DESPITE THE LONG SUCCESS OF THE 1968 TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime in preventing new nuclear weapons proliferation, some commentators believe it might collapse if a nuclear breakout by a revolutionary power (e.g., Iran) leads to a proliferation cascade in the Middle East or East Asia. (1) It is feared that such a proliferation cascade would exacerbate regional insecurities and might possibly lead to regional nuclear conflict. To prevent such collapse, these commentators call for intensified diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action to enforce the NPT's nonproliferation norm such as in the recently concluded (and still somewhat controversial) Iran nuclear deal. In contrast, many nuclear abolition advocates contend that the NPT regime is facing a legitimation crisis portending a different kind of regime collapse. (2) This collapse consists in the gradual and subversive capture of the NPT by its nuclear weapon states (NWS) parties, which has led to the strict and narrow enforcement of nonproliferation requirements while permitting the NWS to avoid their nuclear disarmament commitments. This capture not only reinforces the division between nuclear haves and have-nots, but it prevents an effective nuclear abolition and it undermines the view that nuclear global governance is truly characterized by the rule of international law. Under such conditions, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties are ensnared in a variety of political, security, and moral dilemmas, none of which are resolved by accommodating the capture of regime governance mechanisms by the NPT NWS. In this essay, I argue that NPT regime subversion of this latter kind is legally and morally intolerable and, accordingly, the NNWS should defect en masse from the NPT. In what follows, I briefly advance the case for NPT subversion and then make a more detailed defense of the regime defection argument. The Subversion of the NPT Generally, international regimes are subverted if there is gross noncompliance of states parties that undercuts an effective implementation of regime rules, or if the states parties' common interests as expressed in treaty documents are sublimated to those of a few powerful members. Undoubtedly, the powerful few will dispute any charge of regime subversion, especially if significant disagreement persists over the meaning of controversial treaty provisions or statements. Even so, such denials alone do not rule out the possibility of regime subversion and, accordingly, such a possibility deserves to be explored. Let us note first that, alongside the NPT's nonproliferation provisions, the Preamble and Article VI express a common interest in realizing nuclear abolition. (3) Indeed, both parts suggest that nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are not expected to happen simultaneously. Rather, nonproliferation policies arc confidence-building measures necessary for nuclear disarmament measures to succeed. (4) Second, recall that in the 1995 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)--the first one held after the Cold War's end-many NNWS demanded that the NWS reaffirm Article VI disarmament commitments in exchange for their vote to renew the NPT indefinitely. The NWS reaffirmed their commitments, but then in the next three years failed to act accordingly. In a 1998 response to this inaction, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) of NNWS published a manifesto expressing grave alann. Then, at the 2000 NPT RevCon, the NAC secured the commitment of the NWS to a list of 13 Steps detailed as essential preconditions of nuclear abolition. (5) Tragically, after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the George W. Bush administration abandoned the 13 Steps, reasserted the relevance of preventive nuclear strikes in counterterrorism operations, and began the push to modernize the US nuclear arsenal. By early 2008, one might have been forgiven for thinking that the NPT had been utterly subverted by the Bush administration. …
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Apr 2, 2024
Andrej Stefanović + 1
Open Access