Protection Doctrine Research Articles

Contemporary perspectives on the strategic role of information in internet of things-driven industrial services

PurposeThis paper aims to analyze the debate related to the strategic role of information in the industrial service business, that is, whether information is a resource that could and should be protected. The connection between manufacturers’ servitization and management strategy literature is used in the analysis.Design/methodology/approachA qualitative case study on five new entrants to the industrial service market.FindingsThe results of the study provide new insights on both the characteristics and boundary conditions of new entrants’ approaches to strategically benefitting from information resources. Instead of aiming to possess and control data, the case companies prefer the access to large data volumes over exclusive access, render the question of data ownership to be largely irrelevant and perceive that the strategic relevance of information lies in novel data combinations.Practical implicationsThe study provides a contemporary perspective on the prevailing information resource protection doctrine in the context of industrial services. Most importantly, the results challenge the hitherto unquestionable strategic relevance of customer relationships in Internet of Things (IoT)-driven service businesses. Furthermore, the results identify the need for flexible organizational structures that aim to leverage the complexity of the market environment.Originality/valueThrough providing a theoretically grounded and empirically backed contemporary perspective on the role of information in IoT-driven service businesses, the study expands the strategic understanding of industrial service providers.

Projeto de Lei n. 3734/2012 e Súmula 605 do STJ: o direito da criança e do adolescente esquecido

Após valiosas conquistas ao longo das últimas três décadas no tocante ao Direito da Criança e do Adolescente, especialmente com a consagração da Doutrina da Proteção Integral a partir do artigo 227 da Constituição Federal de 1988 e do Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente (Lei 8069/1990), observam-se os Poderes Legislativo e Judiciário em direção oposta, seja ao acelerar o trâmite do Projeto de Lei 3734/2012, contrário à Doutrina da Proteção Integral, seja pela necessidade de aprovação da Súmula 605, pelo Superior Tribunal de Justiça, o que denota o desrespeito pelas instâncias inferiores à referida doutrina, pois precisou elucidar dúvida ou divergência sobre a aplicabilidade de medida socioeducativa após a maioridade penal. O presente artigo procura analisar se tais medidas são prejudiciais ao desenvolvimento de adolescentes submetidos ao regime prisional, bem como se desrespeitam o Direito da Criança e do Adolescente.

Evaluation of Acoustic Parameters for Angulimala Sutta using Voiced to Unvoiced Ration and Vowel Distribution

Pirith is believed as a protective doctrine preached by the Load Buddha in Pali language. The aim of this study is to analyze acoustic properties of Pirith using computer-aided methods and identify special characteristics and patterns. In this study, two methods were used to identify special characteristics of Angulimala Sutta. First method calculates voiced to unvoiced ratio using zero crossing rate and energy content associated with the acoustic signal while second method recognizes vowel distribution using first and second formant frequencies. Results of the first method indicates approximately 96% of frames are voiced while the second method suggests approximately 72% of vowels concentrate in the square region of F1,0~1500 Hz and demonstrating when chanting the Angulimala sutta most of the time the tongue height is low positioned in back levels while lips shaped unrounded. KEYWORDS: Formant frequencies, Voiced to unvoiced ratio, Zero-Crossing rate, Vowel distribution

Equal Protection Exceptionalism

Equal protection doctrine addressed to immigrants' rights is thoroughly exceptional. It is an amalgam of super-deference, suspect class treatment, and even intermediate scrutiny, depending upon whether immigrants are present in the United States lawfully or not, and whether a state or federal classification is at issue. No other area of equal protection law modulates equal protection scrutiny in this way, producing unparalleled complexity and tension within the doctrine--and ultimately undermining equality. It is time to rethink the doctrine.

A história constitucional da infância no Brasil à luz do caso do menino Bernardino

O presente artigo discute a história constitucional da proteção à infância e à adolescência no Brasil. Como ponto de partida da análise teórica sobre o surgimento e a consolidação dos direitos e garantias fundamentais do público infanto-juvenil, será narrado o caso do menino Bernardino, que inspirou uma nova visão sobre a tutela dos menores desassistidos, tanto que é atribuída à repercussão desse caso a motivação política para, em 1927, a promulgação do primeiro Código de Menores do Brasil. Será adotada, assim, a metodologia da micro história, aliada à revisão bibliográfica, para relatar o caso em comento e o delineamento histórico dos diferentes diplomas jurídicos, constitucionais e infraconstitucionais, que trabalharam o tema da infância no Brasil, até a adoção da Doutrina da Proteção Integral por meio da Constituição da República de 1988.

American Equal Protection and Global Convergence

Commentators have noted that equal protection doctrine is in a state of transformation. The nature of that transformation, however, is poorly understood. This Article offers a clearer view of the change underway. This Article is the first to reveal and synthesize three major trajectories along which the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to move. First, the Court has begun to blur the line that it previously drew between facial discrimination and disparate impact. Second, the Court has begun to collapse its previously established tiered standards for reviewing discrimination. These two trajectories combine to produce a third trajectory of change: by blurring the distinction between facial discrimination and disparate impact, and by collapsing tiered review, the United States’ equal protection doctrine is converging with equality jurisprudence from peer jurisdictions abroad. After describing these changes, we argue that the collective wisdom of foreign jurisdictions should serve as persuasive authority encouraging the United States to continue along its current trajectories of doctrinal reform. We contend that foreign jurisdictions have served as laboratories of doctrinal innovation from which the United States could learn.

A Influência Midiática e do Setor Publicitário no Consumo Precoce: Um Olhar a Partir da Educação Ecológica para um Consumo Sustentável

O trabalho versa sobre os estímulos midiáticos e do setor publicitário no desenvolvimento de crianças e a adolescentes. Objetiva verificar se a exposição à publicidade do consumo influencia no comportamento dos infantes frente ao meio ambiente. Especificamente, descreve o meio ambiente como Direito Fundamental das presentes e futuras gerações sob a ótica da Doutrina da Proteção Integral, bem como a relação das mídias televisiva e online com o consumo precoce. Ainda, analisa o papel da educação ecológica na conscientização para um consumo sustentável. Para tanto, utiliza-se o método de abordagem dedutivo, método de procedimento monográfico e técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica.

Infâncias, adolescências e juventudes: direitos humanos, políticas públicas e movimentos sociais

O texto se destina a relacionar os parâmetros definidos pelos Direitos Humanos como critérios objetivos que limitam e, ao mesmo tempo, servem para a avaliação do regime democrático, isto é, à submissão de todos às regras que regulamentam o exercício, e, por assim dizer, determinam o respeito às liberdades públicas – aqui, reconhecidas especificamente à criança, ao adolescente e ao jovem. As liberdades públicas são tomadas como o conjunto dos interesses indisponíveis, dos direitos individuais e das garantias fundamentais pertinentes à infância, à adolescência e à juventude. A Doutrina da Proteção Integral consolidou as medidas que se destinam à promoção e à defesa das liberdades públicas que são especificamente destinadas à criança, ao adolescente e ao jovem. As políticas sociais públicas específicas são instrumentos político-ideológicos capazes de vincular os gestores públicos ao cumprimento das formulações e dotações orçamentárias democraticamente estabelecidas para a realização dos programas e projetos sociais em prol da infância, da adolescência e da juventude. A emancipação subjetiva da criança, do adolescente e do jovem, isto é, a melhoria da qualidade de vida individual e coletiva da população infanto-adolescente-juvenil, depende, assim, tanto da articulação da sociedade civil organizada quanto da mobilização da opinião pública, com o intuito de que os interesses coletivos, os direitos individuais e as garantias fundamentais desses novos cidadãos passem a ser culturalmente aceitos como valores sociais e da própria racionalidade pública.

Invisibilidade e (des)tratos nos atendimentos dos maus tratos na Proteção Integral: a necessidade de uma governança de dados e reorientação de fluxos

A partir dos postulados da doutrina da proteção integral estabelecida pela Constituição da República de 1988 e pelo Estatuto da Criança e Adolescente (Lei 8.069/90), pretende-se refletir sobre o conceito e a problemática dos reflexos cíveis e criminais dos maus tratos como espécie comum de violência intrafamiliar praticada contra crianças e adolescentes. Para além da análise do tema sob perspectiva crítica, objetiva-se analisar deficiências de fluxo na dinâmica de funcionamento das instituições responsáveis (Conselho Tutelar, órgãos de Segurança Pública, Defensoria Pública, Ministério Público e Poder Judiciário), bem como sugere-se melhor gestão e tecnologia da informação para prevenção e elaboração de políticas públicas efetivas e necessárias para o trato da questão em harmonia com o ordenamento jurídico atual.

What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said, Concurring Opinion

Professor Jack Balkin has convened a group of scholars to author their own opinions in What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said (forthcoming 2017). Ours concurs in the majority’s equal protection analysis and goes on to offer due process as a separate ground on which to recognize same-sex couples’ right to marry. Our due process reasoning departs not only from Professor Balkin’s majority opinion but also from Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Obergefell. And it answers common objections to substantive due process advanced by Chief Justice Roberts and others dissenting in Obergefell.We write on due process grounds because of our concern that existing equal protection doctrine approaches the question in Obergefell in ways that (1) privilege marriage as the framework for relationship recognition and (2) privilege spousal over parental aspects of the marriage relationship. Our due process analysis situates same-sex couples’ right to marry within a broader range of liberty decisions that protect rights to intimate and family relationships and that locate marriage along a continuum of protected relationships. We show that due process protects not only spousal but also parent-child relationships. Some claim due process secures negative liberty only. We show that due process precedents require government to recognize certain spousal and parental relationships; due process protects the individual’s decision to form and maintain relationships as well as to avoid them. And there are many who attack the liberties protected by the Court’s due process cases as “unenumerated” rights with no more legitimacy than the Court’s infamous decision in Lochner. We show that Americans have long invoked due process to protect substantive as well as procedural rights, and show how in modern due process cases, from Griswold and Roe to Casey and Lawrence, the Court has acted in the tradition of Carolene Products, intervening on behalf of those whose conduct the majority has punished and stigmatized. The Court’s liberty and equality cases reflect an evolving understanding of the citizenship status of those whose conduct was once thought reasonable to criminalize.We offer our liberty analysis of same-sex marriage claims to strengthen, rather than supplant, equal protection frameworks. In its current form, equal protection doctrine tends to focus narrowly on questions of classification, leading critics of marriage equality — on the Court and in this volume — to object that bans on same-sex marriage do not classify on the basis of sexual orientation. We show that discretion shapes judgments about classification in race, sex, and orientation cases, and demonstrate how marriage bans classify on the basis of orientation. Yet we ultimately conclude that classification is neither necessary nor sufficient for an equal protection violation. Cases like Brown and Windsor reason about equal protection in antisubordination terms, focusing on a law’s social meaning and impact. Our liberty analysis supports this approach to equal protection, as it illuminates the importance of the interest at stake and the harm its deprivation may cause.

Da retórica protetiva à pretensão punitiva: compreendendo decisões judiciais de medida socioeducativa de internação no recife

Trata-se de pesquisa sociojurídica com sessenta decisões judiciais de medida socioeducativa de internação a adolescentes proferidas nos anos de 2011 e 2012 nas Varas da Infância de Pernambuco, investigando sobre a presença de códigos ideológicos do julgador na argumentação judicial. A pesquisa é quantitativa e foi utilizada como metodologia a análise de conteúdo, a fim de encontrar as relações que existem entre subjetivismos do julgador e as decisões judiciais. O marco teórico da pesquisa é a Criminologia Crítica, segundo a qual o desvio são qualidades (etiquetas) atribuídas a determinados sujeitos através de processos de interação social. Verificou-se que as decisões estão vinculadas a estereótipos que trazem consequências à autoimagem do jovem processado que, a contrassenso do que enuncia a Doutrina da Proteção Integral, enseja um retorno ao menorismo, tornando o adolesceste um objeto marginalizado pelos atores judiciais.

Liberal Jurisprudence and the Literal Grammar of Marriage Equalit(y)(ies)

This article employs linguistic anthropological methods to examine the debate over whether equal protection doctrine requires legal recognition of same-sex couples’ marriages. It focuses on oral arguments at the Supreme Court of California in the seminal In re Marriage Cases (2008). I argue that the contested use of equal protection terminology simultaneously displays the cultural neutrality of liberal jurisprudence and harbors cultural ideologies about sexual orientation. During oral argument, this duality compressed into grammatical competition over a single shorthand term, equalit(y)(ies). Selecting the singular versus plural form reproduced counterbalanced arguments in favor of uniform equality through marriage or comparable equalities through domestic partnership status. But the ideologies hidden within the grammatical nuance also provided flexibility to overcome that inertia at particular moments.

Use Of Diplomatic Protection To Prosecute Perpetrators Of Xenophobic Attacks In South Africa.

Xenophobia in South Africa is expressed as negative attitudes towards foreigners, but also, it occurs in xenophobic practices such as discrimination, exploitation and violence. The attitude of hatred towards foreigners is especially held against people coming from other African countries. Being a nation of hope and “greener pasture” to foreigners from especially many African countries, such discriminatory attitudes and practices may lead to consequences of magnitude proportion if left unabated. Following a qualitative approach of enquiry, the aim of this paper is to consider whether the doctrine of diplomatic protection may be used to prosecute perpetrators of xenophobic attacks in South Africa; in light of developments under international law.

FOR THE SAKE OF PROTECTING RELIGION: Apostasy and its Judicial Impact on Muslim’s Marital Life in Indonesia

This paper discusses the rule of apostasy and its impact on the apostate’s legal status. It investigates how Indonesian Islamic family law administers the commit of apostasy and how it would determine the apostate’s legal status on his or her marriage and his or her right to custody of child in particular. Deploying socio-legal approach it observes how Muslim judges resolve familial cases related to apostasy at court and to what extent their legal decisions on these issues are shaped by the majority of religious authorities’ and their owm understanding of the Islamic doctrine of religious protection. It argues that while the Islamic state law has sought to move away from the classical religious rules in the administration of apostasy as to protect human rights, judges find it difficult to renounce the dogma that Muslims must protect their religion from any possible danger other groups of religion would create and that the religious protection is often in conflict with the realization of the right to religious freedom.

Preventive Arbitration: Towards Strengthening the African Union’s Mediation Capacity for Human Protection

The doctrine of human protection as articulated by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in the Cyril Foster Lecture in February 2011 addresses immediate threats to human security. International responses to such threats are often initiated in the context of peace support operations by the United Nations (UN). These pacific measures available under Article 33 of the UN Charter, in particular international mediation, are fairly well developed within the UN. The role of regional organisations, particularly the African Union (AU), can be enhanced if these tools, such as mediation, are equally developed. As proposed in this article, this will involve restructuring the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA) so as to bring mediation within the ambit of the latter, in line with the proposed Mediation Support Unit, and remove it from its current location under the APSA. Strengthening the AU's mediation capacity may also require developing additional pacific tools, such as arbitration. Arbitration capacities could then be integrated into a mediation mechanism for enhanced human protection. This article theorises the concept of 'preventive arbitration' as a means of strengthening the AU's pacific mechanisms for conflict prevention through peaceful means.

A] History [Of Discrimination] Only Goes So Far

The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, through decades of evolving jurisprudence, has become the source of several constitutional rights. As a result, it is often the topic of contentious discussions in the courts and academia. Distinct doctrine exists around the Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause, rendering each of these Clauses individual sources of different, specific rights or remedies. Narrowing in these Clauses, this Article identifies a glaring inconsistency, or irony, in equal protection doctrine — specifically the treatment of a history of discrimination first in its consideration when establishing a class and determining its suspectness, then later in determining whether a violation of equal protection has occurred.

They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum

In American law, Native nations (denominated in the Constitution and elsewhere as “tribes”) are sovereigns with a direct relationship with the federal government. Tribes’ governmental status situates them differently from other minority groups for many legal purposes, including equal protection analysis. Under current equal protection doctrine, classifications that further the federal government’s unique relationship with tribes and their members are not subject to heightened scrutiny. Yet this deferential approach has been subject to recent criticism and is currently being challenged in pending cases. Swept up in the larger drift toward colorblind or race-neutral understandings of the Constitution, courts and commentators question the distinction between tribes’ political and racial status, and urge courts to strike down child welfare and gaming laws that benefit tribes. Yet tribes (as collectives) must trace their heritage to peoples who preceded European/American settlement in order to establish the political relationship with the federal government. Tribes, in order to be recognized as such under the Constitution, therefore must, as an initial definitional matter, consist of people tied together by something akin to lineage. Descent and ancestry (often conflated with the socio-legal category of “race,”) are the difference between legitimate federal recognition of tribal status and unauthorized and unconstitutional acts by Congress. Congress, in other words, cannot establish a government-to-government relationship with just any group of people. Tribes are treated differently from other groups due to their ties to the indigenous peoples of North America, and federal courts should not use that constitutional distinction against tribes in a misguided effort to eradicate all traces of things currently sounding in “race.”The argument advanced here might be seen as a form of American Indian law exceptionalism. Yet it is consistent with racial formation theory’s project of understanding race as a construction that serves, creates, and perpetuates legalized subordination, and that also shapes daily social conceptions and interactions. Racial formation theory calls for multiple accounts of racialization depending on the social and economic purposes served by each groups’ subordination. On the remedial side, racial formation theory therefore necessarily anticipates what we might think of as multiple exceptionalisms. Reversing policies that aimed to eliminate Native people from the continent, and the racialized understanding of Indians that drove them, requires maintaining the political status of tribes as separate sovereigns, not destroying it in the name of an ahistorical conception of “race” neutrality.

Privilege and Punishment: A Failure of Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause is a powerful and flexible tool for enforcing equality. Nevertheless, equal protection doctrine has been unable to restrain a particularly pernicious cause of inequality known as special legislation, which is legislation that singles out an individual or small, identifiable group for benefits or burdens that do not apply to anyone else. Through special legislation, state legislatures and Congress transfer public wealth to named individuals, exempt them from the generally applicable laws, and define the elements of torts and crimes to reach specific targets. This Article considers whether the Equal Protection Clause, which is the Constitution’s most explicit restraint on unequal treatment by government actors, is capable of restraining special legislation. Although special legislation creates significant inequalities, limitations on the scope of the Equal Protection Clause make it inadequate, standing alone, to curtail special legislation. Nevertheless, this Article’s analysis of the Equal Protection Clause reveals the clause’s surprising connection to a number of other clauses of the Constitution; together, these clauses suggest a principle that can restrain special legislation effectively and coherently. This principle – a value of legislative generality – is deeply rooted in the Constitution’s text, history, and jurisprudential underpinnings.This Article is an integral part of a larger project of describing and defining the contours of the Constitution’s value of legislative generality. After describing why the Equal Protection Clause, on its own, fails to restrain special legislation, this Article concludes by demonstrating how the Clause plays a vital role in contributing to an independent and coherent principle of legislative generality.

Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor

Which classes are considered suspect under equal protection doctrine? The answer determines whether courts will defer to legislatures and other government actors when they single out a group for special burdens, or intervene to protect that group from such treatment. Laws burdening suspect classes receive the strictest scrutiny possible—and under current doctrine, whether a class is suspect turns largely on whether the court views the group as possessing political power. But how do courts know when a class lacks political power? A liberal plurality of the Supreme Court initially suggested that political power should be measured according to a group’s descriptive representation in politics. Under that measure, the mostly white, male, wealthy, straight makeup of most of the nation’s decisionmaking councils would indicate that other groups lack political power. But that measure never received majority support from the Court. Instead, the Court consolidated around a different measure of political power, one that focused on democratic actions favorable to a group. If laws have been enacted protecting the group from discrimination or otherwise advancing the group’s interest, the Court assumes that the group can attract lawmakers’ attention and therefore does not need judicial protection. In the forty years since the Court introduced this standard, it has not deemed a single class suspect under it. In fact, it is hard to imagine any class ever meeting the standard of political powerlessness under this measure. Even the most politically marginalized groups (such as the poor, non-citizens, and felons) have benefited from laws favoring their interests. Is favorable democratic action really an accurate measure of political power? Focusing on the poor, we advance the first empirical test of the Supreme Court’s measure of political power. Our findings suggest that legislators’ support for anti-poverty legislation is not motivated by the political power of the poor—implying that favorable democratic action does not always accurately indicate a group’s political power. Given these findings, we argue that the court should rely on a more holistic, and thus more reliable, measure of political power. The measure should include favorable legislative actions, but also indicators of lobbying activity, political responsiveness, voter turnout, and descriptive representation in politics. MEASURING POWER: SUSPECT CLASS DETERMINATIONS AND THE POOR Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li

Splitting the Baby

This article examines the review of un Security Council resolutions by the European Court of Human Rights. Analysing recent decisions in the Nada and al-Dulimi cases against the background of the conclusion of the long-running Kadi saga, it builds upon the wealth of literature on the subject by proposing a theoretical basis for incidental review. It argues that the ECtHR directly review the lawfulness of an impugned resolution against a customary human rights standard, which would determine the applicability of Article 103 of the un Charter to displace those Convention rights that are not accepted in custom by modifying the Bosphorus doctrine of equivalent protection to one of ‘adequate protection’. It thereby argues that it is possible to compromise between what are at present diametrically polarised positions, thus transcending from the issue of the power to judicially review to that of the standard or intensity of review. It would thus become possible to not only embed the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in the wider legal system but also to increase bottom-up pressure to entrench the protection of basic human rights in un Security Council practice.