Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime Research Articles

Faults & failures

The nuclear weapons tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May have raised a host of complex, far-ranging issues: whether the world’s nuclear nonproliferation regime has been breached irreparably; why national intelligence organizations such as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency failed to predict the Indian tests; why world leaders so signally failed to anticipate their occurrence, despite clear warnings from India’s leaders; whether something can now be done to forestall an incipient nuclear arms race on the subcontinent; and so on.

The Nuclear non-proliferation regime: prospects for the 21st century

Acknowledgements - Notes on the Contributors - The Renewed NPT: Old Wine in New Bottles? R.G.C.Thomas - PART 1: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES - Nuclear Proliferation following the NPT Extension G.Rathjens - A Treaty Reborn? The NPT After Extension J.F.Pilat &C.W.Nakhleh - The NPT and Power Transitions in the International System T.V.Paul - The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nonproliferation Regime B.A.Thayer - Chemical, Biological, and Missile Proliferation K.C.Bailey - The NPT: Coping with the Best and Worst Cases Z.S.Davis - PART 2: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES - Proliferation and Non-Proliferation in Ukraine: Implications for European and US Security S.Blank - Japan's Nuclear Policy: Reflections on the Immediate Past, Prognosis for the 21st Century Ambassador R.Imai - Nuclear Imbalance of Terror: The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Program B.Cumings - Is the Nuclear Option an Option for South Korea? T.W.Park - South Asia's Nuclear Revolution: Has it Occurred Yet? P.R.Lavoy - The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programs: A Race to Oblivion? S.Ganguly - Should India Sign the NPT/CTBT? R.G.C.Thomas - Iran's Nuclear Quest: Motivations and Consequences H.Vaziri - PART 3: RETROSPECT - The Realities of Nuclear War: Memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki J.N.Yamazaki - Index

核不拡散輸出管理体制の強化と将来の課題

The Iraqi attempt to develop nuclear weapons which was detected in 1991 made the world recognize the need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the field of export control, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had implemented export controls on nuclear materials and equipments since 1977. In addition to this, the group introduced, in 1992, the control of nuclear-related ‘dual-use’ items such as machine tools and carbon fiber, which are usually used for non-nuclear products but can possibly be used for nuclear activities.Also, the control guidelines of nuclear export, which had already been under control (such as the transfer of nuclear materials), were made stronger by introducing the full-scope safeguards by IAEA as a condition of the transfer.The reinforcement of the nuclear export control regime should be appreciated from the viewpoint of preventing nuclear proliferation. However, this implies an increased flexibility of the regime entailing difficulties of export control and a need of harmonization among participating countries. Some directions, such as introducing more rigorous rules, promoting information exchange and enhancing transparency, are suggested to improve the regime.

Is the Future like the Past? Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Is the Future like the Past? Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

This article examines the feasibility of using role theory as a tool for predicting compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime specifically and foreign policy generally. Following the work of K.J. Holsti, we correlated Belarussian and Ukrainian leaders' articulations of national role with their countries' subsequent behavior. We found that the use of national role conception as both an independent and mediating variable explains more cases ofcompliance and noncompliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime than prevailing theories of proliferation.

The future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime

The future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime

The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The purpose of this article is to develop a theory, rooted in social psychology, that explains the nuclear nonproliferation regime. I posit that the regime evolved to serve the interests of a group of established liberal democracies that self-consciously identify their security interests collectively on the basis of shared core values and a history of cooperation. The United States acts as principal guardian of the regime. This role stems from its role as the principal defender of liberal democracy during the Cold War. The self-identification of the liberal group of states biases their perception of and reaction to threats to the regime in their own favor. I support this claim by comparing responses to violations and perceived violations of the regime by members and nonmembers of the group. Findings indicate a strong bias in favor of the liberal group.

The Prospects of a Settlement in Korea and Russia's Approach: Beyond the US-North Korea Nuclear Accord

S 305 The Prospects of a Settlement in Korea and Russia’s Approach: Beyond the US-North Korea Nuclear Accord Amangueldy lrguebaev The October 21 accord between the United States and the DPRK can only strengthen the effectiveness of the world-wide nuclear nonproliferation regime. Now the international community can really hope for a lasting peace, stability and security on the Korean peninsula. It is also a significant development in various external factors of the settlement in Korea, which continue to exert influence on this region. The Geneva talks have confirmed the emergence of the following interrelated tendencies: (a) internationalization of the Korean problem with parallel and synchronized improvements on various directions of its settlement; (b) approaching transition of the status in the Korean peninsula into “a genuine coexistence of two Korean sides” which could prolong the state of division; (c) transition of the center of gravity in the powers’ competition in Korea from the military-political sphere to the economic sphere. An important and evident result of the Geneva accord, in the case of its smooth implementation, could be the considerable growth of the DPRK’s image and its entrance into the international community. There are two factors of Korean settlement, external and internal, and it will be desirable to see a parallel maturing and development of both. But the realities of the Korean peninsula, particularly the deepened intra-Korean confrontation, are now hindering a desirable simultaneous movement. That is why a maturation of external factors should first occur, and the Geneva agreement can well contribute; productive intraKorean dialogue and improvement of relations between South and North probably can be expected. This process requires time and there is a need for “preparatory measures” for building a base for “democratization” of intra-Korean relations. 306 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula is based on consideration of Russia’s national security and interests. A stable and peaceful climate on the Korean peninsula, productive intra-Korean dialogue, development of partnership relations with the ROK and neighborly relations with the DPRK-all these meet Russia’s interests. The main point of Russia’s stand on the nuclear issue is to defend the international system of nuclear nonproliferation. The second is to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The third is to solve the nuclear issue by peaceful means through negotiations. That is why Russia welcomed in principle the Geneva agreement. Russia’s stand on participation in KEDO is based on the two points. First, Moscow gives a priority to nuclear nonproliferation and strengthening the NPT system. That is why Russia considers it out of the question to blow up the Geneva package on banning North Korea’s nuclear program over a dispute on a reactor model. In other words, the implementation of the Geneva accord itself must not become a hostage of such disagreements. Second, guided by the first point, Moscow does not press for replacing the South Korean type of reactor Russian reactor; there are other types, for example, in the United States and Germany. But Russia has to bear in mind its own potential of production of reliable reactors in Russia, as well as its experience of cooperation with the DPRK in the sphere of peaceful use of atomic energy. Thus Russia has declared its readiness to supply the Russian model if the international consortium takes such decision. Thus Russia stands for a combined approach to all aspects of this issue, to gain the main purpose: supplying light-water reactors to the North in order not to force this issue back to its initial starting line. Russia still considers valid its proposal to convene a “multilateral conference on security and nuclear-weapon free status of the Korean peninsula.” Recent positive developments towards a settlement in Korea do not diminish the value of this proposal; instead they underline the advisability of an international forum. The nuclear issue is only a part of the very complicated Korean problem. Any attempts to settle the problems of the Korean peninsula by force or to impose sanctions on North Korea would be absolutely counter-productive.

China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies: Boom or Bust for the NPT Regime?

The steady growth of its power makes China essential to the success of regional and global nonproliferation efforts. Yet China's nonproliferation policy is still an enigma that has evolved from outright opposition to the nuclear nonproliferation regime to partial membership. If this evolution continues, China could become a senior partner in the regime. It has not already become a full partner because it has continued to export nuclear and missile technology in contradiction to the nonns of the regime and to its own nonproliferation policy. Beijing cannot close the gap between its declarations of support for nonproliferation and its continued pattern of controversial exports without implementing export controls on sensitive technologies. This article examines the gap between China's declared nonproliferation policy and its failure to put an end to controversial exports. The gap, I argue, can be explained by examining China's nascent export control system and the way it differentiates among export commodities. Political and military officials regulate exports within the limits of their authority, and in effect, two export control systems have evolved-one of civilian commodities and conventional arms and another for sensitive exports. As China embraces nonproliferation norms and agreements, the continued evolution of its nonproliferation policy depends on bridging the gap between these two systems.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Nuclear non-proliferation: The prospects for the non-proliferation regime after the Gulf War

Weapons of mass destruction provided a backdrop to the second Gulf War. They were invoked as one of the justifications for the war and affected its conduct. The war's aftermath revealed that Iraq, a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, had indeed been engaged in an ambitious clandestine programme to produce nuclear weapons. There are still disagreements about how close Iraq came to possessing a reliable nuclear device, but there is no doubt that this case has underlined the need for continued vigilance, and for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. This article assesses each of the basic components of a sound regime in the light of what has been learnt so far from the Iraqi experience. Reference is also made to the perceived new threats to international security which have emerged following the dissolution of the USSR.

Iraq and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Roles of Inspections and Treaties

In the aftermath of the GulfWar, revelations about Iraq's extensive program to develop nuclear weapons challenge the future of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Until inspections sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council began, Iraq's violations of its obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its related safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency went undetected. The ultimate impact of Iraq's behavior on the regime cannot yet be determined, but there is now an opportunity to improve safeguards and other aspects of the regime, including strengthening export controls and proliferation intelligence collection and sharing and the development of appropriate response capabilities.

Arms transfer limitations and Third World security

Preface. About the authors. Introduction. Part 1 Controversies: Third World arms control and world system conflicts Third World arms control in a hegemonistic world Third World arms control - a Third World responsibility Third World arms control, military technology and alternative security. Part 2 Supplier control: US policy on arms transfers to the Third World Soviet arms transfer restraint the conventional arms transfers talks - an experiment in mutual arms trade restraint problems and prospects of arms transfer limitations among second-tier suppliers - the cases of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany arms transfer limitations - the case of Sweden. Part 3 Recipient control: regional arms control in the South American context problems and prospects for arms control in South-East Asia Third World arms control - role of the non-aligned movement. Part 4 Integrating approaches: arms transfer control and proposals to link disarmament to development the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a model for conventional armament restraint. Assessment. Select bibliography. Index.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and The Soviet Union

An international regime may broadly consist of a ‘set of purposes, norms, rules and procedures’, which are intended to affect, channel, contain and shape patterns of behaviour. Such a “‘regime is cither a conscious creation’ of actors or at least is recognised and consciously used by them regardless of its manner of creation.”1 The nuclear non-proliferation regime which the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—USA, USSR and UK, had sought to establish ever since the 1960s fulfils most of the parameters of the international regime. The germs of the non-proliferation regime can be traced back to the policy of denial and secrecy adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the early phases of the development of nuclear energy and technology. The Western Suppliers’ Group (WSG), a precursor of the 1975 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), formed in 1954 at the initiative of the United States, was meant even at that time to control the sales of uranium to prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities. The WSG consisted of South Africa, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, Australia and the United States. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which was established in 1957 with the concurrence and explicit support of the Soviet Union, was on the one hand meant to provide the peaceful use of nuclear energy and on the other to create an international safeguards system to check and control the diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. Over the years the IAEA with all its safeguard measures has emerged as the key component and instrument of the international non-proliferation regime.

In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 249 reader (or merely to reinforce a previous degree ofexpertise) on the technologies involved in nuclear commerce, legal and otherwise. Although occasional repetitiveness leads one to feel that the book could have been condensed somewhat , it is nonetheless a highly worthwhile work that deals effectively with the complex and controversial issues involved in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations. By Caroline Thomas. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1987. 228 pp., $30.00/cloth, $14.95/paper. Reviewed by Angela Lykos, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Caroline Thomas intends In Search of Security to be a textbook designed to familiarize the student of international relations with the problems confronting developing countries. Given her assumption that economic independence precludes political security, she devotes much of her book to arguing that the present global economic system, as run by the industrialized nations, violates Third World states' sovereignty. In using this analytical framework of NorthSouth relations, Thomas presents a one-sided account of the Third World's plight in the international system. Thomas asserts that the international monetary system, as led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), deprives the developing nations of the right to form their own economic policies. Since the IMF's primary aim is the maintenance of the world capitalist system, it chooses to ignore the Third World's special needs. By pointing out that the IMF's stabilization programs impose austere conditions on nations seeking assistance, Thomas questions the IMF's premise that balance of payments equilibrium facilitates economic growth. Moreover, she contends that the IMF incorrectly assumes that a developing nation 's domestic policies are the main cause of balance of payments difficulties and that it disregards the fact that exogenous factors often play a crucial role. Although Thomas's interpretation is valid, she oversimplifies the Third World's dilemma by placing so much emphasis on the IMF's actions and by failing to elaborate on other external and internal causes. Thomas also criticizes the international trade system for being insensitive to Third World problems: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the IMF's counterpart, has established a trade structure inherently biased against the developing nations. Third World efforts to reform the existing trade regime, such as United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, have been disappointing , since the industrialized countries are primarily interested in preserving their economic power, not in distributive justice. She also maintains that world hunger is due not to a supply shortage but to an unfair distribution system among nations. Thomas, however, acknowledges that the problem ofland reform does exist at the domestic level. In the political arena, Thomas denounces the nuclear weapons NonProliferation Treaty as an effort by the nuclear powers to formalize inequalities 250 SAIS REVIEW in the international system. Since nuclear weapons are symbols of power, by preventing the Third World from acquiring them, the superpowers maintain their dominant position. Thomas disagrees with the notion that the developing nations do not possess the "common sense" to have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Nevertheless, the Third World is more volatile than the industrialized nations, and Thomas fails to consider what effect the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the developing nations would have on stability. Finally, Thomas uses Jamaica as a case study to illustrate how external factors, such as foreign governments, multinationals, the IMF, and the capitalist economic system limit a developing nation's policy options. What characterizes Thomas as a typical Third World proponent is her argument that the main cause of the Third World's economic and political dilemmas are the industrialized nations' actions. Although In Search of Security is not objective, it does provide a comprehensive view of one side of the North-South confrontation. Soviet-Latin American Relations in the 1980s. Edited by Augusto Varas. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 290 pp. $38.50/cloth. Reviewed by Susan Thornton, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Traditional Soviet-Latin American relations have been cautious and have not enjoyed a high priority in the USSR— which, for the most part, acknowledges U.S. hegemony in the region and seeking to avoid provoking further superpower tensions by challenging declarations of U.S. strategic...

Nuclear Non-Proliferation: An Agenda for the 1990s

Part I. Non-Proliferation in the Late 1980s John Simpson: 1. The legacy of the 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: the president's reflections Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker 2. The threshold countries and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime Jozef Goldblat and Peter Lomas Part II. The World in 1995 John Simpson: 3. The international system in the 1990s Ian Smart 4. Third World perspectives on security and nuclear non-proliferation: an Indian view Aswini K. Ray 5. Nuclear trade relations in the decade to 1995 William Walker 6. New technologies and the nuclear non-proliferation regime Dennis Fakley and Ronald Mason 7. Strategic arsenals, arms control and nuclear disarmament in the 1990s Steve Smith Part III. Options for Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime in the 1990s John Simpson: 8. Non-proliferation in 1995, or plus ca change Lewis A. Dunn 9. Smoothing the path to 1995: amending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and enhancing the regime Harald Muller 10. Enhancing internal restraints on nuclear proliferation Philip Gummett Part IV. Extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Beyond 1995: Issues and Propsects John Simpson: 11. The 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference: issues and prospects David Fischer 12. A world without the NPT? Joseph Pilat 13. Safeguards and technical constraints in the 1990s Charles N. van Doren 14. Nuclear non-proliferation in the 1990s: an agenda of issues and policy choices John Simpson Appendices Index.

The view from Japan

If an international nuclear nonproliferation regime is to be strengthened, nothing will be gained by holding back activities designed to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is advisable instead for advanced nuclear energy states to assist any country in the development of nuclear energy and while ensuring that such development is limited to peaceful uses. It should also be noted that if cooperation in the field of peaceful uses is not extended as promised by theNPT, in Article IV, theNPT-based nuclear nonproliferation regime will be in constant peril of collapse.

A Theory of Oligopoly

A Theory of Oligopoly