NPT Review Conference Research Articles

The Unfulfilled Promise of the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The view that the 2015 NPT Review Conference failed because of American, British and Canadian obstructionism is misleading, and sometimes disingenuous.

Peaceful use agenda at the 2015 NPT review conference

Peaceful use agenda at the 2015 NPT review conference

The 2015 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Review or a Requiem?

THE YEAR 2015 WILL BE A MEMORABLE YEAR IN THE HISTORY OF THE TREATY on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It will be forty-five years since this unique treaty--with 189 states parties, the most widely subscribed to a multilateral disarmament treaty--entered into force and twenty years after its historic indefinite extension and reinforcement in 1995. For me, it will mark a thirty-year association with the NPT since I chaired the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Third NPT Review Conference in 1985 and Main Committee I of that Review Conference. Ten years later, I presided over the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Countless words have been written in exegesis of the final packages of the Three Decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, all of which will no doubt be regurgitated as we approach the 2015 NPT Review Conference. On 12 May 1995, in my closing statement as president of the historic NPT Review and Extension Conference that extended the treaty for an indefinite duration, I stated: permanence of the Treaty does not represent a permanence of unbalanced obligations, nor does it represent the permanence of nuclear apartheid between nuclear haves and have-nots. What it does represent is our collective dedication to the permanence of an international legal barrier against nuclear proliferation so that we can forge ahead in our tasks towards a nuclear weapon-free world. Since then, despite the emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons-armed states and the unprincipled concessions made through the US-India nuclear cooperation deal, the continued outlier status of Israel with its undeclared nuclear weapons possession, and the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and its outrageous nuclear weapons testing, the nuclear nonproliferation norm has held firm for the 184 non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT--especially after the 24 November 2013 interim agreement over Iran's nuclear program. Article VI--the disarmament article of the NPT--remains unimplemented despite the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Thirteen Steps agreed on at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the 2010 Review Conference's sixty-four-point Action Programme, together with the agreement on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) proposal and the conceptual breakthrough on recognizing the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, augured well for the strengthened review process. However, the report cards meticulously maintained by civil society on actual achievements, the return to Cold War mind-sets by the United States and Russia, and the negative record of all the nuclear weapons states have converted the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world into a mirage. Unless the Ninth NPT Review Conference reverses these ominous trends, it is doomed to fail and imperils the future of the NPT. Taking Stock Some stocktaking is relevant. In 1995, we had five nuclear weapons states and one was outside of the NPT. Today, we have nine nuclear weapons-armed states--four of them outside the NPT. One of them (India) is being given special privileges by the entire Nuclear Suppliers Group in violation of Article I of the treaty and paragraph 12 of Decision II in the 1995 package. Another (Pakistan) has received two power reactors from China, a nuclear weapons state within the NPT. In 1970, when the NPT entered into force, we had a total of 38,153 nuclear warheads. Today we have 16,300--just 21,853 fewer--with over 4,000 on deployed status and the promise by the two main nuclear weapons states to reduce their deployed arsenals by 30 percent to 1,550 each within seven years of the new START (the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) entering into force. Another NPT nuclear weapons state, the United Kingdom, is on the verge of renewing its Trident nuclear weapons program. …

Nonproliferation treaty talks end in acrimony

Issues of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament take a back seat to a Middle East regional nuclear-free zone.

Fractures are widening on nonproliferation treaty

Nonnuclear states’ patience with weapons states’ inaction on disarmament is wearing thin.Nonnuclear states’ patience with weapons states’ inaction on disarmament is wearing thin.

Towards the NPT Review Conference: Deceptive Ease of the Third PrepCom—No Harbinger of Miracle

Towards the NPT Review Conference: Deceptive Ease of the Third PrepCom—No Harbinger of Miracle

Africa and the 2015 NPT Review Conference

African states' attendance at and participation in the preparations for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has produced mixed results, with the continent acting as both agent and bystander in respect of certain issues. African agency is evident in, for example, its position as a member of groupings on Iran's nuclear weapons programme and the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Less agency is evident in states' individual actions. This underscores the importance of African states' preference for multilateralism. However, African agency is also less evident in African multilateral efforts at the NPT preparatory meetings. The impact of these developments on the 2015 NPT Review Conference is too soon to tell but may bode ill for African agency.

Humanitarian Campaign's challenge to nuclear-weapon states

As the next NPT review conference approaches, a new movement to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons is gathering strength. The next few months will provide a crucial test for the world's diplomats and the robustness of the basic bargain at the heart of the NPT.

Slowing nuclear weapon reductions and endless nuclear weapon modernizations: A challenge to the NPT

The nuclear-armed states have large residual nuclear arsenals, and post-Cold War reductions of nuclear weapons have slowed. Meanwhile, the nuclear nations have undertaken ambitious nuclear weapon modernization programs that threaten to prolong the nuclear era indefinitely. These trends present a challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty community, appearing to contradict the promises by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states to pursue a halt to the nuclear arms race and to seek nuclear disarmament. The NPT does not explicitly place limitations on modernizations, but the 2015 NPT Review Conference will have to address whether extending the nuclear arsenals in perpetuity is consistent with the obligations under NPT’s Article VI and the overall purpose of the treaty.

Explaining EU Performance in the NPT Review Conferences: Limited Ambitions but Pragmatic Positioning

In this article explanation for the EU’s negotiation performance in the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon) is offered. First examining how the EU has performed over the period 1995 to 2010, it conducts a systematic review of how EU performance has been shaped by a range of variables including the interests of its Member States, its own institutional capabilities, and the wider conditions of the international system. It argues that the major challenge for EU performance within the NPT has been its own negotiation positioning which, beset by limited ambitions, has confined the EU to always being a supporter of the NPT regime rather than a driver of it. Explanation for this can be seen not merely in the invariable challenge of trying to coordinate highly divergent energy and security Member State interests into a workable common position, the lack of EU competence in this field, but also by the difficult structural conditions within the negotiation environment. Taking these conditions into consideration it is suggested that the EU’s limited ambition within the NPT may also be the most pragmatic positioning it can take.

On the Road to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) highlighted two issues in particular—progress toward a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction–Free Zone and the Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—that may not only greatly affect the health and vitality of the NPT and the 2015 RevCon, but possibly also have implications for the international nonproliferation regime as a whole. Dr. William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interviewed Ambassador Cornel Feruta, chairman of the 2013 PrepCom, to discuss these and other issues related to the meeting and the future of the treaty and its review process.

Confronting the “Perpetual Menace to Human Security”

Nuclear weapon states historically have attached great secrecy to their nuclear weapon and fissile material production programs and stockpiles, despite warnings that this would fuel fears, handicap informed debate and decision making, and drive arms races. As evidenced by the “Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament” agreed upon at the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, however, the international community now sees greater transparency about nuclear weapon and fissile material stocks as necessary for enabling and monitoring progress toward nuclear disarmament. To support this effort, the International Panel on Fissile Materials has proposed a step-by-step program for weapon states to declare their inventories, production histories, and disposition of nuclear warheads and fissile materials, and to set up joint projects to develop methods for verifying these declarations. This openness initiative is described here, and could be adopted at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, laying a basis for negotiating verifiable deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and their eventual elimination.

Ireland and the 1975 NPT Review Conference: Norm-Building and the Role of Small States

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were among the first foreign policy issues through which Ireland established a role for itself at the UN. A number of ‘Irish Resolutions’ submitted to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) from 1958 to 1961 are internationally recognised for placing nuclear proliferation on the UN agenda and were used as a blueprint during the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereafter ‘NPT’ or ‘the treaty’) in the 1960s. Mohammed Shaker, as president of the 1985 NPT Review Conference and author of the most comprehensive history of the NPT’s negotiation to date, notes:

Ireland and the 1975 NPT Review Conference: Norm-Building and the Role of Small States

Ireland and the 1975 NPT Review Conference: Norm-Building and the Role of Small States

NGOs PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN THE NPT REGIME

The 2 nd NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in advance of the 2015 NPT Review Conference took place in Geneva from April 22 to May 3, 2013. What new developments did the 2013 PrepCom bring to the ...

The VIII NPT Review Conference: A Successful or Failure Event?

In August 1945, the United States dropped two nuclear bombs against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki initiating the so-called “nuclear era”. Some years later, the number of countries possessing this terrible weapon increased to five. Today, eight or nine countries are in possession of such destructive weapons. What has done by the international community to stop the proliferation of such deadly weapon? The international community began in the 1950s the consideration of specific measures with the purpose of impeding further the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, at appropriate time, to begin the destruction of all nuclear weapons in a defined period at multilateral level and under international supervision. After so many years of efforts in this direction, these two important objectives have not been still reached. This paper analyses each one of the main outcomes of the VIII NPT Review Conference and recommend specific actions to be implemented by all NPT State parties in order not only to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons but to destroy them.

The IAEA, the NPT and the VIII NPT Review Conference

Since the end of World War II the international community has been building, step by step and with many difficulties, the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime. The purpose of this regime is the prevention of the proliferation of this type of weaponry and to achieve, as one of their final goal, the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and the closure of all nuclear weapon production facilities or the conversion of these facilities for their exclusively use with peaceful purposes in the future. Despite all efforts made by the majority of the international community, the world still is far from achieving this important objective. This article offers to the international community a group of actions for the strengthening of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime and for the beginning of multilateral negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR CUTS IN VIEW OF NPT ARTICLE VI COMMITMENTS

The first Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference will be held in Vienna on April 30–May 11, 2012. The agenda includes progress made by nuclear-weapon states on imple...

Mirando o passado: autonomia e proteção nas Conferências de Exame do TNP (2000-2010)

O objetivo do artigo é examinar as posições de Estados nuclearmente e não-nuclearmente armados com relação à não-proliferação, ao desarmamento e aos usos pacíficos da energia nuclear nas três últimas Conferências de Exame do TNP. O argumento central é o de que os Estados nuclearmente armados almejavam desenvolver medidas mais rigorosas quanto à não-proliferação de armas nucleares e preservar sua autonomia em relação a outros Estados, fazendo concessões predominantemente marginais na área de desarmamento nuclear a fim de minimizar a oposição de Estados não-nuclearmente armados, especialmente em 2000 e 2010. Já os Estados não-nuclearmente armados desejavam evitar a adoção de medidas propostas pelos Estados nuclearmente armados que minassem o direito inalienável aos usos pacíficos da energia nuclear e ampliar os compromissos dos Estados nuclearmente armados com relação ao desarmamento nuclear.

Daniel H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was extended indefinitely in 1995, provides a comprehensive legal structure of rights and obligations designed to protect mankind from nuclear aggression and accidental extinction. Yet its implementation takes place in a political environment of uncertainties and controversies. The still existing universality gap,1 an apparent implementation gap (Iran), and the absence of effective measures towards general and complete nuclear disarmament � which are to be seen against the background of the global challenge that non-state actors are getting access to weapons of mass destruction � call for urgent and effective measures to increase implementation of the NPT and ensure compliance with its rules. Any of these measures at first requires an interpretation of the Treaty. Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not provide an article-by-article commentary to the NPT, a task that Daniel Joyner undertook in the first chapter of his previous book, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and that has meanwhile been supplemented by the Final Document of the most recent NPT Review Conference.2 The present book is rather a monograph on important principles and rules of the Treaty including its three pillars: peaceful use of nuclear energy (Preamble, paragraphs 4�7, and Articles IV�V); nuclear disarmament (Preamble, paragraphs 8�12, and Article VI); and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Preamble, paragraphs 1�3, and Articles I�III). The author convincingly claims the equal relevance of these pillars on the basis of the textual context and the negotiating history and he critically evaluates their perception by important states parties over time. His book is �thesis-driven�, in that it undertakes to reveal �distorted and unsustainable policy positions, particularly among Western, nuclear-weapon-possessing states�. It is the policy of these states to request non-nuclear-weapon states