Abstract
Mid-twentieth century witnessed a renewal of the interest in the problem of evil, presented by Mackie et al. in the form of the logical argument from evil. However, this argument was proven ineffective in securing victory over theism. A more successful strategy was devised by Rowe and Draper—the so-called evidential argument from evil. I believe that the current responses to it fail to defend God. In this paper, I try to face the evidential argument by embracing a triple strategy, which involves an alternative theology. First, a shift of focus regarding suffering from the prevalent anthropocentrism to the perspective of soteriological teleology is proposed. Second, I present a theodicy in line with Plato’s approach in the Timaeus, as well as with some aspects of the theodicy in the Vedānta-sūtra II.1.32–36. Third, I argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to the problem of evil, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation. If it is to provide a successful defense of theism against the problem of evil, that price should not be considered too dear.
Highlights
The problem of evil (PoE) may seem to have acquired almost an aura of triviality, on account of the ease with which it is summoned whenever the theistic worldview comes under attack
A person directly afflicted by instances of horrendous evil will most probably take a different standpoint on any of the aspects of PoE, as compared with a person somehow spared from harsh experiences
I shall argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to PoE, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation
Summary
The problem of evil (PoE) may seem to have acquired almost an aura of triviality, on account of the ease with which it is summoned whenever the theistic worldview comes under attack. Faced with the force of the evidential argument from evil, a theist could decide to pursue one of the following options: to ignore it, taking PoE in general as a non-threatening challenge to the theistic belief; to cling to some of the already existing theodicies, or propose a novel one but along the same or similar lines; to embrace some form of alternative theology that allows for the modification or redefinition of some of God’s essential attributes, and which, enables its proponent to offer a purportedly satisfying answer to PoE; to give up on theism, considering that there is, after all, no way to conjure up good reasons for the presence of the obviously gratuitous, unjustifiable instances of evil in a universe allegedly created ex nihilo by an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity. I shall argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to PoE, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation
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