Terms Of Mental States Research Articles

Reduced mentalizing in patients with bulimia nervosa and features of borderline personality disorder: A case-control study

BackgroundMentalizing, the mental capacity to understand oneself and others in terms of mental states, has been found to be reduced in some mental disorders such as Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Some studies have suggested that Eating Disorders (EDs) may also be associated with impairments in mentalizing, but studies have not always yielded consistent results. This is the first study to systematically investigate mentalizing impairments in patients with Bulimia Nervosa (BN) compared with controls. In addition, we investigated whether impairments in mentalizing were related to BPD features, rather than BN per se, given the high comorbidity between BPD and BN.MethodsPatients with BN (n = 53) and healthy controls (HCs; n = 87) completed a battery of measures assessing mentalizing including the Reflective Function Questionnaires (RFQ), the Object Relations Inventory (ORI; Differentiation-Relatedness Scales) and the Reading The Mind in The Eyes Test (RMET).ResultsPatients with BN scored significantly lower than HCs on all tests of mentalizing, with moderate to large between-group effect sizes. These differences were partially accounted for by BPD features as assessed with the Zanarini Rating Scale for Borderline Personality Disorder (ZAN-BPD), and partially by bulimic symptoms measured with the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q).ConclusionsPatients with BN have significantly lower levels of mentalizing as assessed with a broad range of tests compared to HCs. These differences were related to both bulimic symptoms and BPD features. Although further research in larger samples is needed, if replicated, these findings suggest that poor mentalizing may be a significant factor in BN patients and should be addressed in treatment, regardless of the presence of BPD features.

A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire (§2), I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition (§3) and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, they have a form of derived-intentionality. §4 argues that what feelings are about, in this derived sense, is our relationship to ourselves and the world: they function as affective appraisals of the state of our agency. §5 shows that this function is necessary to the activity of the mind insofar as it is orientational. Finally, §6 discusses the examples of epistemic pleasure and moral contentment and argues that they manifest the conditions of cognitive and moral agency respectively.

Fluctuations of mentalization in the context of relational stimuli and representational contents

BackgroundMentalization as the ability to interpret human behavior in terms of mental states is not a stable characteristic but is subject to fluctuation depending on the context. Nonlinear system theories explain the fluctuation of mentalization by stressing the context of the relationship in which there emerges a new quality of mentalization and/or activation of elements of the internal system of representations.Participants and procedureThe aim of the study was to test whether the fluctuation of mentalization depends on the type of relational stimulus (imagining the responsiveness/unresponsiveness of a significant other) or on the interaction of the stimulus with the content aspects of representation (a predominance of relatedness/sociotropy or a predominance of self-definition/autonomy). The investigators collected the utterances of 49 students about a situation involving a significant other, which was preceded by a request to imagine that this person was responsive (Condition 1) or unresponsive (Condition 2). The level of mentalization was assessed by means of the Metacognition Assessment Scale. The investigators divided the group into two subgroups with different configu­rations of representational contents (a predominance of relatedness/sociotropy or self-definition/autonomy) bas­ed on the scores in the Personal Style Inventory.ResultsMentalization fluctuations dependent on the interaction of the stimulus and representational contents were observed in the group with a predominance of sociotropic contents for interpersonal mentalization but not for self-reflective mentalizing.ConclusionsMentalization must not be decontextualized; however, it is not the stimulus alone but the interaction of the stimulus with representational content that determines the fluctuations of mentalization. Individuals with a predominance of relatedness experience a decline in the capacity for interpersonal mentalization after imagining a significant other’s unresponsiveness, which can be interpreted as resulting from a weakening of the function of differentiating.

The Italian version of the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire: Validity data for adults and its association with severity of borderline personality disorder.

IntroductionImpairments in the ability to understand others and the self in terms of internal mental states (reflective functioning [RF] or mentalizing) are thought to play a key role in the development of borderline personality disorder (BPD). The first aim of this study was to validate the Italian version of the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ), a brief self-report measure of RF, by examining its factor structure with Principal Component Analyses (PCA), and correlations with constructs that should be theoretically related to RF. In addition, we investigated whether the RFQ could empirically distinguish between healthy controls and carefully diagnosed BPD patients using Research Operating Curve methods, and was related to severity of borderline pathology as measured with the Shedler–Westen Assessment Procedure (SWAP), an observer-rated measure of BPD pathology.MethodsAn Italian translation of the RFQ was administered to a sample of 154 healthy controls and a clinical sample of 59 BPD patients diagnosed with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II disorders. Clinical severity of BPD was assessed with the SWAP. Normal controls completed self-report inventories of constructs related to RF (mindfulness, empathy, Theory of Mind, alexithymia, and autistic traits).ResultsPCA confirmed the a priori factor structure in the Italian translation of the RFQ, showing two subscales that measure certainty and uncertainty about mental states, with satisfactory reliability and construct validity. These dimensions also distinguished BPD patients from healthy controls (p < 0.05). ROC analyses showed that the uncertainty subscale discriminated BPD patients from healthy individuals (area under the curve = 78%, cut of 4.5 points, sensitivity = 73%, specificity = 68%). Within the patient group, regression analyses showed uncertainty about mental states to have a significant unique contribution in predicting BPD severity (p < 0.05), explaining 12% of the variance.ConclusionsResults largely supported the reliability and validity of the Italian version of the RFQ. These findings also provide further evidence for the role of impairments in mentalizing and reinforce the rationale for offering mentalization-based interventions to individuals with this disorder.

Attenuated impression of irony created by the mismatch of verbal and nonverbal cues in patients with autism spectrum disorder.

Perception of irony has been observed to be impaired in adults with autism spectrum disorder. In typically developed adults, the mismatch of verbal and nonverbal emotional cues can be perceived as an expression of irony even in the absence of any further contextual information. In this study, we evaluate to what extent high functioning autists perceive this incongruence as expressing irony. Our results show that incongruent verbal and nonverbal signals create an impression of irony significantly less often in participants with high-functioning autism than in typically developed control subjects. The extent of overall autistic symptomatology as measured with the autism-spectrum questionnaire (AQ), however, does not correlate with the reduced tendency to attribute incongruent stimuli as expressing irony. Therefore, the attenuation in irony attribution might rather be related to specific subdomains of autistic traits, such as a reduced tendency to interpret communicative signals in terms of complex intentional mental states. The observed differences in irony attribution support the assumption that a less pronounced tendency to engage in higher order mentalization processes might underlie the impairment of pragmatic language understanding in high functioning autism.

Is it enough to put yourself in another’s shoes? Thoughts about the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior

Empathy is the ability to understand another one’s mental states in terms of emotions and thoughts. In the pubblic mind, often, this skill is directly related to the ability to act in a prosocial, or moral, way. Clinical literature shows us that some neural deficits and psychological disorders can actually cause a significant lack of empathic ability and therefore the implementation of socially maladaptive behaviours, even criminal. However, there are also some diagnostic categories characterised by failure to “put yourself in another’s shoes”, but patients don’t usually act in an antisocial way; then, not all the criminals meet the criteria for psychiatric diagnosis. So, the question is: only low levels of empathy leads to antisocial behaviours? And if so, does therapeutic interventions for empathic skill entail moral enhancement? The present work aim to answer to all those issues through a multilevel and cross-discilplinary analysis of psychology, neurosciences and philosophy literature.

Desire understanding in 2-year-old children: An eye-tracking study

‘Much research has investigated children’s understanding of others’ mental states in terms of beliefs, but far less is known about their understanding of others’ desires. To fill this gap, we used an eye-tracking paradigm to test 2-year-old children’s desire understanding by measuring their anticipatory looking behavior as well as changes in their internal arousal (i.e., changes in pupil dilation). Children showed increased pupil dilation when an adult reached for an object she had previously emoted negatively towards (the object incongruent with her desire). Children also showed weaker evidence of anticipating that an adult will reach for an object that she had emoted positively towards (the object congruent with her desire). These results suggest that 2-year-olds robustly recognize whether or not an individual’s actions are consistent with her desires, and seem to have a budding capacity to predict an individual’s actions based on her desires. Thus, by age 2 years, children are on their way to acquiring a robust desire psychology.

Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics

This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s (2017) argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one way or another, have neither practical nor theoretical import. Rowlands concludes this because, on his analysis, there is no non-arbitrary fact of the matter about which properties something must possess in order to qualify as a mental representation. By way of reply, we admit that Rowlands’s analysis succeeds in revealing why attempts to answer the RTM-question simpliciter are pointless. Nevertheless, we show that if specific formulations of the RTM-question are stipulated, then it is possible, conduct substantive RTM debates that do not collapse into merely verbal disagreements. Combined, Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate how, by employing specifying stipulations, we can get around Rowlands’s arbitrariness challenge. Section 2 reveals why RTM, as canonically construed in terms of mental states exhibiting intensional (with-an-s) properties, has been deemed a valuable explanatory hypothesis in the cognitive sciences. Targeting the canonical notion of mental representations, Section 3 articulates a rival nonrepresentational hypothesis that, we propose, can do all the relevant explanatory work at much lower theoretical cost. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show what can be at stake in the RTM debate when it is framed by appeal to the canonical notion of mental representation and why engaging in it matters. Section 4 extends the argument for thinking that RTM debates matter. It provides reasons for thinking that, far from making no practical or theoretical difference to the sciences of the mind, deciding to abandon RTM would constitute a revolutionary conceptual shift in those sciences.

Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness

Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to the impure intentionalist account of states of sensory awareness. On the basis of Husserl’s phenomenological work, I argue that a focus on intentionality at the level of sensory awareness is phenomenologically implausible. The final part offers an alternative functional account of sensory awareness based on what Husserl called ‘immanent association’.

Mentalizacijos paauglystėje raida ir sutrikimai

Paauglystė – tai laikotarpis, kai vyksta itin daug pokyčių, ypač svarbių socialiniam pažinimui. Tai nulemia vis geresnį paauglių savęs įsisąmoninimą (Harter, 2012). Todėl šiuo laikotarpiu labai svarbus tampa besivystantis mentalizacijos gebėjimas, užtikrinantis savo ir kitų elgesio supratimą psichikos būsenų kontekste (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, &amp; Target, 2005). Nors neabejojama paauglystės laikotarpio svarba įtvirtinant mentalizacijos gebėjimą, vis dar stokojama nuoseklios mentalizacijos raidos paauglystėje analizės. Šiame straipsnyje* siekiama užpildyti esamą spragą ir, remiantis psichodinamine, raidos psichologijos, raidos psichopatologijos bei neuromokslo teorine ir empirine medžiaga, analizuoti mentalizacijos gebėjimo raidą paauglystėje, pagrindinį dėmesį skiriant paauglystėje svarbiausioms poliariškoms mentalizacijos konstrukto dimensijoms – emocinei ir kognityviai bei savęs ir kito mentalizacijai, taip pat mentalizacijos sutrikimo sąsajai su psichopatologija.

Mentalizing and interpersonal problems in borderline personality disorder: The mediating role of identity diffusion

Individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) are characterized by problems in interpersonal functioning and their long-term social integration often remains problematic. Extant theories have linked identity diffusion to many of the interpersonal problems characteristic of BPD patients. Recent theoretical accounts have suggested that identity diffusion results from problems with mentalizing or reflective functioning, that is, the capacity to understand oneself and others in terms of intentional mental states. In this study we tested these assumptions, i.e., whether identity diffusion plays a mediating role in the relationship between mentalizing difficulties and interpersonal problems, in a sample of 167 BPD patients. Highly significant correlations were found between mentalizing impairments, identity diffusion and interpersonal problems. Mediation analyses showed that identity diffusion fully mediated the relationship between mentalizing difficulties and interpersonal problems. This study provides preliminary evidence that impairments in mentalizing are related to identity diffusion, which in turn is related to interpersonal problems in BPD. Further longitudinal research is needed to further substantiate these conclusions.

Mentalization-Based Treatment for Adolescents with Borderline Personality Disorder - Concept and Efficacy

Mentalization-Based Treatment for Adolescents with Borderline Personality Disorder - Concept and Efficacy In recent years, the concept of mentalization has become increasingly important in practice and research. It describes the imaginative ability to understand human behavior in terms of mental states. Mentalization is a central component to understand the etiology and to treat patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Both adult and adolescent patients with BPD have limited mentalization abilities, which can be reliably assessed using the Reflective Functioning Scale. Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT) was originally developed as an integrative approach for the treatment of adult patients with BPD. It is a manualized psychotherapy with psychodynamic roots with the aim to increase mentalizing abilities of patients. Since then, MBT has been further developed for other mental disorders as well as for the treatment of different age groups. One of these developments is MBT for Adolescents (MBT-A). MBT-A includes both individual as well as family sessions and the average duration of therapy is about twelve months. MBT-A can be applied in inpatient and outpatient settings and aims to improve mentalizing abilities in emotionally important relationships and the whole family system. First studies have found evidence for the efficacy of MBT-A. A randomized controlled trial (RCT) is currently being carried out to evaluate the efficacy of MBT-A for adolescents with conduct disorder. However, further evidence for efficacy and further conceptual development is needed.

The expressive function of folk psychology

The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states. Keywords: folk psychology, propositional attitudes ascriptions, reasons, expressivism, descriptivism.

Mentalization in Chilean Educational Staff With 12-Month-Old Children: Does It Make a Difference in Relation to What Children Receive at Home?

ABSTRACTParental mentalizing, which is the capacity to understand behavior in terms of mental states and to reflect this back to a child through speech, is a key construct in child development. Adults with high mentalization promote children’s secure attachment, mentalization and self-regulation. This study describes this competency in a sample of teachers from Chilean nurseries in interaction with 12-month-old children during a storytelling scenario and compares it with the children’s mothers. The sample comprised 208 adults (104 teachers and 104 mothers). The adults were asked to tell 2 stories to the children, and these situations were recorded, transcribed, and codified using guidelines that identified 4 references to mental states (desires, cognitions, emotions, and attributes) and 4 references to nonmental states (causal and factual talk, physical states, and connections with the child’s life). Research Findings: The results showed significant differences between the educational staff and the mothers, and the teachers performed better than the mothers in terms of both greater mentalization and a greater number of references to desires, causal talk, emotions, and physical states. Practice or Policy: The results provide evidence regarding the supportive role played by educational staff in children’s development, especially in underprivileged sectors.

Pluralism, social cognition, and interaction in autism

In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are well able to understand other people’s behavior by considering social rules and norms, scripts, and stereotypes. Moreover, some individuals with autism succeed in understanding other people’s behavior in terms of mental states by employing explicit behavioral rules as a compensatory strategy. The paper ends with a discussion of the social cognitive (dys)functions in autism and their relation to the motivation of individuals with autism to engage in social interaction.

Grasping for Traits or Reasons? How People Grapple With Puzzling Social Behaviors

Within social psychology, it is well accepted that trait inference is the dominant tool for understanding others' behavior. Outside of social psychology, a different consensus has emerged, namely, that people predominantly explain behavior in terms of mental states. Both positions are based on limited evidence. The trait literature focuses on trait ascriptions to persons, not explanations of behavior. The mental state literature focuses on explanations of ordinary behaviors (for which social scripts provide mental states), not of expectancy-violating behaviors. We examined the critical test case for the two opposing positions: explanations of expectancy-violating behaviors. Participants provided open-ended explanations of puzzling actions, which were content-analyzed for use of mental states, traits, and other causal background factors. Across four studies, three stimulus sets, and two subpopulations, people overwhelmingly offered mental states when explaining puzzling actions (compared with ordinary actions), while they struggled to generate traits and other background factors.

Imagining Experiences

AbstractIt is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take for a special imagistic way of thinking about experiences is instead a special way of misconstruing them. It is this tendency to misrepresent experiences through the use of imagery that gives rise to the appearance of an explanatory gap. The pervasiveness and tenacity of this misrepresentational reflex can be traced to its roots in a particular heuristic for monitoring and remembering the mental states of others. The arguments together amount to a new path for defending the transparency of perceptual experience.

Gender differences in the relationships of temperament and behavioral problems in Russian adolescents

Problems related to aggression in young people are traditionally subsumed under the header of conduct problems, which include conduct disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. Such problems in children and adolescents are an important societal and mental health problem. In this paper we present an evolutionarily informed developmental psychopathology view of conduct problems inspired by the NIMH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative. We assume that while there are many pathways to conduct problems, chronic or temporary impairments in the domain of social cognition or mentalizing are a common denominator. Specifically, we conceptualize conduct problems as reflecting temporary or chronic difficulties with mentalizing, that is, the capacity to understand the self and others in terms of intentional mental states, leading to a failure to inhibit interpersonal violence through a process of perspective-taking and empathy. These difficulties, in turn, stem from impairments in making use of a normally evolutionarily protected social learning system that functions to facilitate intergenerational knowledge transmission and protect social collaborative processes from impulsive and aggressive action. Temperamental, biological, and social risk factors in different combinations may all contribute to this outcome. This adaptation then interacts with impairments in other domains of functioning, such as in negative and positive valence systems and cognitive systems. This view highlights the importance of a complex interplay among biological, psychological, and environmental factors in understanding the origins of conduct problems. We outline the implications of these views for future research and intervention.

Taking the fictional stance

In this paper, I set out to answer two foundational questions concerning our psychological engagements with fictions. The first is the question of fictional transformation: How we can see fictional media while also ‘seeing’ those objects as fictional ones? The second is the question of fictional response: How and why we take the objects of fiction to be the types of things that we can respond to and judge? Standard responses to these questions rely on distinct cognitive attitudes like pretense, imagination, and make-believe. I call this position the distinct attitude view (DAV). I argue against the DAV, arguing instead that a psychological framework of fiction can answer the two questions without appealing to distinct mental attitudes. Hence, I call my position the standard attitude view (SAV). The challenge for the SAV is to explain the two questions in terms of everyday mental states and the intentional content of those states. I do so by appealing to the concept of taking the fictional stance. We take the fictional stance when we recognize that the object of our engagement is fictional. I bolster the fictional stance with a commonsense ontology of fiction, a notion of representational seeing, and an analogy with Arthur Danto’s ‘is’ of artistic identification. I conclude by showing how the fictional stance helps to solve the paradox of fiction: a puzzle concerning the nature of our emotional responses towards fictions.

Cognición social y educación: teoría de la mente

Theory of mind —children’s understanding of themselves and others in terms of internal mental states, such as thoughts, wants, and emotions— influences children’s transition to school and their success within school. This article reviews evidence showing that theory of mind influences school-age children’s relationships with their peers and teachers, and thus their adjustment to school. It also influences children’s academic motivation within school and for school tasks. Theory of mind further directly influences children’s successful performance on, and strategies for undertaking, academic tasks, such as reading and mathematics. Moreover, it fosters children’s abilities to provide explanations, which in turn help them learn new material more effectively from teacher instruction and from school textbook material.