NPT Review Conference Research Articles

United States Pursues Nonproliferation Agenda at NPT Review Conference, Agrees to 2012 Conference on Nuclear-Free Middle East

United States Pursues Nonproliferation Agenda at NPT Review Conference, Agrees to 2012 Conference on Nuclear-Free Middle East

Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference

A necessary political success, this year’s conference has far-reaching implications

China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World

A new wave of interest in the complete elimination of nuclear-weapons is washing over international security institutions. Although the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is as old as the nuclear...

Nuclear Disarmament and the 2010 NPT Review Conference

AbstractThe upcoming 2010 NPT RevCon, unlike its predecessor in 25, appears set to take place in an international climate characterised by a widespread hope that there will be practical movement toward nuclear disarmament. This hope has been expressed not only by long‐term arms control and disarmament advocates but also by such US ‘cold warriors’ as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Thus, this survey article will address two key questions: (1) why is progress on nuclear disarmament seen by many as vital for reinvigorating the international non‐proliferation regime? (2) What are the prospects for progress on nuclear disarmament at the 2010 NPT RevCon?

SAVING THE NPT

For more than forty years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has provided major security benefits to the international community; however, the treaty is suffering from internal and external pressures, and benign neglect on the part of its members is undermining its authority. To ensure the treaty's continued viability, it is time for member states to start showing the NPT the respect it deserves and to renew their commitments to its fundamental purposes. Achieving this requires remedial action in at least four areas of vulnerability: reinvigorating nuclear disarmament; strengthening nonproliferation; overcoming the NPT's institutional deficit; and fostering a rapprochement between NPT and non-NPT states that does not abandon the goal of treaty universalization. There is still time before the 2010 NPT Review Conference for concerted action to restore the NPT's vitality and for the United States to resume its leadership role on behalf of the treaty and its membership.

THE NPT

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.

DEBATING DISARMAMENT:

The author offers a close analysis of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the treaty's only article dealing with disarmament, focusing upon both its text and negotiating history, and assesses its applicability as a standard for judging treaty compliance. The author critiques comments on Article VI made by the International Court of Justice in a 1996 case as legally ill founded and conceptually incoherent as a compliance yardstick. The only interpretation of Article VI consistent with its text and history, the author argues, is that it—as it says—merely requires all states to pursue negotiations in good faith; specific disarmament steps are not required. Claims that the 2000 NPT Review Conference imposed new legal obligations for disarmament or altered the meaning of Article VI are found to be mistaken; although the conference could theoretically have adopted interpretive criteria for understanding the meaning of Article VI, it did not in fact do so. Applying his Article VI compliance standard to the case of U.S. compliance, and comparing modern circumstances with those during the Cold War, the author also describes what he says is an excellent U.S. record of Article VI compliance.

Vertical nuclear proliferation

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending £1 billion on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about £20 billion on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear counter-measures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

EXAMINING ISRAEL'S NPT EXCEPTIONALITY: 1998–2005

Israel's exceptional status as a nonsignatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been an increasingly salient issue, particularly during the intense debate over universality in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and again following the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998. This analysis argues that despite these events, Israel's diplomatic position has not weakened significantly in the past decade. The factors that have led to this outcome include changes in the political and strategic environment, including the Iraqi and Iranian NPT violations, and Israeli engagement in different fora such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations, and in bilateral strategic dialogues with key powers. This report examines whether Israel's exceptional status is likely to be maintained in the face of recent developments in Iran and the precedent set by the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.

The future of the NPT1

Despite the 2005 NPT Review Conference ending problematically, there remains no real alternative to that regime for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. Any replacement of the current regime would only compound existing problems and challenges. We cannot afford to live in a world where ‘more nuclear weapons are better’. To do so would be to avoid disarmament and create a divisive security environment. A better approach would be for the global community to strive for a true partnership in achieving non-proliferation goals.

The NPT review conference: 188 states in search of consensus

(2005). The NPT review conference: 188 states in search of consensus. The International Spectator: Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 19-31.

From Individual State Preferences to Collective Decisions: An Analytic Account of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

AbstractThis article provides a framework for the analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's five-year review conferences and of similar multilateral collective security policy-making fora from a truly global perspective. Factor and discriminant analytic models have made it possible to broaden the scope of inquiry beyond the interests, capabilities and preferences of the few rich and powerful states. Additionally, the use of participant observation, historical analysis and legal hermeneutics techniques provides a much needed qualitative perspective that complements and refines the interpretation of quantitative findings.

Transparency with accountability: Reporting by states party to the treaty on the non‐proliferation of nuclear weapons

This report is an overview of some of the discussions that took place at the Round Table on Reporting by States party to the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which met in Ottawa, June 19–20, 2003. Participants examined the response of States parties to the reporting requirement agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and considered how such reporting might be improved in the future. Among other topics of discussion, the Round Table examined the reporting experience at the 2002 and 2003 NPT Preparatory Committee meetings, considered the content of reporting by both nuclear‐weapon States and non‐nuclear‐weapon States, and discussed the use of the reports by States and NGOs.

The 2000 NPT review conference

(2000). The 2000 NPT review conference. The Nonproliferation Review: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 146-161.

Pulling back from the nuclear brink: reducing and countering nuclear threats

Part 1 Been there, accomplished that - lessons from experience: US nonproliferation policy - lessons learned from our experience with Iraq and North Korea, Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci detecting cheating on nonproliferation regimes - lessons from our Iraqi experience, Dr David A. Kay. Part 2 Victories for nonproliferation: the utility of nuclear weapons - tradeoffs and opportunity costs, Dr James E. Doyle and Col. Peter Engstrom can proliferation be stopped? a look at events and decisions in the mid-1990s, Leonard S. Spector factors in the decisions by Argentina and Brazil to accept the nonproliferation regime, Dr John R. Redick nuclear rollback - understanding South Africa's denuclearization decision, David Albright why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons - nonproliferation incentives and disincentives, Dr William C. Martel. Part 3 Proliferation battlegrounds: nuclear leakage from the post-Soviet states, Dr William C. Potter nuclear proliferation and nuclear reversal in South Asia, Dr Neil Joeck nuclear proliferation issues and prospects in the Middle East, Dr William L. Dowdy the logic of nuclear proliferation - a look at Persian Gulf states, Dr A.F Mullins Jr. Part 4 Progress toward nuclear arms control and disarmament: US nuclear disarmament and restrictions in the 1990s, Edward T. Fei and Adam M. Scheinman the 1995 NPT review conference - future implications, Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr Russian nuclear disarmament and restrictions in the 1990s, Dr Oleg A. Bukharin French nuclear disarmament and restrictions in the 1990s, Therese Delpech British nuclear disarmament and restrictions in the 1990s, Stephen J. Willmer Chinese proliferation bureaucracies, Lt-Col Kevin F. Donovan USAF. Part 5 Specialized NGOs and public assistance to nonproliferation: the role of NGOs in nuclear nonproliferation efforts, Ben Sanders a limited nuclear-weapons-free-zone for Northeast Asia? Dr John Endicott the DOE Co-operative Monitoring Center - achieving comparative security objectives through technical collaborations, Dr Arian L. Pregenzer. Part 6 Counterproliferation - confronting WMD opponents: US counterproliferation efforts - prevent, deter, defend, Dr William J. Perry Secretary of Defense 1994-97 weapons of mass destruction and national security in the post-Cold War world, General Charles A. Horner consequences of the spread of weapons of precise destruction, Dr David G. Blair military responses to proliferation threats, Dr Barry R Schneider.

The 1995 NPT review and extension conference: An overview

The 1995 NPT review and extension conference: An overview

95/05368 NPT Review Conference. An outcome that allows the nuclear industry to breathe again

95/05368 NPT Review Conference. An outcome that allows the nuclear industry to breathe again

Delegate perspectives on the 1995 NPT review and extension conference

Delegate perspectives on the 1995 NPT review and extension conference

The importance of being earnest: The NPT review and extension conference

The threat that nuclear power presents to the world has been offset by the fact that when it is properly constrained, it provides an important deterrent. This delicate equilibrium depends on many factors, not least on the control of the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states—which is where the nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty has been of paramount importance. Mitchell Reiss here outlines US preparations to help ensure the extension of the treaty in New York and possible obstacles in its path— namely, potential spoiler countries and the complexities, of voting’ procedures: Failure to extend the treaty has dangerous ramifications for us all.

1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE: AN APPRAISAL

1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE: AN APPRAISAL