State Justice Research Articles

Some problems of the relation between reliability and justification

The problem of generality appears when we take the reliability theory of justification in its simple form. This problem can be avoided if we require (as Goldman does) that besides actual reliable processes there must not be available other reliable processes which would lead us to reject, the present belief. For a process to be reliable it is necessary that it preserves the truth. If it would lead us to believe true propositions as well as false ones then it is not reliable. Reliability theory of justification is a theory of justified belief and not a theory o justified believer. This suffices to show that realibility is both a sufficient and necessary condition of justification.

Platão e a definição tradicional de conhecimento

In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates often contrasts opinion (doxa) with knowledge (episteme), as a fallible form of cognition against an infallible one. He seems to suggest that by attaching to a true opinion a ‘calculation of cause’ or some sort of account, we can convert it into knowledge. Many scholars and epistemologists have taken this suggestion as evidence that the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief traces back to Plato. In this paper, I claim that it is inaccurate to suppose that Plato foresaw the tripartite analysis of knowledge of the Contemporary Epistemology. Focusing on the theory of recollection and the distinction between true opinion and knowledge in the Meno, I intent to show that the two-world metaphysics implies the treatment of opinion and knowledge as cognitions which are essentially different and mutually irreducible. Also, since Socrates was mainly concerned with the notion of knowledge as knowing what (is) which requires an apprehension of essences or Forms, he did not pay particular attention to the knowing that. As a result, Socrates did not argue to establish the conditions of justification to be given propositionally in order for a belief becomes knowledge.

Opportunity beliefs and class differences in subjective status injustice during the Great Recession in Iceland

Sociologists theorize that opportunity beliefs shape whether individuals see their status in society as just or unjust – a topic that is broadly relevant to research linking social structure to emotions and behaviors. Two prominent theories, however, entail competing propositions. The dominant ideology thesis suggests that believing in opportunity barriers increases subjective status injustice, especially for lower class individuals. In contrast, relative deprivation theory implies that believing in restricted opportunities deters upward comparison among the lower classes, potentially reducing class differences in subjective status injustice. Relationships between class position, opportunity beliefs, and subjective status injustice were studied using survey data gathered during the Great Recession in Iceland. The findings indicate that beliefs in opportunity barriers are widespread, yet few see their social status as unjust. Moreover, only opportunity barriers stemming from political ties and gender increase subjective status injustice, especially so in the case of political ties among lower class individuals. It is likely that this latter sentiment was made particularly significant during the recession by an intense moral discourse condemning nepotism and cronyism. Because these two opportunity constraints are widely condemned in Iceland, we suggest that only opportunity barriers defined as social problems in a given society are salient enough to influence status justice evaluations.

Mix En Meng It Op: Emile YX?'s Alternative Race and Language Politics in South African Hip-Hop

Mix En Meng It Op: Emile YX?'s Alternative Race and Language Politics in South African Hip-Hop

The Service Conception: Just One Simple Question

It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least three conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condition’, the ‘independence condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’. The overarching rationale of these conditions is that they ensure that authority is only justified when it provides the best means for the subject to conform to the reasons for action that she actually has. However, it is difficult to clarify whether Raz implicitly presupposes a fourth necessary condition. This condition might be called a ‘reliable belief condition’, that is, that the putative subject must reliably believe that the putative authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception (or more precisely, its other three conditions). In sum, the purpose of this paper is to pose Joseph Raz one simple question: is it a necessary condition of your Service Conception, that the subject believes that the authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception? As a matter of interpretation, different parts of Raz’s work appear to lead in entirely opposite directions: some parts clearly support the reliable belief condition, others do not. Regardless of Raz’s ultimate answer, however, the question reveals a broader inconsistency. Only if the Service Conception does include the belief condition will it support Raz’s claim that authority is consistent with one’s rational ‘self-reliance’, that is, acting upon one’s own judgement (including, as to who has authority). Only if the Service Conception does not include the belief condition will it support Raz’s perfectionist account of government. It seems Raz must choose between one or other.

An Approach to the Problem of Authority

This paper examines the central problem of authority as illustrated through the lenses of philosophical anarchism. The justification of authority constitutes the paramount problem of political philosophy. The philosophical debate on political obligation, initiated by defenders of the state and anarchists, concerns the justification of a special bond between citizens and political institutions and lies at the centre of the discussion on authority. Philosophical anarchism’s criticism of political obligation creates great difficulties to state justification. Yet, this anarchist strand has been dismissed as a merely negative critique of political authority, with no alternative positive proposal of its own. In disagreement with this view, this paper aims at improving our idea of authority by revealing the value of the anarchist approach. For this I focus on the position of critical philosophical anarchism and on three theorists each of whom relates in a significant way to this position. I discuss Rousseau as a traditional theorist whose view is a basic inspiration for the anarchist approach to political institutions. Joseph Raz’s theory is analyzed as a view largely compatible with critical philosophical anarchism’s perspective on state authority. Finally, I discuss Simmons as a representative critical philosophical anarchist, from whose approach, however, I depart in my defense of critical philosophical anarchism. My conclusion is that critical philosophical anarchism sheds a new light on the important insights on authority offered by the above theorists and helps us adopt a new perspective on political institutions. In contrast with political anarchism, it does not propose to overthrow the state. Yet it justifies the former by establishing an everlasting criticism of authority. The absence of political obligation reaffirms the responsibility of citizenship. This entails a responsibility on our part, whether anarchists or not, to participate in evaluating continually authority’s decisions and practices, toward a better political world.

What the legislature did not say

The paper is about the uses of the argument from legislative counterfactual intention, in the field of legal interpretation and argumentation. After presenting the argument from intention in general, it distinguishes the varities of the argument from counterfactual legislative intention and discusses their justification conditions.

DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL FLOWS OF INSTANT GRANULATED DRINK PRODUCTION

The development of equipment for food processing enterprises caused by dissatisfaction with the reached level requires further improvement of methods for the development of the equipment-and-technology system, and also requires the analysis of all processes in a technological flow. Diagnostics of the corresponding technological system should become an indispensable condition of scientific justification of such developments. The article deals with quality evaluation of the integrity level of existing and adapted technological flows of instant granulated drink production. As a result of the research it has been established that the level of integrity of the existing production technology is low and constitutes Θ=-0.16. It has also been established that low stability of functioning of the line as a system considerably decreases in time because of instability of functioning of a subsystem of extraction (η=0.64) that is caused by instability of the process of extraction performed by a traditional method resulting in low quality of the produced drinks. To increase the stability of a subsystem of extraction the device for dispersing and extraction of plant raw materials has been developed. The use of the device makes it possible to intensify the process of extraction of fruit raw materials due to more effective impact on its cellular structure. As a result the output of extractives with preserved physiological value increases, and the need for preliminary crushing of the extracted raw materials passes. Thus, after performing repeated diagnostics of the modernized technological flow it has been established that stability of a subsystem of extraction has increased up to η=0.92 during the estimated interval of time. It has led to substantial increase of the level of integrity of a technological flow of instant granulated drink production up to Θ=0.21 followed by a shift of the level of integrity of a technological flow from the sphere of badly organized systems to the sphere of highly organized, complete systems.

Discourse, Justification, and Education: Jürgen Habermas on Moral Epistemology and Dialogical Conditions of Moral Justification and Rightness

AbstractIn this essay Walter Okshevsky addresses the question of whether a certain form of dialogically derived agreement can function as an epistemic (universal and necessary) criterion of moral judgment and ground of moral authority. Okshevsky examines arguments for and against in the literature of educational philosophy and develops Jürgen Habermas's affirmative answer as presented in his discourse theory of morality. Habermas's position is articulated as a moral epistemology (“strong dialogicality”) and is developed through his critique of the “monologism” of certain aspects of Immanuel Kant's moral theory. Okshevsky concludes with a consideration of some educational implications of Habermas's position.

Understanding the transformation of the Polish footwear industry through firm’s strategies, trade geography and spatial heritage

Abstract:The article investigates the current condition of the Polish footwear industry and its relationships with the European counterpart. Through the prism of context rooted in history, legal framework, post-socialist transformation, reorientation to export, European integration and other factors, it delivers a justification for the current state of the industry and firm strategies. The analysis encompasses main macroeconomic indicators of the industry and the sector, changes in the structure of production, external relations (primarily export) and basic data on employment. Conclusions from the analysis of data are backed by information acquired from in depth interviews conducted in 2013 and 2014 in two traditional footwear industry regions. This sector of industry was characterized by dynamic growth of production in the post war socialist period, decline following 1989, small scale inflow of foreign investment and reorientation of external relations.

A autoridade epistêmica do testemunho

Muito do que conhecemos deriva do relato de outras pessoas. Nem todo relato, entretanto, é apto para produzir crenças justificadas. O que se pretende neste paper é analisar as condições que devem ser satisfeitas para que um testemunho possa produzir crenças justificadas e, a partir daí, conhecimento. Assumindo uma posição não reducionista do testemunho, segue-se a contribuição de Robert Audi para concluir que o testemunho é fonte legítima de justificação e de conhecimento, argumentando que a confiança que se tem nos outros pode, em circunstâncias adequadas, satisfazer as condições para a justificação e para o conhecimento.

Two new objections to explanationism

After a period of inactivity, interest in explanationism as a thesis about the nature of epistemic justification has been renewed. Poston (Reason and explanation: a defense of explanatory coherentism, 2014) and McCain (Evidentialism and epistemic justification 2014; Erkenntnis 79:99–109, 2014) have both recently offered versions of explanationist evidentialism. In this paper, we pose two objections to explanationist evidentialism. First, explanationist evidentialism fails to state a sufficient condition for justification. Second, explanationist evidentialism implies a vicious regress.

Procedural Moral Enhancement

While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important – reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural approach; certain internal processes generally contribute to people’s moral reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness, empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn make people more morally reliable in a variety of contexts and has implications for recent debates over moral enhancement.

Paul’s Radicalisation of Law-obedience in Romans 2: The plight of someone under the Law

This article re-examines the tension between Paul’s focus on the doing of the Law in relation to justification in Romans 2, and righteousness by faith in Romans 3:21–35. Taking into account current approaches to Romans 2, Paul’s references to the doing of the Law are interpreted as forming part of the conditions for salvation and justification in the old era before Christ. The impossibility of doing the whole Law and the total depravity of all people constitute the plight of the old era under the Law. This plight is set in contrast with faith in Christ and anticipates the solution of faith in Christ, which marks the new condition for justification in the eschatologically new era in Christ.Keywords: Paul; Romans 2; New Perspective on Paul; justification; law

Reframing the Debate Around State Responses to Infertility: Considering the Harms of Subfertility and Involuntary Childlessness

Many countries are experiencing increasing levels of demand for access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Policies regarding who can access ART and with what (if any) support from a collective purse are highly contested, raising questions about what state responses are justified. Whilst much of this debate has focused on the status of infertility as a disease, we argue that this is something of a distraction, since disease framing does not provide the far-reaching, robust justification for state support that proponents of ART seem to suppose. Instead, we propose that debates about appropriate state responses should consider the various implications for health and broader well-being that may be associated with difficulties starting a family. We argue that the harms and disruption to valued life projects of subfertility-related suffering may provide a stronger basis for justifying state support in this context. Further, we suggest that, whilst ART may alleviate some of the harm resulting from subfertility, population-level considerations can indicate a broader range of interventions aimed at tackling different sources of subfertility-related harm, consistent with broader public health aims.

Molting of broiler breeders conditions for economic justification in continued production

The method of artifcial interruption of the production process by hens, broiler breeders, today known as the molting, it is often used in recent years as one of possible reasonable steps in making decisions on feasibility of continuing exploitation of broiler breeder safter the regular production process. The aim of this study was to test the economic proftability molting hens-broiler, during one exploitation period. It included the throat of hybrid heavy line COBB500. The animals in the house were exposed to the same microclimate conditions, with identical positions in relation to light, ventilation, water, food and fertilization system. The analysis of food consumption per produced egg can be notice that parents’ hens during the process of molting consume more food by 43% compared to the hens fed the normal cycle of production. Achieved income was 2.54% higher after billing code for molting chickens instead of the regular production cycle. Economic indicators egg production after molting demonstrate justifcation of these biological and technological operations, considering that the net income per hen housed is the same income in the normal production process.

Transformative Unfair Discrimination Jurisprudence: The Need for a Baseline Intensity of Review

ABSTRACTThe Constitutional Court holds that the prohibition of unfair discrimination is aimed at preventing and addressing patterns of group disadvantage. However, there is a striking inconsistency between this transformative aim and the court's decisions in a set of five controversial cases. In Hugo, Harksen, Jordan, Volks, and Union of Refugee Women, slender majorities found discrimination to be fair despite clear indications that it entrenched patterns of group disadvantage. Existing critiques of these judgments have focused on the court's failure to conduct a fully contextualised assessment of the impact of the discrimination. In doing so, commentators have generally overlooked an equally significant flaw in these decisions. In this article, I demonstrate that the majority judgments all adopted an indefensibly weak intensity of review in assessing the state's justifications for the discrimination, leading the court to uphold discrimination on flimsy grounds. The error was that the majority judgments did not satisfy the ‘baseline’ intensity of review, the non-negotiable threshold of review which, I argue, ought to be applied in all unfair discrimination cases. I demonstrate that this baseline has four central requirements which were flouted in these decisions: (a) the discriminator must present a justification for the discrimination; (b) the court must subject this justification to a proportionality analysis; (c) it must apply a full proportionality analysis, exploring the legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto senso of the discrimination; and (d) the court must place the evidential and argumentative burden squarely on the discriminator in assessing its justifications. These baseline requirements would have left the court with little option but to find the discrimination to be unfair in these five cases. In this light, I argue that consistent application of this baseline can help to make the court better at addressing patterns of group disadvantage in future decisions.

Insufficient Justification for Exclusion Prompts Compensatory Behavior

ABSTRACTThis experiment examined participants’ compensatory behavior toward an excluded stranger. Participants engaged in a four-person social introductions task and rank-ordered each other member of the group; the lowest ranked person was excluded from a subsequent game. Using a 2 × 2 design, participants were randomly assigned to a justification condition (insufficient vs. sufficient) and to an exclusion responsibility condition (responsible for exclusion vs. exclusion by random selection). Results revealed that after limited introductions (i.e., insufficient justification for one’s ranking decision), being responsible for the exclusion prompted compensatory behavior toward the excluded stranger. However, after extended introductions (i.e., sufficient justification of one’s ranking decision), participants did not compensate the excluded person. These results suggest that insufficient justification for exclusion may lead to compensatory behavior, when one is responsible for the exclusion.

Why isn't faith a work? An examination of Protestant answers

AbstractProtestant critique of the Catholic idea of inherent righteousness has, since the time of the Reformation, given rise to counter-questions about the status of faith in Protestant theology. Is faith a human condition for justification (that is, a human act or inherent property which is necessary for justification), and why should not faith in that case be counted as a kind of work? Many Protestant theologians, however, view it as very important to dissociate faith from works. This article examines a number of Protestant attempts to explain why faith is not a work. The examined explanations rely on a number of ideas, for example, that faith is not a work because faith is a gift of God, or because faith is non-voluntary, or because faith is not a condition of justification, or because faith does not merit justification, or because faith is union with Christ. The problem with many of these Protestant answers to the question of why faith is not a work is that they can equally well be used to explain why the supernatural virtue of love is not a work. The Reformers, however, strongly associated love with ‘works of the law’, and wanted to keep love out of the doctrine of justification. For Protestants who share this view of love, the present article poses a challenge. Is it possible to dissociate faith from works without at the same time dissociating love from works, thereby legitimising the Tridentine understanding of justification? The author concludes that this is indeed possible, but only if an important identity marker for much Protestant theology is given up, namely the purely forensic understanding of the doctrine of justification.

Taking up space on earth: Theorizing territorial rights, the justification of states and immigration from a global standpoint

AbstractThe author’s 2012 book On Global Justice gives pride of place to the idea that humanity collectively owns the earth. Independently, there has been a flourishing literature on the justification of rights to territory. Central to this discussion are a Kantian and a Lockean approach. This paper recapitulates the author’s approach to humanity’s collective ownership of the earth and argues that, properly understood, both of those approaches should integrate the global standpoint constituted thereby. However, the goal here is not to amend the Kantian and Lockean approaches to territory, but to refute them. To that end the paper also argues that both approaches endorse an unacceptably strong view of the justifiability of states and should therefore be rejected. The view in On Global Justice emerges vindicated, according to which territorial rights, the justification of states and immigration all need to be theorized together, and need to be theorized from a genuinely global standpoint.