Abstract
Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to the impure intentionalist account of states of sensory awareness. On the basis of Husserl’s phenomenological work, I argue that a focus on intentionality at the level of sensory awareness is phenomenologically implausible. The final part offers an alternative functional account of sensory awareness based on what Husserl called ‘immanent association’.
Highlights
Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in discussing consciousness
This paper argues that the impure intentionalist account of states of sensory awareness is phenomenologically implausible and provides an alternative to it that does not rely on intentionality
To conclude this section: we have seen that impure intentionalism is a phenomenological theory which suggests that all mental states involve a mode and content, and that they are always directed at an object
Summary
Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in discussing consciousness. This description coincides with the standard intentionalist view I discussed so far, according to which consciousness can be adequately accounted for in terms of what is being represented This standard view differs, from Crane’s own theory, which suggests that consciousness is determined ‘by its entire intentional nature’ (Crane 2009, 475). As for Crane, for Husserl intentional consciousness cannot be adequately addressed exclusively in terms of represented contents; it requires referring to act-processes and their various sub-components as well This third claim seems to put Husserl’s theory of intentionality in closer proximity to Crane’s impure intentionalism than to the standard intentionalist view. I suggest that sensory awareness can be understood functionally in non-intentional terms on the basis of association and the subjective affections that co-vary with its operations
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
