Intentionality, evil, God, and necessity

Amir Horowitz

doi:10.1017/s0034412519000477

Abstract

AbstractIn an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for the existence of created minds, and this evil is outweighed by the good that is involved in the existence of created minds. The present article argues that this suggestion fails to solve the problem.

Highlights

In an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce ( ) suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’
Pearce emphasizes that the logical problem of evil is concerned with the existence of any evil whatsoever, that is, with the inconsistency of the existence of God with there being even a minor evil, and he attempts to undermine this alleged inconsistency, that is, to show that God’s existence is consistent with there being some evil in the Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core
There are a few versions to the real problem of evil, and Pearce refers to that one of them which is concerned with the horrendous evil and suffering that fills the world

Summary

Introduction

In an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce ( ) suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. What Pearce argues is that the state of affairs in which intentionality exists necessarily involves some evil, and that this state of affairs is both self-consistent and consistent with the existence of (an omnipotent and perfectly good) God. It is consistent with the existence of God since it is necessary for some goods that outweigh this evil.

Results

Conclusion