Ideological Violence Research Articles

Exploring the Relationship between Opportunity and Self-Control in Youth Exposure to and Sharing of Online Hate Content

ABSTRACT The rise of the Internet has dramatically increased the degree to which youth may be exposed to online hate content, and simplified the process of sharing this content with others. Viewing messages that contain hate speech or language vilifying others can increase an individual’s risk of radicalization to extremist views and the acceptance of violent ideologies. Researchers have begun to explore the risk factors for exposure to such content, with prior studies demonstrating a relationship between low self-control and online activities being important correlates. Few studies have utilized youth samples to assess these relationships, or explored the voluntary consumption and sharing of content. This study attempts to address this gap in the literature using self-report responses provided by a sample of 1,193 youths in South Australia. A series of quantitative models are estimated assessing the relationships between self-control, opportunities to view content using both on and off-line measures, and four dependent variables related to exposure to or sharing of hate content. The implications of this analysis for our understanding of the utility of criminological theory to radicalization and countering violent extremism are discussed in detail.

Countering Violent Extremism through Narrative Building in Pakistan

An analytical study of violent extremism reveals that criminal law’s deterrence theory is ineffective in curbing irrational behaviours of ideologically disoriented men. Such behaviours are mostly the outcomes of circumstances where subjectivities of hate, fear, anguish, zeal, and passion override the punitive objectivity of laws. Sociopolitical and ideological violence is the systematic behaviours of the masses to express chronic agonies emerging from the scarcity of their basic human needs including dignity, the pursuit of happiness, social justice, and common wealth. These values mostly revolve around an ultimate conception of equality that is hard to accomplish in ethnically or socially polarized societies because the legal systems in these societies are meant more to enforce coercive public order than to construct a collective conception of justice.

Why Do Online Countering Violent Extremism Strategies Not Work? The Case of Digital Jihad

ABSTRACT This article discusses the reasons why content moderation and control in cyberspace, being a primary means of online countering violent extremism (CVE), does not work as intended. It makes four main arguments. Firstly, despite years of efforts from CVE stakeholders, the propaganda of militant Islamist VEOs is still easily accessible on the Internet. This study has mapped hundreds of addresses engaged in digital jihadist activities at the turn of 2020–2021. It effectively proves that the current approach to online CVE brought few tangible effects. Secondly, these programs have been unevenly applied to militant Islamist organizations. There have been groups which represent violent extremist ideology but are not actively combated by stakeholders. As a result, these groups have been able to establish a solid foothold on the surface web. Thirdly, the efficiency of CVE strategies based on content takedowns are decreased by the relative ease of terrorists reestablishing banned communication channels, the availability of vast alternatives for online propaganda dissemination, the introduction of impractical legislation by governments, overlapping jurisdictions on the Internet and the “Streisand effect.” Finally, adequate strategies aimed at curbing digital jihad should be primarily based on offline and online activities which fall outside of the remit of CVE.

Psychopathology of Young Terrorist Offenders, and the Interaction With Ideology and Grievances.

Psychopathology might be a risk factor for terrorist offending as it is for violent offending. Therefore, we examined the prevalence of psychopathology in young and adult Jihadist terrorist offenders on the basis of primary source judicial information and forensic mental health reports with the European Database of convicted Terrorist offenders (EDT). We hypothesised that psychopathology might be associated with ideological risk factors, and that these associations might be different for young and adult terrorist offenders. Therefore, we examined whether and to what extent psychopathology is related to a violent ideology, to grievances and anger about perceived injustice. We investigated whether this differs among 120 adult and 46 juvenile terrorist offenders. We found that most adult and young Jihadist terrorist offenders with a forensic mental health report had psychopathological problems. Most frequently found were symptoms and traits of intellectual disability disorders, depressive disorders, psychotic/schizophrenic disorders, substance use disorders, and personality disorders. Most frequently found clinically relevant personality traits were problems with relationships, poor regulation of aggression, feelings of anger, and paranoid feelings. We found some first indications for a positive association between psychopathology and grievances and anger about perceived injustice. In the young terrorist offenders with depressive symptoms, grievances about perceived injustice were more often present than in young terrorist offenders without these symptoms. In adult terrorist offenders it was found that grievances about perceived injustice and the anger were related to cluster B personality traits. In addition, in both young and adult terrorist offenders expressed grievances about perceived injustice were related to problems with relationships. Further research into psychopathology in terrorist offenders seems necessary with larger groups of adolescents and adults in relation to ideological, personal and contextual risk factors and how these factors relate to different terrorist acts. This may lead to more knowledge about engagement into terrorism and possible disengagement from terrorism. It may also lead to the inclusion of psychopathology into violent extremism risk assessment tools.

Evidence of Psychological Manipulation in the Process of Violent Radicalization: An Investigation of the 17-A Cell.

IntroductionRadicalization leading to violence is a complex social process that frequently targets young people. In this study, we examine the 17-A cell, which carried out terrorist attacks in the Spanish cities of Barcelona and Cambrils on August 17, 2017. We focus on the psychological manipulation techniques used to radicalized members of the cell.MethodsUsing deductive content analysis, we examined the judicial order of the National High Court related to “Operation Ramblas” and the police proceedings of Cuerpo de Mossos d'Esquadra (CME) associated with the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks. Our goal was to determine whether psychological manipulation was used on the cell members and, if so, how frequently.ResultsOur results suggest that different psychological manipulation techniques were used on the 17-A cell members to facilitate their use of ideological violence. The most frequent strategies were cognitive control (control of attention, group identification, and denigration of critical thinking), environmental control (control of information), and emotional control (authoritarian leadership).ConclusionsThis study provides evidence that psychological manipulation techniques were used in the radicalization of 17-A cell members. The results are discussed in the context of previous research on the psychology of violent extremism and terrorism. We highlight the need for prevention and psychosocial interventions to steer young people away from violent extremism.

Информационные системы для анализа угроз национальной безопасности

Information technology plays a significant role in what has become known as «computational social science». The development of online technologies and digital research methods in the subject areas of social science is associated with the application of new interdisciplinary approaches and the integration of researchers from different fields of knowledge. As an effective and promising tool for researchers in the study of violent ideologies that destabilize the social order, the article discusses examples of databases, services and platforms for multivariate analysis. Opportunities and imitations of customizing data collection, processing, and presentation are outlined. An overview of the specific characteristics of the databases, services and platforms on the START Research Center website is presented. Conclusions are made about what opportunities such tools open for researchers and the prospects of realization of the most interesting solutions for improving the process of automation of data analysis are outlined.

Contingencies of Violent Radicalization: The Terror Contagion Simulation

This paper builds confidence in the terror contagion hypothesis that violent radicalization leading to predatory mass violence operates as a system. Within this system, the contingent values of key root causes create channels within which violent ideologies and terrorism emerge. We built a system dynamics simulation model capable of replicating historical reference modes and sophisticated enough to test the contingent values of these propositions. Of 16 propositions, we identified six root-cause propositions that must simultaneously exist, act in concert and explain the dynamics of their interaction which generate a terror contagion. Other propositions can strengthen or weaken an existing contagion but not eliminate it. We use an experiment to demonstrate how changing the contingent values of these propositions creates downward channels. This experiment helps reconcile the swarm vs. fishermen debate over the true root causes of violent radicalization. Within these channels, the contingent values can favor swarm or fishermen manifestations. The simulation and experimentation results enable the future development of the terror contagion hypothesis, provide a testing environment for research on violent radicalization, and provide a pathway to policy development in the combating of terrorism that arises from violent radicalization.

Islam and Human Rights: Friend or Foe?

<p align="left">In the context of the relationship between Islam and democracy along with human rights, Islam represents two opposing positions (the two faces of Islam). On the one hand, Islam is seen as a religion of compassion (raḥmat li al-‘ālamīn), respects plurality, upholds tolerance and cares about human rights. On the other hand, Islam is often identified with separatism, discrimination, intolerance and violent phenomena. In Islamic countries and Muslim-majority countries, violations of human rights frequently occur. Islam often appears with a double face. In addition to being a source of law to bring about peace, it is often used as the basis for violent ideologies from state’s repressive policies to terrorism movements. This article elaborates on the basic concept of human rights in Islam and the dynamics of protecting and upholding human rights. Using a conceptual approach, this study aims to seek religious awareness in the midst of globalization where religion can strengthen the concepts of human rights. When religion is used as a source in the rational policy framework of a country, especially the protection and enforcement of human rights, it can be ascertained that human rights in that country will flourish and will be accepted by the citizens.</p>

DERADIKALISASI MANTAN NARAPIDANA TERORISME: STUDI KASUS MW ALIAS WG

A case study of deradicalization of MW aka WG is interesting to explore because of the participation and involvement of TNI personnel or Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa) in providing assistance and guidance to former terrorism convicts so that MW aka WG and its community can be disengaged from terrorist group and violent ideologies. UU no. 5 Tahun 2018 has regulated the involvement of the TNI in dealing with acts of terrorism, but so far the implementation rules through the Presidential Regulation have not been ratified so that the involvement of the TNI (Indonesian National Army) cannot be fully operationalized, TNI (Indonesian National Army) unit which has been deployed to the village level (Babinsa) is a huge potential to be used in monitoring and preventing the spread of radicalism and terrorism in the form of deradicalization activities so that former terrorists or ex-convicts do not rejoin terrorist group or spread radical ideas and terrorism for the recruitment of new members of terrorist groups.

Terroryzm z perspektywy nauczania trzech papieży — Jana Pawła II, Benedykta XVI i Franciszka

The aim of this study was to indicate the position taken on the phenomenon of terrorism in the teaching of the Catholic Church by three popes: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis. It has been found that, apart from the common, unambiguously negative assessment of the analysed phenomenon by the hierarchy of the Church, each of them sets out his own observations on its nature and causes. In the teaching of John Paul II, the predominant conviction is that terrorism is an ideology of violence which spreads on the basis of technological and economic development and brings chaos on both a political and personal level. Benedict XVI states that terrorism promotes a civilisation of destruction, which above all questions the dignity of the individual, seeking their annihilation. Pope Francis, on the other hand, focuses on stressing the need for intercultural and interreligious dialogue in order to reduce the growing tensions that are the source of terrorist acts. All the Fathers of the Church, however, draw attention to the fundamental problem of the instrumental treatment of human life by terrorist organisations, for which human beings become a mere means to achieve their various aims.

15.1 ANGRY YOUNG MEN, COMMON THREADS IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF EXTREMIST GROUPS

Presentation attendees will: 1) understand psychological commonalities among gang members and violent extremists; 2) recognize how group affiliation can drive destructive ideologies; and 3) learn of opportunities to promote engagement with young men and to decrease the risk of identification with violent movements. The presenter will review the demographics of gang members and violent extremists. When available, experimental research will frame causative factors and contributing influences. Challenges that limit a better understanding of the threat from violent groups and ideologies will be explored. Gang members and violent extremists share multiple demographic factors, and most strikingly, the vast majority of them are male. Factors associated with male adolescents and young men joining violent groups include perceived lack of social acceptance and support, along with limited financial and leisure opportunities. Street gangs and extremist groups’ messages of personal agency, purpose, and affiliation have strong appeal. School is often the primary socializing environment outside the home and the most important place where children become enculturated. Boys have significantly higher rates of discipline and academic underperformance. Studies of bias against male students show mixed results but may be a factor. Biological factors, perhaps interacting with school environments, likely play a role. Precise characterizations of the nature of male school disengagement has defied easy categorization. The rejection of mainstream institutions and establishment viewpoints is a component of extremist groups. Yet, issues of trust and problems with groupthink abound throughout society. Human cognitive abilities have limitations, and association with a group can promote views that members believe reflect logical argument but actually appear to function more as badges of group identity. Gang members and violent extremists show common characteristics, and some scholars argue that they function as part of a continuum. Reducing the impact of violent ideologies is an important priority. Supporting and integrating young men into mainstream society should start at the school level and also requires community-based programming.

Everywhere was Home until Now: Understanding the Rejection and Repatriation of the Almajiris amidst the Covid-19 Pandemic in Northern Nigeria

The chapter examines the threat posed by Boko Haram, arguing that its growing audacity and resiliency can better be understood within the context of the transnational flow of the global Salafi Jihadist ideology. Salafi jihadism focuses on the use of violence to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam practised by the “pious ancestors”, that is Mohammed and the early Islamic community. The transnational flow of this fringe and violent ideology is emboldening Boko Haram, and it poses significant threats to sub-regional and national security. To effectively counter the threat posed by Boko Haram, there is a need for a robust combination of the use of force and political dexterity. This will require, among other measures, a political strategy that builds government legitimacy and effectiveness in delivering public goods to citizens, strengthening support for moderate Islam, and implementing a robust programme on countering ideological support for extremism and terrorism.

Countering Violent Islamist Extremism in Muslim Mindanao the 4M Way: The Role of Alternative Narratives

This article argues that countering violent Islamist extremism in the southern Philippines requires greater employment of proactive Alternative Narratives (AN) rather than more reactive Counter-Narratives (CN). It offers the “4 M Way” of employing Alternative Narratives so as to achieve Information Dominance over countervailing violent extremist ideology. Properly executed, the 4 M Way could gradually steer vulnerable Muslims away from violent Islamist ideological rigidities toward the flexible beliefs that have long been part of the lived realities of Bangsamoro region—and essential for peace and stability in Muslim Mindanao.

Cognition and Emotion in Extreme Political Action: Individual Differences and Dynamic Interactions

Who is most likely to join and engage in extreme political action? Although traditional theories have focused on situational factors or group identity, an emerging science illustrates that tendencies for extreme political action may also be rooted in individuals’ idiosyncratic cognitive and affective dispositions. This article synthesizes cutting-edge evidence demonstrating that individuals’ cognitive and affective architecture shapes their willingness to support ideological violence. In the cognitive domain, traits such as cognitive rigidity, slow perceptual strategies, and poor executive functions are linked to heightened endorsement for ideological violence. In the emotion domain, characteristics associated with emotional reactivity and impaired emotional regulation, such as sensation seeking and impulsivity, can facilitate readiness for extreme political action. The review homes in on the roles of cognitive rigidity and sensation seeking as traits heightening proclivities for extreme pro-group behavior and recommends that future research should assess cognition-emotion interactions to reveal different subprofiles of political actors. A theoretical framework focused on cognitive and affective information-processing traits—and their interactions—opens up tractable empirical questions and a future research agenda. Identifying subsets of ideologues is an endeavor with potential to inform the design of evidence-based interventions aimed at reducing ideological extremism and fostering social understanding.

The sociocognitive processes of ideological obsession: review and policy implications.

Understanding what motivates people to join violent ideological groups and engage in acts of cruelty against others is of great social and societal importance. In this paper, I posit that one necessary element is ‘ideological obsession’—an ideological commitment fuelled by unmet psychological needs and regulated by inhibitory and ego-defensive mechanisms. Drawing from evidence collected across cultures and ideologies, I describe four processes through which ideological obsession puts individuals on a path towards violence. First, ideological obsession deactivates moral self-regulatory processes, allowing unethical behaviours to be carried out without self-recrimination. Second, ideologically obsessed individuals are easily threatened by information that criticises their ideology, which in turn leads to hatred and violent retaliation. Third, ideological obsession changes people's social interactions by making them gravitate towards like-minded individuals who support ideological violence. As these social networks become more interconnected, they amplify one's adherence to violent extremism. Finally, ideologically obsessed individuals are prone to psychological reactance, making them immune to communication strategies intended to dissuade them from using violence. In fact, messages espousing non-violence can have the opposite effect by reinforcing their violence-supporting ideology. I conclude by presenting evidence-based strategies to prevent radicalisation leading to violence for individuals in pre-criminal spaces.This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

Science education against the rise of fascist and authoritarian movements: towards the development of a pedagogy for democracy

In the twenty-first century, the rise and support of fascism-related views threaten freedom of speech, freedom of sexual orientation, religious tolerance and progressive agendas that advocate equity. We argue that mainstream science education generally does not, but should, educate students against fascism-related views—such as racism, sexism, homophobia and religious intolerance—with a view to strengthening mutual respect and the common good. We argue some science teaching practices are found to be suitable to fascism-like ideologies (e.g. race in genetics teaching), and that the use of the concept of ‘scientific literacy’ has focused on neoliberal possessive individualism. As a consequence, mainstream science education overlooks the development of sympathy, altruism and interpersonal skills. We also discuss the activity of science education in authoritarian, undemocratic regimes in history, showing that fascist regimes have long used ‘apolitical’ scientists’ achievements to establish and expand regimes’ intolerant and violent ideologies. We use that historical relationship to argue fascism is science education’s business. Given the fear that current political discourses in many countries are again swinging towards fascism, we outline potential pathways for science education which focus on the social and emotional development of students. We argue that to develop a pedagogy for democracy, that attends to equity and social justice, it is imperative it enables pupils to develop at a psychological level with diverse others, including through their own agency. This pedagogy builds on critical pedagogies.

Poetic Updates In Uzbek Literature (On The Example Of Prose Masterpiece)

As a result of the renewal of national thinking, the events of life and the principles of the approach to the human person in Uzbek prose also changed and began to take on new forms. In a number of prose works, we find images of courageous people who have not lost their identity and faith over the years. At the same time, we are confronted with those who, under ideological pressure, have turned to "modernity", apostatized, deceived and become servants of a deceptive and violent ideology. We see that the hypocrisy inherent in such images is portrayed in all its horrors. It can be seen that in Uzbek prose works the attempt to reflect the unique nature, unique world, past and feelings of the nation has become a certain aesthetic principle, and such positive research serves as a basis for significant growth in prose. The works we have analyzed not only renew epic thinking in one way or another, but also serve as a basis for the emergence of new trends, currents and directions in literary life. As a result, it influences the development of socio-spiritual and artistic aesthetic thinking.

Profiles of Violent Radicalization: Challenging Key Premises on Root Causes Leading to Terrorism

This study challenges the key premises of the current debate on radicalization's root causes, leading to predatory mass-violence. The current debate's three key premises are that there are only two radicalization templates: top-down (fishermen) or bottom-up (swarm). Additionally, these templates of radicalization are more useful to understand terrorism than regional or violent ideology. Finally, there is only one primary dynamic, a trade-off of prevalence, between the two templates. These premises arose from case analysis of a sample set of terrorist incidents. We used the University of Maryland START Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to create a total population sample of 4,646 terrorist incidents in Western Europe (WEUR) and the United States (US) from 1995-2018. We classified them into seven different violent ideologies: Anti-Government, Crime & Hate Crimes, Left-Wing, Right-Wing, Separatism, Takfiri, and Unknown and then categorized them for indications of swarm or fishermen suspected radicalization. From this data, we assembled a catalog of profiles, which we then subjected to statistical testing using a total population sample rather. We found that regional and violent ideologies had significant differences. Even though radicalization templates in aggregate had some differences when tested to control for the region and violent ideology, those statistical differences disappeared—suggesting that region and violent ideology, as system-level contingencies, have more influence than the radicalization template. We also found evidence suggesting a third kind of radicalization template, that of copycats or wannabe. Furthermore, we found evidence that the interaction between the three templates varied from the presumption of a trade-off of prevalence. We suggest that radicalization templates are manifestations of contingencies within a general system of radicalization. The system structure and contingencies are the root causes of radicalization, not the manifestations that emerge from it. This evidence establishes a starting point for a new path of systems sciences research to bear on the important questions of predatory mass-violence and radicalization, which leads to it.

Root Causes of Violent Radicalization: Reconciling Fishermen V. Swarm Debate with a System Structure of a Terror Contagion

This paper broadens the search for causes of radicalization leading to predatory mass violence beyond the well-known fishermen-swarm debate. We begin by creating a system hierarchy of five levels within which we synthesize expert theories of radicalization to present a complete system structure in a causal-loop diagram (CLD). From this we identify potential root-causes operating simultaneously at different levels of the hierarchy. Leveraging complexity science we demonstrate that six root causes operating at the highest level of system structure work together create a dynamic we term a ‘terror contagion’. As these root causes influence downwards into a system they create channels favoring different violent ideologies as well as radicalizaiton dynamics such as fishermen or swarm. This analysis demonstrates that swarm and fishermen are the effects of true root-causes of radicalization, and not the cause of radicalization itself. We conclude by proposing several experiments to test the proposed terror contagion hypothesis through traditional analysis as well as computer modeling and simulation.

The Role of Quran Translations in Radicalizing Muslims in the West and Misrepresenting Islam

There is considerable evidence that many translations of the Quran constitute fertile ground for the radicalization of a large number of Western Muslims, particularly those who do not speak Arabic as their mother tongue. While a handful of previous studies have addressed the factors engendering terrorism, more remains to be said regarding the roots thereof. Therefore, this article employs the narrative theory of translation studies (TS) to highlight how these texts are manipulated through their translation, in order to deceive and brainwash young Muslims in the West. It argues that terrorist groups are successful in creating a radicalized discourse by injecting their violent ideology into Quran translations and by framing the facts to serve their objectives. This discourse is masked by the holiness of the Quran that is not questionable for Muslims. The article concludes that many translations of the Quran are dangerous and instantiate a supportive tool for terrorist groups in their attempts to brainwash Muslims and secure recruits within Western communities. The article recommends the engagement of Western governments in monitoring the circulation of Quran translations and even in undertaking a role in institutionalizing the process of translation, rather than leaving it in the hands of unqualified individuals.