Since the European elections in 2014, the number of parties elected to the European Parliament (EP) in Germany has more than doubled . The removal of the 5-percent threshold in electoral law gave seven small(est) parties with an increasing number of MEPs (2024: 12) continuously access to the EP . At the same time, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gained also access to the EP with a growing number of seats in the EP (2024: 15 seats); finally, the Sahra Wagenknecht Bündnis (BSW), founded a few months before the election, entered Parliament in 2024 with six MEPs . As a result, the six established parties (CDU, CSU, SPD, Grüne, FDP, Linke) together only account for around two thirds of the 96 MEPs (2019: 79 .2 percent) . In 2024, the gains in seats made by the minor parties, AfD and BSW were offset by losses for the Grünen (9), SPD (2) and Linke (2), primarily as a reaction to the policies of the so-called traffic light government in the numerous conflict situations with a partly domestic and European dimension . With regard to the social profile of MPs – and the prerequisites for a competent and responsible performance of the mandate –, there are hardly any differences in the overall high educational backgrounds among MPs . However, pre-parliamentary political and institutional experience – as elements for the professionalization of politics and parliamentary representation – can be found above all in the established parties as informal prerequisites for nomination for a parliamentary mandate . Otherwise, these informal recruitment requirements for a mandate are also gradually gaining ground in the AfD . Differences between established parties and those newly elected to the EP since 2014 can also be seen in the length of parliamentary membership of MEPs; this continuity of membership and experience of MEPs over several electoral terms, which is functionally necessary for a parliament, is almost exclusively borne by the established parties in the EP . Although the ‘renewal’ of MEPs required for functional reasons was in line with the long-term average of around one third in the 2024 EP elections, the ‘new’ parties accounted for a very high proportion (71 .4 percent) . The AfD in particular, with 12 new MEPs (80 percent), continued its renunciation of the development of (constructive) European parliamentary competences, in line with its anti-EU program .
Read full abstract