Value Of Individual Autonomy Research Articles

디지털 헬스케어에서 디지털 넛지와 의사결정의 규범성

In digital healthcare based on healthcare big data, digital nudges are gaining importance and a key role in bioethics. This situation raises new ethical issues, such as: can individuals using digital nudges provided by digital healthcare enhance their autonomy in decision-making? Can individuals be free from external micro-interference in the form of digital nudges? To what extent can individuals be allowed the freedom to participate in the design of precision medicine? Furthermore, the traditional norms and values of individual autonomy, justice, the common good, etc. that have been addressed in bioethics are not appropriate for the new context, so there is a need to reconceptualize existing concepts, especially the concept of autonomy in relation to decision-making. This reconceptualization should have a systematicity that can give timely practicality to the moral issues that may arise in situational contexts, especially in digital healthcare based on personalized medicine. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explore the normativity or approach of decision-making that is appropriate for the ethics of digital nudges to address the above emerging ethical issues.

Critical Reflection and the Limits of Parental Authority

ABSTRACTIn modern pluralist societies, the meaning and value of individual autonomy is highly contested. Typically, some religious groups deny the ideal of leading a self‐directed life and regard strict obedience to God's commands as the primary goal of child education. This article pursues the question of whether a liberal state may legitimately interfere with parental authority in order to protect the development of a child's inner capacity for autonomy. It is argued that the ability to critically re‐evaluate one's life plan is valuable for the offspring of secular and pious parents alike. Therefore, restrictions on parental rights can be justified within a liberal theoretical framework that is neutral between autonomous and heteronomous conceptions of the good. However, religious parents need not be prepared to call their most important tenets into question; they may foster their children's capacity for critical reflection in other ways. Since the vast majority of religious families meet this requirement, state interventions are rarely warranted.

Социальные науки и глобальная турбулентность: перезагрузка мейнстрима

After the collapse of the bipolar world, the neoliberal mainstream emerged in the global hierarchy of social sciences, built on three axiomatic pillars: Western domination, capitalism (free market) and liberalism (the value of individual autonomy). Nowadays, one can more and more often witness criticism and disintegration of the mainstream, which claimed the universality of descriptions and legitimation of modern societies that have reached the end of history in the form of open-access liberal market democracies. The purpose of the article is to find out how transformations of the prevailing political and economic orders, configurations of the subjects of geopolitical dominance and their legitimate metaphors determine the direction of changes in the social sciences mainstream. The hypothesis of the research is that the prevailing principles of stratification and distribution of public resources will be less and less valuable and institutionally related to capitalism, market and democracy, since an appeal to the latter does not lead to an increase in the available opportunities for the majority of the population in practice. The global change in social ontology, the structure of economic reproduction and legitimate foundations of the political order bring about a drop in the credibility and relevance of mainstream concepts focused on the axiomatics of market values and liberal rhetoric. Intellectual attempts to restore the relevance of the neoliberal mainstream through the construction of local utopias (flat world, creative class, knowledge economy, etc.), the introduction of complementary concepts of civil repair (J. Alexander), sociocultural trauma (P. Shtompka), unworthy government (bad governance), dependence on previous development (path dependence) or gauge (N. Rozov) do not save from growing conceptual stretch. Formation of a society without tangible economic growth and a declining need for mass labor leads to the inevitable transformation of the mainstream. Alternative and peripheral theories that describe the contours of a global future mainly in non-market, non-capitalist and, possibly, non-liberal categories are becoming more influential. These are concepts that fix new formats for the distribution of public resources, less and less connected with the market, democracy and hegemony of the West, but increasingly – with rental mechanisms, distributive political regulation and differentiated value of different social groups for the national state. Acknowledgements. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) and the Expert Institute of Social Research (“опн”). Project no. 20-011-31025 “Alternatives to Political Mainstream amidst the Crisis of the Global World Order”.

How Coerced Municipal Amalgamations Thwart the Values of Local Self-Government

Arguments invoking increased functional efficiency have had a profound impact on local government reforms in advanced democracies during the past 60 years. Consequently, most mature democracies have implemented municipal amalgamation reforms, often through top-down coercion. In this article, we demonstrate how far central governments have been willing to go, in terms of coercion, by providing an in-depth historical account of Swedish municipal amalgamations between 1952 and 1974. Debates on amalgamation reforms have typically revolved around pros and cons of mergers. But very few discussions have addressed the more fundamental moral problem of enforcing amalgamations through coercion. Often, large-scale mergers are carried through against the expressed will of municipalities who wish to remain self-governing. In this article, we present a normative defense of strong local self-government, based partly on values of individual autonomy, and partly on group-based human rights, and we show how coerced amalgamations are at odds with these values.

The Modern Law of Class Actions and Due Process

Our goal in writing this article was to offer helpful insight for a reformed interpretation and application of Rule 23 that would make the Rule serve its intended democratic function. The idea of due process is a promise of the rule of law tempered by reasonableness, fairness, and efficiency. It embraces both the value of individual autonomy and the collective interests of the community. The idea of class actions, premised on due process, is to provide a pragmatic method of dispute resolution that is fair to the individual and responsive to the needs of the community and the challenges generated by widely spread and shared harms. In this respect, class actions operate as a tool of democracy. Rule 23 should be interpreted from this hopeful and effective perspective, one that balances individual autonomy against the legitimate needs of the community. But the Rule is not accomplishing its mission. As we show in the article, it appears to be infused with its framers’ self-doubts, and the Supreme Court treats it as an unwelcome guest in the home of traditional litigation forms—see, for example, our discussions of Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation (1999); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011); Jennings v. Rodriguez (2018); Nutraceuticals Corp. v. Lambert (2019).

Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors in the Transformation from Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989

This article examines how contract law came to play an important new role in the organization of the Chinese economy during the decade of reform in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC’), 1978- 1989. Crucial to the movement for reform was the effort to create new institutions to expand, regulate, and channel economic transactions. These institutions were designed to complement centralized planning as the basic means of allocating goods and services. They emphasized limitation and decentralization of planning decisions, the creation of economic incentives, and the increased responsibility of economic actors for the consequences of their actions. These new institutions were introduced in response to a variety of organizational problems in agriculture, industry, and commerce. Nonetheless, they shared common features: the responses in all cases emphasized notions of contract, the legal responsibility of economic actors to perform their agreements, and the value of individual autonomy in setting the terms of economic transactions and relationships.

Civic Engagement in Britain: The Role of Religion and Inclusive Values

The relationship between religion and volunteering is well documented (Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006), and a prevalent hypothesis for the association is that the effect of religion is mediated through religious social networks. However, research on this relationship has largely been conducted on majority Christian populations in the United States and Europe. In this study, we use two data sets, the European Values Study (1999–2008) and the Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (2010) to examine this relationship in Britain on the general population and ethnic minority population, respectively. The results suggest that religion increases volunteering primarily through bonding rather than bridging social networks. We also find that in non-Christian religions, solitary and collective religious rituals may both have an effect on civic participation, but whereas the effect of service attendance is mediated through bonding social networks, the effect of prayer is mediated more through bridging networks. Finally, values of individual autonomy and generalized trust are associated with non-religious, but not religious, participation, suggesting an alternative secular ethos of civic engagement.

Default entitlements in personal data in the proposed Regulation: Informational self-determination off the table … and back on again?

This paper aims to assess the proposed General Data Protection Regulation through the framework of default entitlements in personal data. The notion of default entitlements comes from economic analysis of law and provides new insights into the implications of the data protection reform. While, under the principle of informational self-determination the default entitlements should lie with the individual, the Commission is shown to assign a great deal of default rights to others, including the Information Industry. This article cautions against the possibility of reducing the European system of data protection rooted in the values of individual autonomy and informational self-determination to a mere set of administrative rules channelling the flow of personal data, yet without a clear direction.

Liberal Autonomy as a Pluralistic Value

For many liberals, the value of individual autonomy is the foundation of Uberai political morality; it underwrites individuals' rights and liberties and liberal notions of justice, marks the limits of liberal toleration, and sets the terms on which a liberal society can also be a multicultural society (e.g., Raz 1986; Kymlicka 1989; 1995; Rawls 1993; Tamir 1993; Habermas 1994). Yet, for many multiculturalists, the liberal value of individual autonomy is an obstacle to building a multicultural democracy; it is seen as too 'sectarian', demanding, or intolerant a value on which to base political morality for a culturally diverse society (e.g., Young 1990; Margalit and Halbertal 1994; Parekh 2000; Galston 2002; Kukathas 2003; Modood 2007). In this essay, I want to argue that autonomy is a much more 'open', democratic, and accommodating value than both these liberal and multiculturalist accounts suggest.Of course, one might reasonably ask why persevere with liberal autonomy at all. As the multiculturalism literature now abundantly attests, there are, after all, other theoretical and even liberal approaches available that promise to be far more accommodating of cultural difference than any autonomy-based approach is likely to be. If autonomy commands attention, it is because of its pervasive place as a governing value in liberal democracies today. Part of the new thinking associated with the Enlightenment, autonomy's influence as a public value largely emerged in the twentieth century. That influence has only continued to grow. While never reaching the ubiquity prescribed by so-called 'comprehensive liberals', the valorisation of autonomy has increasingly come to inform - or be reflected in - the law, public policy, and even interpersonal relations in liberal democracies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Indeed, it is fair to say that the rise of autonomy as a governing value constitutes something of a world historical transformation. But this is also why it is important to scrutinize what is claimed in the name of respecting autonomy. As we will see, though often deployed as a blunt instrument and argument stopper, the liberal value of autonomy in fact offers a platform for democratic contestation and intercultural dialogue about the permissible limits of liberal toleration. My point of departure, then, is that autonomy also speaks to the interests of cultural minorities negotiating life today in liberal societies, and that they would do well also to speak the language of autonomy.I will begin (part 1) by canvassing the concept of autonomy relevant to this discussion. Autonomy is a notoriously slippery concept to pin down, so it is essential to clarify the dimensions of the concept that are implicitly appealed to in law and public policy. I will suggest a framework for operationalizing autonomy as a multidimensional political value, and which allows mainstream and minority practices to be assessed and compared on their 'autonomy credentials'. Thereafter, I will consider, in turn, three areas where the value of autonomy lends itself to considerable interpretive and practical latitude. The first (part 2) concerns the applicability of autonomy; that is, whether specific practices can be said to satisfy or violate the dimensions of autonomy. The second area (part 3) involves the issue ?? prioritization. This aspect occurs implicitly inasmuch as the dimensions of autonomy have differential political force in liberal practice, and arises circumstantially where cases pit the autonomy of different parties against each other or where other compelling public interests are at stake. In each case, judgments need to be made regarding how best to honor the value of autonomy in the circumstances. The final substantive part (4) argues that judgments concerning the applicability and prioritization of the dimensions of autonomy in relation to minority cultural practices should be informed by how a society treats mainstream practices and cases. …

Equality in Difference: Hierarchical Multiculturalism and Membership Illusions

In his introduction to the Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism , Ivison makes very clear that while multiculturalism (MC) or the "accommodation of cultural differences" concerns itself with the autonomy and freedom of groups, it especially focuses on individuals if individual 'freedoms' are curtailed by group cultural expectations. This perspective, however, reveals a bias toward only accommodating diversity that is compatible with the liberal ends of individual freedom and autonomy ("as well as thinking of ways of liberalizing currently illiberal practices") (p. 10) as defined by the cultural (usually western) majority. Any societal subculture or "group that violates their members' basic liberties, or prevents them from exercising their autonomy are not entitled to multicultural accommodation or protection" (p. 11). To be entitled to accommodation, groups need to respect individuals' basic rights and offer "informed and effective choices" (p. 15) under the protection of specific political forms that promote diversity while supervising/controlling actions such that no cultural value transgresses the liberal values of individual autonomy and freedom that MC purports to protect. The 'recognition' or the accommodation of cultural diversity (and not necessarily difference) is, for MC liberals, "connected to a rich sense of equality," an 'equality' that prescribes treating "like cases alike" (p. 7). However, this approach ignores structural inequalities (i.e. racism, sexism, classism) as these inequalities supposedly exist outside the cultural realm. This particular approach poses a false dichotomy between the cultural and material world, perpetuating a misunderstanding of culture as an epiphenomenon outside (or parallel to) the material world while also imposing similarity as the key element in equality , with the corollary that anything (values, beliefs, etc.) or anybody different is found wanting and therefore lesser (Scott 1988).

The Double Standard of 'Honest' Relationships: One for Israelis, Another for Immigrants

This paper compares the regulation of marital and semi-marital relationships within the Israel general legal regime, with their regulation within spousal immigration policy. The comparison demonstrates that while traditional marital values are cherished within the general legal regime, they are balanced against to values of individual autonomy and justice. When it comes to spousal immigration policies the hegemony of traditional marital norms is unshakeable. The paper asserts that the different approaches can be attributed to the articulation of spousal immigration policies as the system of allocation of privileges to aliens, and the lack of transparency and democratic accountability, which to an extent seems as a natural result of this articulation. These features, coupled with the alienage of those affected by immigration policies make the price of reproducing the marital ideal, through immigration perquisites almost invisible. The paper aims to challenge the perceived naturalness of the current immigration regime and to bring the heavy price of sustaining the marital ideal that is now hidden in administrative back-yards into the light and public eye.

Words and Worlds: The Supreme Court in Rapanos and Carabell

This paper explores the expression of competing worldviews in the opinions of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. An “ecological” worldview identified with modern environmentalism appears in Justice Steven’s dissent and in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in these cases. An opposed “atomistic” worldview is evidenced in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion. These competing worldviews reflect different beliefs and values held by the justices affecting environmental regulatory cases such as Rapanos. The atomistic worldview is consistent with values of individual autonomy and mastery of the physical environment for economic advancement, the ecological worldview with values of individual restraint in support of a common good and fitting harmoniously into the natural and social environment. These competing worldviews, and their associated values, have contrary implications for law. Justices embracing the ecological worldview tend to favor a broad scope of federal regulatory power, limited property rights, and general interpretations of environmental regulatory authority. Justices resisting this worldview tend to have contrary views on these issues. The paper also argues that the same values that animate the substantive differences of the justices in cases such as Rapanos also may affect the justices’ preferences for interpretational approaches. That is, the values that lead justices to be more or less accepting of the ecological model are also among the values that may influence justices to be textualists or intentionalists.

Idealism and Ethics of Public-health Practitioners

possibly distract from that point; and besides, Mac kenbach devotes greater attention to guiding that journey than to making the case for his point. Scattered among the historical experiences in the journey are these lessons for the present: First, that 'the ethical foundations of public health are less self evident than we would like,' calling for 'an analysis' of these. Second, that while public-health practitio ners generally are imbued with 'large-scale altruism,' this may be rooted more in Utopian idealism than realism, prone to be translated into overzealous public-health actions. And finally, then, the actual point: the 'suggestion' that 'the large-scale altruism of public health has to be balanced with the value of individual autonomy.' The journey reveals, very notably, that the present 'idealism' in public health could have had its roots in fascism - Third Reich 'public health policies that we today would regard as very progressive,' notably the 'very strict non-smoking policies including bans on smoking and extensive health education campaigns.' The guide of the journey points out, however, that this

Kos, Dresden, Utopia... A journey through Idealism Past and Present in Public Health

This essay reviews some of the sources of idealism in public health, on the basis of an intellectual journey to Kos (home to Hippocrates and his altruistic legacy), Dresden (where the Deutsches Hygiene Museum illustrates the historical connections between fascism and public health), and Utopia (exemplified by Etienne Cabet's Icarie, a fantasy of an ideal city which has nevertheless been partly realized). It is suggested that the large-scale altruism of public health has to be balanced with the value of individual autonomy, and that some degree of dreaming of a better and healthier world is indispensable for further progress in public health. The main conclusion is that the ethical foundations of public health are not always self-evident, and that critical reflection on these foundations was, is, and will always be necessary.

“It’s Like Playing With Your Destiny”: Bosnian Immigrants’ Views of Advance Directives and End-of-Life Decision-Making

Patient autonomy is a primary value in US health care. It is assumed that patients want to be fully and directly informed about serious health conditions and want to engage in advance planning about medical care at the end-of-life. Written advance directives and proxy decision-makers are vehicles to promote autonomy when patients are no longer able to represent their wishes. Cross-cultural studies have raised questions about the universal acceptance of these health care values among all ethnicities. In the current investigation, Bosnian immigrants were interviewed about their views of physician-patient communication, advance directives, and locus of decision-making in serious illness. Many of the respondents indicated that they did not want to be directly informed of a serious illness. There was an expressed preference for physician- or family-based health care decisions. Advance directives and formally appointed proxies were typically seen as unnecessary and inconsistent with many respondents' personal values. The findings suggest that the value of individual autonomy and control over the health care decisions may not be applicable to cultures with a collectivist orientation.

Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice

University of Toronto Law Journal 54.4 (2004) 391-447 [Access article in PDF] Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice† David G. Duff* I Introduction In order to raise revenues to finance public expenditures, governments typically collect general taxes on income, consumption, or wealth, as well as more specific benefit taxes and user fees imposed on the presumed or actual beneficiaries of government expenditures. In Ontario, for example, the provincial government levies general taxes on personal income, retail sales, and corporations, as well as more specific gasoline and fuel taxes and fees for vehicle and driver registration.1 Similarly, Ontario municipalities collect both general taxes on residential and non-residential property and specific fees for water and sewage treatment, solid waste collection and disposal, public transit, and public recreation.2 As alternatives to more general taxes based on broad measures of each taxpayer's economic capacity, benefit taxes and user fees are condemned by some and praised by others. According to a leading tax scholar of the early twentieth century, for example, the idea that taxes should vary according to the benefits that persons receive from government is 'the principle away from which all modern science and progress have been working,' a principle based on 'a false political philosophy' from which follows 'a false political economy.'3 In a similar vein, another prominent tax scholar rejected the benefit principle of taxation as 'a significant element in a reactionary social philosophy, constructed from the gratuitous implications of laissez-faire economics.'4 Relying on the ability to pay principle advocated by these scholars, the Canadian Royal Commission [End Page 391] on Taxation (Carter Commission) downplayed the role of benefit taxes, concluding that '[a] careful examination of the goods and services provided by government or government enterprises does not suggest that greater emphasis should be placed on the benefit approach in Canadian taxation.'5 Others, however, extol benefit taxes as preferable to general taxation in various ways. According to Canadian economist Richard Bird, for example, 'it is only through the application of benefit taxes that an appropriate level and structure of government activity can, at least in theory, be determined simultaneously with the means of financing it.'6 For Richard Wagner, moreover, only benefit taxation accords with the values of individual autonomy and citizen sovereignty that underlie contractual conceptions of the state, while taxation based on ability to pay accords with an 'absolutist order.'7 In contrast to these critics and advocates, this article adopts a more even-handed approach to benefit taxation, regarding benefit taxes and user fees as preferable to general taxation for specific purposes but inferior to general taxes for other purposes. Part II provides a theoretical framework for analysing benefit taxes and user fees, defining these levies in contrast to general taxes, examining theoretical arguments for and against reliance on benefit taxes and user fees, considering the appropriate role of benefit taxes and user fees as a method of government finance, and reviewing the manner in which these levies should be designed. Part III considers benefit taxes and user fees in practice, surveying the extent to which governments rely on these levies in Ontario and other jurisdictions and examining the current and potential application of benefit taxes and user fees to finance various categories of government expenditures. Part IV summarizes the argument of the article and offers general conclusions. II Benefit taxes and user fees in theory In order to evaluate the role of benefit taxes and user fees in actual tax systems, it is helpful to begin by understanding the characteristics of these levies as opposed to general taxes, arguments for and against the collection of revenues in this form, the implications of these arguments for the role of benefit taxes and user fees as a method of raising revenue, [End Page 392] and the ideal design of these levies in order to achieve the purposes for which they are best suited. As a foundation for the analysis of actual taxes and expenditures in Part III of this article, the following sections provide this theoretical framework. A...

Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism

Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism Joseph Chan One of the most challenging issues that must be faced today in any attempt to develop a contemporary Confucian ethical and political theory is the question of individual autonomy. Since the May Fourth Movement, Confucianism has been criticized as failing to recognize the dignity of the individual and the value of individual autonomy as understood in the Western liberal traditions of political thought. Some have gone further to contend that Confucianism not only fails to recognize, but even actively suppresses, individual autonomy. The most forceful critic in this regard was Chen Duxiu, who argued powerfully that Confucianism is unfit for modern life because its ethics seriously undermines individual autonomy and self-respect. This criticism is still influential today, but appears in a different form. Confucianism, it is now claimed, is unfit in the context of human rights and civil liberties because it does not respect the autonomy of the individual.1 Is it true that Confucianism does not recognize individual autonomy? In the past, scholars often defended Confucianism against these charges. Their argument holds that there is, within Confucianism, a concept of moral autonomy that can support civil liberties with out having to incorporate the liberal notion of individual autonomy.2 This argument of moral autonomy is important. If sound, it can revise, if not reject, the dark and pessimistic picture of Confucianism powerfully painted by May Fourth thinkers. In this essay I seek to examine critically the Confucian conception of moral autonomy and explore its implications regarding civil liberties. The concept of moral autonomy is, unfortunately, vague and ambiguous, and the arguments that make use of this idea do not help remove its vague nessor ambiguity. The question of whether Confucian ethics has a conception of moral autonomy often invites two replies, neither of which is fruitful for my purposes here. The first uses Kant's view as a yardstick to measure any alleged conception of moral autonomy. It says that because Kant coined and popularized the term, we should take his concept as the definition of moral autonomy. And because Kant rejects anything other than one's practical reason as the source of morality, Confucian ethics, which sees morality as grounded in human nature and heaven, cannot possibly have such a concept of moral autonomy. The second reply goes to another extreme. It says that conceptions of moral autonomy range from a minimal one that require sonly the agent's voluntary endorsement of morality to a demanding one that takes morality as a kind of free creation of the individual's will. From this reply it should not be difficult to pick one particular conception from the spectrum to characterize the Confucian view, and then conclude that Confucianism does have a conception of moral [End Page 281] autonomy. Alternatively, one might even add a Confucian conception to the list if none from the existing range of conceptions fits it. Both replies are problematic because they direct our attention away from substantive issues to terminological ones. A more fruitful strategy, I believe, is to ask whether the elements commonly found in conceptions of moral autonomy can also be found in Confucian ethics, without necessarily concluding that those elements that are present in Confucian ethics would amount to a genuine conception of moral autonomy. To what extent can those elements found in Confucian ethics support civil liberties? This is a substantive question, not one of mere terminology. For the sake of convenience, however, I shall still use the phrase "a Confucian conception of moral autonomy," instead of the clumsy "the elements in Confucian ethics that are present in other common conceptions of moral autonomy." But the use of "a Confucian conception of moral autonomy" should not be taken to mean that I intend to settle the terminological dispute in one way or another. Rather I shall discuss some aspects of moral autonomy that are commonly found in different conceptions, and then examine whether they are present in Confucian ethics. Individuals are autonomous if they are in some sense masters of their own lives. Individuals are morally autonomous if they are in some sense masters of their moral lives. But what does it...

Regulation or Regimentation: The conditions for an autonomy-based Psychotherapy Profession

The three main papers in this issue all concentrate, in their different ways, upon the crucial relevance of the value of individual autonomy in psychotherapy. Barbara Jakel explores the crucial importance of recognising the bi-polar competence of the client, both in their capacity for love, and that for existential and spiritual autonomy. Carl Goldberg, with a graphic illustration from personal experience, explores the enormous dangers inherent in the power imbalances of training, and psychotherapeutic work, and the consequent imperative need for personal maturity, in this profession. Richard Erskine, with a touching personal childhood Christmas parable, develops his understanding of the basis of respectful therapy in the acknowledgement of the subjectivity and intersubjectivity of our beliefs as practitioners, and our theories of inquiry. These recognitions or autonomy are offered at a time when it is under threat. The context of this, in part, is that psychotherapy, in many countries, is seeking recogni...

Ferrajoli on Rights

The author considers the distinction drawn by Ferrajoli betweenrights and their guarantees to be an important acquisition forpost-Kelsenian legal theory, but criticises the distinction drawn between fundamental rights and patrimonial rights, in particular contesting the hypothesis that non-disposability/inalienabilityis a characteristic of fundamental rights. On the contrary, Joribelieves that there is a substantial symmetry between fundamentalrights and patrimonial rights, because patrimonial rights can beseen as guarantees of the fundamental right of equal legal capacity.He also argues that the distinction between fundamental and patrimonial rights cannot be drawn solely on the formal terrain, but must beextended to their contents and their ethical importance. Finally,he studies Ferrajoli's thesis of citizenship: in his opinion, theabolition of citizenship hoped for by Ferrajoli would lead to asort of imperialism of rights, ethically a position fraught withproblems, in the light of the ethical value of individual autonomy.

For the protection of others. The value of individual autonomy and the safety of others.

This paper investigates legal and moral justifications of coerced treatment for psychiatric patients who are detained on the grounds that they may harm others. While the general issues concerning compulsory treatment and detention have been widely canvassed, it has seldom, if ever, been noticed that the moral reasons that we may have to detain a person who appears to be dangerous to others are different from the moral reasons we may have to treat him or her. For example, it has not been noticed that compulsory detention and compulsory treatment are supported by two different moral principles, namely the Principle of Harm and the Principle of Beneficence, and, therefore, that the arguments which support compulsory detention do not also support compulsory treatment. The conceptual confusion between legitimacy of compulsory detention and legitimacy of compulsory treatment is exacerbated by the ambiguous wording utilised in S 3 of the UK Mental Health Act, which implies that treatment may be necessary for the protection of others. Failure to pay attention to these distinctions has led to tragic consequences, in terms of violations of individual autonomy and in terms of public safety.