New strategies for the nuclear suppliers group (NSG)

Abstract

Membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has grown rapidly in the past decade. If continued, this rate of growth threatens to condemn the NSG to years of stalemate and stagnation as it includes states with significantly divergent interests. In contrast, cooperation between NSG members and nonmember states could increase substantially without threatening the workings of the NSG itself. The authors argue that keeping the NSG as an effective tool in the effort to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends on the ability to differentiate between three types of states: (1) states unwilling or unable to cooperate with NSG members on nonproliferation issues, including export controls; (2) states able and willing to cooperate with NSG members on such issues; and (3) states able and willing to coordinate their nonproliferation export control policies with NSG members. The authors argue that NSG members should work with the latter two types of states, but that different strategies are required for each. As illustrative examples, the authors consider the guidelines for such strategies and apply them to two important cases; the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.