Liberal Autonomy as a Pluralistic Value

Abstract

For many liberals, the value of individual autonomy is the foundation of Uberai political morality; it underwrites individuals' rights and liberties and liberal notions of justice, marks the limits of liberal toleration, and sets the terms on which a liberal society can also be a multicultural society (e.g., Raz 1986; Kymlicka 1989; 1995; Rawls 1993; Tamir 1993; Habermas 1994). Yet, for many multiculturalists, the liberal value of individual autonomy is an obstacle to building a multicultural democracy; it is seen as too 'sectarian', demanding, or intolerant a value on which to base political morality for a culturally diverse society (e.g., Young 1990; Margalit and Halbertal 1994; Parekh 2000; Galston 2002; Kukathas 2003; Modood 2007). In this essay, I want to argue that autonomy is a much more 'open', democratic, and accommodating value than both these liberal and multiculturalist accounts suggest.Of course, one might reasonably ask why persevere with liberal autonomy at all. As the multiculturalism literature now abundantly attests, there are, after all, other theoretical and even liberal approaches available that promise to be far more accommodating of cultural difference than any autonomy-based approach is likely to be. If autonomy commands attention, it is because of its pervasive place as a governing value in liberal democracies today. Part of the new thinking associated with the Enlightenment, autonomy's influence as a public value largely emerged in the twentieth century. That influence has only continued to grow. While never reaching the ubiquity prescribed by so-called 'comprehensive liberals', the valorisation of autonomy has increasingly come to inform - or be reflected in - the law, public policy, and even interpersonal relations in liberal democracies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Indeed, it is fair to say that the rise of autonomy as a governing value constitutes something of a world historical transformation. But this is also why it is important to scrutinize what is claimed in the name of respecting autonomy. As we will see, though often deployed as a blunt instrument and argument stopper, the liberal value of autonomy in fact offers a platform for democratic contestation and intercultural dialogue about the permissible limits of liberal toleration. My point of departure, then, is that autonomy also speaks to the interests of cultural minorities negotiating life today in liberal societies, and that they would do well also to speak the language of autonomy.I will begin (part 1) by canvassing the concept of autonomy relevant to this discussion. Autonomy is a notoriously slippery concept to pin down, so it is essential to clarify the dimensions of the concept that are implicitly appealed to in law and public policy. I will suggest a framework for operationalizing autonomy as a multidimensional political value, and which allows mainstream and minority practices to be assessed and compared on their 'autonomy credentials'. Thereafter, I will consider, in turn, three areas where the value of autonomy lends itself to considerable interpretive and practical latitude. The first (part 2) concerns the applicability of autonomy; that is, whether specific practices can be said to satisfy or violate the dimensions of autonomy. The second area (part 3) involves the issue ?? prioritization. This aspect occurs implicitly inasmuch as the dimensions of autonomy have differential political force in liberal practice, and arises circumstantially where cases pit the autonomy of different parties against each other or where other compelling public interests are at stake. In each case, judgments need to be made regarding how best to honor the value of autonomy in the circumstances. The final substantive part (4) argues that judgments concerning the applicability and prioritization of the dimensions of autonomy in relation to minority cultural practices should be informed by how a society treats mainstream practices and cases. …