Abstract
The problem of generality appears when we take the reliability theory of justification in its simple form. This problem can be avoided if we require (as Goldman does) that besides actual reliable processes there must not be available other reliable processes which would lead us to reject, the present belief. For a process to be reliable it is necessary that it preserves the truth. If it would lead us to believe true propositions as well as false ones then it is not reliable. Reliability theory of justification is a theory of justified belief and not a theory o justified believer. This suffices to show that realibility is both a sufficient and necessary condition of justification.
Highlights
The problem of generality appears w hen we take the reliability theory of justification in its sim ple form
Reliability theory of justification is a theory of justified belief and not a theory o justified believer
The simple version of the reliability theory of epistemic justification can be formulated in the following way: a belief is justified if and only if the process which leads to that belief is reliable
Summary
The problem of generality appears w hen we take the reliability theory of justification in its sim ple form. The simple version of the reliability theory of epistemic justification can be formulated in the following way: a belief is justified if and only if the process which leads to that belief is reliable. For each process token which resulted in a belief there is some relevant process type whose reliability determines the justifiability of the belies produced by that token.
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