Abstract
It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least three conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condition’, the ‘independence condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’. The overarching rationale of these conditions is that they ensure that authority is only justified when it provides the best means for the subject to conform to the reasons for action that she actually has. However, it is difficult to clarify whether Raz implicitly presupposes a fourth necessary condition. This condition might be called a ‘reliable belief condition’, that is, that the putative subject must reliably believe that the putative authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception (or more precisely, its other three conditions). In sum, the purpose of this paper is to pose Joseph Raz one simple question: is it a necessary condition of your Service Conception, that the subject believes that the authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception? As a matter of interpretation, different parts of Raz’s work appear to lead in entirely opposite directions: some parts clearly support the reliable belief condition, others do not. Regardless of Raz’s ultimate answer, however, the question reveals a broader inconsistency. Only if the Service Conception does include the belief condition will it support Raz’s claim that authority is consistent with one’s rational ‘self-reliance’, that is, acting upon one’s own judgement (including, as to who has authority). Only if the Service Conception does not include the belief condition will it support Raz’s perfectionist account of government. It seems Raz must choose between one or other.
Highlights
It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least three conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condition’, the ‘independence condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’
Our question is whether Raz presupposes a fourth necessary condition: that the putative subject must believe that the putative authority-agent satisfies the other three conditions
The latter involves merely belief about the whether following another would lead to best conformity with reason. If the latter is taken to be a necessary condition for authority, the conceptual gap virtually disappears. This is because the fulfilment of the reliable belief condition entails that the subject must believe that she has best reason to submit to the putative authorityagent
Summary
Let us first articulate the conception of authority that is the object of the Service Conception; followed by the account of legitimacy that is the substance of the theory. That the reasons that apply to the agent regardless of the authority-agent’s command are such that it is better to conform to them rather than to decide for oneself, without authority There are, very ‘marginal cases’ where the value of the autonomy, loyalty, sense of identification, and/or community achieved through such consent or respect is sufficient to just ‘tip the balance’ of a regime that would others just fall short of satisfying the Service Conception.16 In all these cases though, the most important point stands: just as in the Service Conception, authority is only legitimate where one best conforms to reason by following the commands of the authority-agent There are, very ‘marginal cases’ where the value of the autonomy, loyalty, sense of identification, and/or community achieved through such consent or respect is sufficient to just ‘tip the balance’ of a regime that would others just fall short of satisfying the Service Conception. In all these cases though, the most important point stands: just as in the Service Conception, authority is only legitimate where one best conforms to reason by following the commands of the authority-agent
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