The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance

Wang Ping

doi:10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

Abstract

With the aging problem aggravated gradually, the pension problem has aroused the concern of many scholars and it become a very unique social problem in china. In the future development, the way to solve the aging problem will be largely through the way of pension insurance. Based on the large difference in China region, this paper chooses the rural areas with more serious aging problems, and uses the game theory to establish the complete information static game to discuss the game relationship between the government and the individual in the rural endowment insurance. Finally, on the basis of certain assumptions, a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance is established, and this paper solve the Nash equilibrium (solution) and utility of the game model in the range of ZZ (the government's profit value when the government chooses to provide the strategy) and the GG (personal benefit value of the individual's choice of payment strategy). Finally, this paper discusses the assumptions and gives the prospect to the further development of the model.

Highlights

[6] The development of many developed countries in the world are faced with the problem of population aging, countries according to national conditions to take a different approach to deal with the problem respectively, and established the old-age insurance system is widely used
The collection of old-age insurance have a certain difference between the urban and rural areas, the pension insurance generally in accordance with the principle: "personal payment - based, government subsidies supplemented", but in practice the individual’s enthusiasm is not high, the government does not support in turn, and it will affect the enthusiasm of the farmers in turn, so the successful establishment of the endowment insurance system in the rural areas may still have a long way to go. [10,11] Based on the importance of the establishment of the old-age insurance system, coupled with the rural areas’ backward, the old people’s care is difficult to do more
The Nash equilibrium of the model is found as the prediction of the player's behavior. [13,14,15,16] This paper will build a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance

Summary

Introduction

According to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security statistics, the number of elderly people aged 60 years old and older has reached 222 million in 2015, accounting for 16.1% of the total population. [1,2,3] Optimistically speaking, the proportion of rural people aged 60 years old and older in China's rural and urban areas is 15.6% and 9.0% respectively, and 2050 will be 32.7% and 21.2%. [1,2,3] China's population aging into the accelerated development stage, pension has become a general need to maintain the life quality of the elderly and to relieve the care pressure of the elderly family members. [4] optimizing the establishment of our country's pension system has become one of the most important issues currently, and the pension will largely become a breakthrough in the issue. [5] In China, with the acceleration of urbanization, the outflow of rural labor force has become more and more serious, so the rural pension problem has become the most important cause of pension.[6] The development of many developed countries in the world are faced with the problem of population aging, countries according to national conditions to take a different approach to deal with the problem respectively, and established the old-age insurance system is widely used. China Rural Endowment Insurance everyone is a participant in the social and economic development, is the main responsibility of the community, the development of individuals need a good social environment and economic environment, social pension problem’s highlights will produce big influence for everyone undoubtedly. The collection of old-age insurance have a certain difference between the urban and rural areas, the pension insurance generally in accordance with the principle: "personal payment - based, government subsidies supplemented", but in practice the individual’s enthusiasm is not high, the government does not support in turn, and it will affect the enthusiasm of the farmers in turn, so the successful establishment of the endowment insurance system in the rural areas may still have a long way to go. To make a valuable leap in the old people’s care, we should only catch the pension which is an important breakthrough. [12] This paper will use the knowledge and method of game theory to construct a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance, and analyze the game problem of rural old-age insurance

Methods

Results

Conclusion