

Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

In analyses of sponsored search auctions for online advertising, it is customary to model the dynamic game of incomplete information by considering a static game of complete infor mation. This approach is used in Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz (2007) (EOS), Hal R. Varian (2007), and the subsequent literature. Modeling complex interactions in uncertain environments as games of complete information has a long history. For example, the Bertrand model of oligopolistic competition posits that companies know their competitors' costs based on their experience from prior interactions. The use of a static game of complete infor mation often offers important benefits. For one, it is tractable?avoiding complex multi period information sets in a dynamic game. Furthermore, a suitably chosen static game can capture important characteristics of the under lying dynamic game. When a game is repeated over an extended period, there is good reason to think participants will learn many characteris tics of their counterparts?supporting the use of a complete information model. Yet the use of a static game of complete information is also unsatisfying. There is no clear way to identify which (if any) equilibria of the static game of complete information are a relevant approximation of the equilibria of the dynamic game of incomplete information.

Reply to “Comment on: A quantum approach to static games of complete information”

This is a reply to the paper by S.C.Benjamin, quant-ph/0008127.

A quantum approach to static games of complete information

We extend the concept of a classical two-person static game to the quantum domain, by giving an Hilbert structure to the space of classical strategies and studying the Battle of the Sexes game. We show that the introduction of entangled strategies leads to a unique solution of this game.

An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

The International Allocation of Economic Activity. Proceedings of a Nobel Symposium held at Stockholm.

This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.