Problem Of Evil Research Articles

GOD’S OWN ETHICS: NORMS OF DIVINE AGENCY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL. By Mark C.Murphy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. x + 210. $70.00.

Religious Studies ReviewVolume 46, Issue 3 p. 392-392 Short Reviews of Recent Publications: Philosophy of Religion GOD’S OWN ETHICS: NORMS OF DIVINE AGENCY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL. By Murphy, Mark C.. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. x + 210. $70.00. First published: 11 November 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/rsr.14758Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume46, Issue3Special Issue: Religion and SexualitySeptember 2020Pages 392-392 RelatedInformation

Kant and Theodicy: A Search for an Answer to the Problem of Evil by George Huxford

Kant and Theodicy: A Search for an Answer to the Problem of Evil by George Huxford

A Discussion on the Religious Response to the Problem of Evil in Ghana Today

The existence of God is taken for granted by many believers. God is described as all good and all loving. The Bible tells believers that everything that God created was good and that God was so satisfied with the work of creation that God rested on the seventh day – cf. Gen. 1:31. This statement raises the question of the existence of Evil. Evil is a reality. The existence of Evil raises a lot of philosophical as well as theological questions such as: how can a benevolent God allow God’s people to suffer? Why should an omnipotent God allow Evil to exist?. This article discusses the problem of Evil. It takes a critical look at the different forms of Evil and the havoc that Evil causes. Finally, it examines how the believer in God can respond to the prevalence of Evil in Ghana today.

Intentionality, evil, God, and necessity

AbstractIn an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for the existence of created minds, and this evil is outweighed by the good that is involved in the existence of created minds. The present article argues that this suggestion fails to solve the problem.

"Finding Ourselves After Darwin: Conversations on the Image of God, Original Sin, and the Problem of Evil" edited by Stanley P. Rosenberg et al.

Review of
 Stanley P. Rosenberg, Michael Burdett, Michael Lloyd and Benno van den Toren, eds., Finding Ourselves After Darwin: Conversations on the Image of God, Original Sin, and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2018), pp. vii + 375, ISBN 978-0801098246. £19.99

Evil Intuitions? The Problem of Evil, Experimental Philosophy, and the Need for Psychological Research

The primary aim of this article is to highlight, at least in short, how the resources of experimental philosophy could be fruitfully applied to the evidential problem of evil. To do this, we will consider two of the most influential and archetypal formulations of the problem: William L. Rowe’s article, “The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism” (1979), and Paul Draper’s article, “Pain and pleasure: an evidential problem for theists” (1989). We will consider the relevance of experimental philosophy to Rowe’s 1979 argument in §1 and to Draper’s 1989 argument in §2. But in addition to exploring how the resources of experimental philosophy might apply to the problem of evil, it is also worth exploring what broader empirical factors might contribute to people having the intuitions that they have—from someone’s affective state to someone’s need for closure. In §3, we want to very briefly elucidate a few areas where the psychology of philosophy might be productively explored in future empirical research.

The Problem of Evil in Sports: Applications and Arguments

ABSTRACT The problem of evil is very old in philosophy (if God is omnipotent and benevolent, why does he allow evil in the world?), but it has not been sufficiently discussed in the context of sports. This article discusses how athletes and fans in sports relate to it. In sports, there are moral evils, such as cheating, trash talking and unjust retaliation. Theists have traditionally appealed to free will as a way to respond to the challenge of moral evil, but this appeal is not without problems. In sports, there are also natural evils, such as injuries and the unfair distribution of natural talents. Theists also have traditional ways of responding to that, but again, it is not clear that these answers are fully satisfactory.

Sins of Thought

According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.

How Problematic is an Unpopulated Hell?

The Problem of Suffering (PoS) claims that there is tension between the existence of a perfect God and suffering. The Problem of Hell (PoH) is a version of PoS claiming that a perfect God would lack morally sufficient reasons to allow individuals to be damned to Hell eternally. A few traditional solutions have been developed to PoH, but each of them is problematic. As such, if there is a solution to PoH that is resilient to these problems, then it deserves our attention. In this paper, I develop such a solution. I call this the Unpopulated Hell View (UHV), which claims that Hell exists as a place where eternal damnation could take place, although it never does. First, I explain how UHV solves PoH. Next, I develop four objections against UHV and defend UHV against them. I argue that although some of these objections do more damage to UHV than others, UHV has satisfying responses to all of them. Ultimately I conclude that UHV merits consideration as a novel solution to PoH because it is less problematic than the traditional ones.

Meaning Agnosticism and Pragmatism

This paper proposes to reconsider agnosticism by taking a step onto a meta-level, investigating agnosticism not as an epistemic stance regarding the choice between theism and atheism, but as a stance toward the question concerning the cognitive meaningfulness and/or truth-aptness of religious discourse. It is argued that this “meta-level” meaning agnosticism may actually be an attractive articulation of a certain kind of religious attitude. While pragmatists like William James have claimed that (epistemic) agnosticism practically collapses into atheism, meaning agnosticism at the meta-level can in fact be a pragmatist position focusing on our human condition and its limits. Additional issues, such as the relations between agnosticism and the theodicism vs. antitheodicism debate regarding the problem of evil and suffering, are also briefly examined.

세월호 참사와 악의 문제 - 아렌트를 중심으로

아렌트는 그 누구보다 악의 문제와 직접 맞닥트린 흔치 않은 지성인이기에 만일 우리가 아렌트의 성찰을 진지하게 마주한다면, 그녀가 작업했던 악의 성찰이 세계의 이해를 시도하는 우리에게 모종의 유의미성을 전해줄 것임에 틀림없다. 연구자는 아렌트의 악에 대한 성찰이 오늘날에도 적실성이 있으며, 특히 아직도 끝나지 않은 ‘세월호 참사’에서의 악의 사태에 대한 비판적 혜안을 제공해줄 수 있다고 주장한다. 아렌트는 정치영역에서 종교나 윤리에서와 같은 절대적인 선악 개념의 실현 의도는 공적 영역을 파괴시키는 결과를 초래하는 것으로 보았는데, 악에 대한 성찰은 행위론 및 공적 영역에 관한 이론과 더불어 아렌트 정치철학에서 중요한 축을 형성한다고 말할 수 있겠다. 아렌트가 악을 피하는 최선의 유일한 방법이 정치라고 생각했다는 점에서, 그녀의 악의 이론에 대한 이해 없이 그녀의 정치철학을 이해한다는 것은 무리라 말해도 무방하다. 본 연구는 세 가지 문제를 중심으로 해서 논의가 전개된다. 첫째, 전통적인 방식으로 선과 악의 절대성을 무비판적으로 정치에 끌어들이는 것에 관한 아렌트의 경고가 함의하는 바가 논구된다. 둘째, 아렌트가 전체주의를 실제로 경험하고 나서 관심하게 된 근본적이고 절대적인 악에 대해 살펴볼 것이다. 끝으로, 아렌트는 전체주의의 잔재인 아이히만 재판을 참관하면서 악에 대한 입장을 더욱 정교하게 가다듬게 되는데, 소위 ‘악의 평범성’(the banality of evil) 개념이 그것이다. 이 논문은 우리 사회의 가장 큰 트라우마, 세월호 참사의 악의 문제를 악에 대한 아렌트의 논의들을 통해 성찰한다.

Easter through Evil: God’s pleasing purposes in the path to glory

The perennial debate regarding the problem of evil has been dominated by philosophers in contemporary theology. And in that arena of discussion, approaches to the problem of evil tend to remove it from its theological context, also overlooking how Scripture addresses the problem. To the world, it seems as if God has failed. Death and evil are still all around us. And therefore, for many, Hume’s dilemma still stands. The aim of this essay is to provide a theological road map that traces out a path to glory, showing that God works in and through evil. My hope is that it will lead the believer, in good conscience, to affirm that while evil exists in the world, when Scripture says God ‘does whatever he pleases’ (Ps. 135:6), evil is included in his pleasing purposes in a manner that does not conflict or contradict with his power, goodness, and love.

The “Whence” of Evil and How the Demiurge Can Alleviate Our Suffering

Mid-twentieth century witnessed a renewal of the interest in the problem of evil, presented by Mackie et al. in the form of the logical argument from evil. However, this argument was proven ineffective in securing victory over theism. A more successful strategy was devised by Rowe and Draper—the so-called evidential argument from evil. I believe that the current responses to it fail to defend God. In this paper, I try to face the evidential argument by embracing a triple strategy, which involves an alternative theology. First, a shift of focus regarding suffering from the prevalent anthropocentrism to the perspective of soteriological teleology is proposed. Second, I present a theodicy in line with Plato’s approach in the Timaeus, as well as with some aspects of the theodicy in the Vedānta-sūtra II.1.32–36. Third, I argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to the problem of evil, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation. If it is to provide a successful defense of theism against the problem of evil, that price should not be considered too dear.

Theodizee und Atheismus: Norbert Hoersters Argumentation gegen die Existenz Gottes

Starting from the problem of evil, Norbert Hoerster argues for an atheistic position. He discusses several historical and current attempts to reconcile the existing evils with the existence of God and comes to the negative conclusion that all of these attempts fail. From this, he concludes that the existing evils speak against the existence of God. In this article I argue that Hoerster's arguments are not sufficient for an atheistic conclusion. Rather, they only strengthen the case for agnosticism, the position according to which we cannot know whether God exists. I want to work out that Hoerster does not recognize this because he does not clearly distinguish the position of agnosticism from the position of atheism, and thereby gives away important potential for differentiation.

Evilism and the a priori

AbstractIn this article, I respond to Stephen Law's evil god challenge (EGC) to traditional theism. I argue that while there are credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, there are no credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-evil. Because of this, theists have a reason for explaining away the a posteriori evidence against theism. The hypothetical evilist, on the other hand, does not. Thus, while the problem of the good makes it absurd to believe in evilism, the problem of evil does not make it absurd to believe in theism.

On Quentin Meillassoux and the Problem of Evil

AbstractThe problem of evil and the injustice it brings out has a long history in western philosophy and it has been one of the core arguments against the existence of God as an all-powerful and all-good Being. In a number of texts Meillassoux agrees with this line of argument, but he also argues that atheism fails to take into account the injustice of evil. His central thesis is that while the existence of evil discounts the existence of the ‘revealed’ God, he proposes a messianic vision where we can hope for the arrival of a God who will have the power to rectify the injustices that have been committed. To justify the possible arrival of such a being Meillassoux describes the world as a contingent place such that things happen without a necessary reason. This explains why, in the past, novel and inexplicable situations (‘advents’) have arisen and, possibly, others might arise. One such possibility is the arrival of a God who will redeem all the injustices suffered within the world.

Getting off the Omnibus: Rejecting Free Will and Soul-Making Responses to the Problem of Evil

AbstractThe nature of suffering and the problem of evil have been perennial issues for many of the world’s religious traditions. Each in their own way has sought to address this problem, whether driven by the all too present reality of suffering or from philosophical and religious curiosities. The Christian tradition has offered numerous and diverse responses to the problem of evil. The free-will response to the problem of evil, with its roots in Augustine, has dominated the landscape in its attempt to justify evil and suffering as a result of the greater good of having free will. John Hick offers a ‘soul-making’ response to the problem of evil as an alternative to the free will response. Neither is effective in dealing with two key issues that underpin both responses – omnipotence and omniscience. In what follows I will contrast a process theological response to the problem of evil and suffering, and how it is better placed in dealing with both omnipotence and omniscience. By refashioning God as neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, process theodicy moves beyond the dead ends of both the free will and soul-making theodicy. Indeed, a process theodicy enables us to dismount the omnibus in search of a more holistic, and realistic, alternative to dealing with the problem of evil and suffering.

Schindler's List, Inglourious Basterds, and the Problem of Evil in American Cinema

The relationship between the cinema and history is distorted to sheer absurdity in Inglorious Basterds, a film that forces the viewer to look at these gross distortions of our familiar Holocaust and World War II genre. Within such a deformed space of Holocaust witnessing, the audience is implicated by the reflexivity of the cinematic apparatus in a climactic ending sequence: we look at Nazis looking at Nazis killing, and everybody laughs. The American audience laughs at the absurdity; the Nazis - Hitler and Goebbels among them - laugh at the screen of Nazi brutality; and Frederick Zoller (playing himself) laughs maniacally at the death of allied soldiers and his brutal efficiency. Within two cinemas, the cinema of the American audience, and the Parisian cinema house of Shoshanna, we all have a part to play in the entertainment of death. Inglorious Basterds is a celebration of the cinema, but it is also a disruption of the relationship between the screen and the Holocaust. A close analysis of the closing sequence in which Hitler is cut to pieces by a wave of bullets shows how our incitement to look at the Holocaust and Hitler is fulfilled by an incitement to violence. The Nazi pole of evil that is fixed so strongly in a landmark Hollywood Holocaust film like Schindler’s List is amplified to such an extreme in the Basterds that it casts the entire dynamic of identity/difference and good/evil into doubt. This analysis engages William Connolly’s Identity/Difference, a work of political theory that reveals a troubling tenor in postmodern politics and culture in which finding evil in the other is integral to identity formation. This paper will argue that Inglorious Basterds radically amplifies the good/evil dynamic in such a way that forces viewers into an agonistic reflection of their identity.

Зло и атеизм: онтологические и этические пред­посылки аргументов от зла

Одним из главных возражений против существования Бога является т.н. аргумент от зла. В наиболее общем виде этот аргумент утверждает, что если бы действитель­но существовал благой и всемогущий Бог, то Он бы обязательно предотвратил мно­жество зол, происходящих в мире. Однако поскольку этого не случается, то очевид­но, что благого и всемогущего Бога не существует. Данный аргумент имеет не толь­ко теоретические, но и практические аспекты. В частности, принимая решение в пользу атеизма, человек руководствуется определенными представлениями о зле и о том, что Бог был бы обязан сделать для его предотвращения. Цель данной ста­тьи – показать, каковы те понятия зла и «божественных обязательств», которые ле­жат в основе атеистической мотивации. При этом в качестве примера логического аргумента от зла рассматривается классический аргумент Джона Л. Мэки, а в каче­стве индуктивного аргумента от зла – аргумент, разработанный Уильямом Л. Роу. В настоящей статье показано, что несмотря на то, что с формальной точки зрения данные аргументы относятся к различным типам аргументов от зла, в их основе ле­жат сходные представления как о природе зла, так и об обязательствах Бога по от­ношению к своему творению. Также автор показывает, что атеистические аргумен­ты от зла предполагают, с одной стороны, квазидуалистическое представление о природе зла, согласно которому зло является абсолютной противоположностью блага, а с другой – подчиненность Бога этике благополучия, подразумевающей за­боту о благополучии всех рациональных и чувствующих существ в качестве без­условного долга.

The Epistemology of Theistic Philosophers’ Reactions to the Problem of Evil

I first argue that, contrary to many atheistic philosophers, there is good reason to think the typical theistic philosopher’s retaining of her theism when faced with the Problem of Evil (PoE) is comparatively epistemically upstanding even if both atheism is true and the typical theistic philosopher has no serious criticism of the atheist’s premises in the PoE argument. However, I then argue that, contrary to many theistic philosophers, even if theism is true, the typical theistic philosopher has no good non-theistic reasons for rejecting any of the atheist’s premises, and she has good non-theistic reasons in favor of the atheist’s premises. In that respect, it’s extremely difficult for the theistic philosopher to respond to the PoE in an informative, non-question-begging way. I close by considering whether theistic philosophers should reject my second thesis.