Abstract

The Iraqi attempt to develop nuclear weapons which was detected in 1991 made the world recognize the need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the field of export control, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had implemented export controls on nuclear materials and equipments since 1977. In addition to this, the group introduced, in 1992, the control of nuclear-related ‘dual-use’ items such as machine tools and carbon fiber, which are usually used for non-nuclear products but can possibly be used for nuclear activities.Also, the control guidelines of nuclear export, which had already been under control (such as the transfer of nuclear materials), were made stronger by introducing the full-scope safeguards by IAEA as a condition of the transfer.The reinforcement of the nuclear export control regime should be appreciated from the viewpoint of preventing nuclear proliferation. However, this implies an increased flexibility of the regime entailing difficulties of export control and a need of harmonization among participating countries. Some directions, such as introducing more rigorous rules, promoting information exchange and enhancing transparency, are suggested to improve the regime.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call