Ferrajoli on Rights

Abstract

The author considers the distinction drawn by Ferrajoli betweenrights and their guarantees to be an important acquisition forpost-Kelsenian legal theory, but criticises the distinction drawn between fundamental rights and patrimonial rights, in particular contesting the hypothesis that non-disposability/inalienabilityis a characteristic of fundamental rights. On the contrary, Joribelieves that there is a substantial symmetry between fundamentalrights and patrimonial rights, because patrimonial rights can beseen as guarantees of the fundamental right of equal legal capacity.He also argues that the distinction between fundamental and patrimonial rights cannot be drawn solely on the formal terrain, but must beextended to their contents and their ethical importance. Finally,he studies Ferrajoli's thesis of citizenship: in his opinion, theabolition of citizenship hoped for by Ferrajoli would lead to asort of imperialism of rights, ethically a position fraught withproblems, in the light of the ethical value of individual autonomy.