Abstract
Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In “Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach” I have applied the “sociology of technology” in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the “Mexican amendments” from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.
Highlights
The current debate on nuclear disarmament is polarized
My question today is whether the combination of the new treaty, the TPNW, and the current modernization plans of the nuclear weapon states have created such a momentum, at least a momentum strong enough for the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)-states to walk out of the process unless unconditional, legally binding negative security assurances are guaranteed, at least for all these states with a double commitment to a nuclear-free status
The NWFZ-states in the five regions and Mongolia theoretically have the potential leverage as they form the majority of the states and have a double commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status
Summary
The current debate on nuclear disarmament is polarized. The nuclear states and their allies insist on security policies that rely on nuclear deterrence. Unconditional and legally-binding negative security guarantees is a tool to gradually limit (and with time reduce to zero) the geographic area available for nuclear deterrence policies. The “Mexican amendments” of 1968 provide some indication of what is possible and raises the question of possible counterstrategies by states in the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states).1 Would they have the political leverage to pressure the nuclear weapons states to approve unconditional and legally binding assurances, and if so how?. The ultimate question deals with the superpowers What would be their role in a world consisting increasingly of nuclear weapon-free zones with unconditional and legally binding security assurances?
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