Supranational System Research Articles

A computer laboratory for studying resource dilemmas

This article deals with decision making in small human groups that share renewable resources. It describes a computer-controlled laboratory that was developed to study factors that influence group members' decisions about resource uses in situations which may lead to the so-called “tragedy of the commons,” in which common resources are depleted unless all users exercise self-restraint. Simular situations can arise in organizations, societies, and supranational systems.

The earth as a system

The planet Earth is a mixed living and nonliving system. It is the suprasystem of all supranational systems as well as the total ecological system, with all its living and nonliving components. The Earth is studied in this article in terms of a general theory of all concrete systems, with special attention to the important subset of living systems. The Earth is an open system, interacting with its atmosphere and with matter and energy in space. Its systemwide processes and the processes of its various components, as well as their variables and indicators, are discussed. In the light of known facts about the Earth as a system, consideration is given to future worldwide problems which must be dealt with by human planners and statesmen.

Expansions: a study in the unity of science.

This article attempts to establish some of the general laws relating to spatial aspects of general systems theory, i.e., how forces, impulses, and ideas (matter, energy, and information) spread, diversify, and compete with one another, and how the earlier history of observed structures can be traced by backtracking. Principles that have long been accepted for nonliving and low-level living systems are recognized in the activities of individual human beings, groups, and supranational systems.

The internal security subsystem

Internal security processes protect all levels of living systems from error and disruption produced by internal and external factors. Such processes allow organizations to survive and evolve in a hostile environment. An internal security subsystem may be present at each level of organization recognized for living systems: cell, organ, organism, group, organization, society, and supranational system. In order for internal security processes to be effective, they must ordinarily maintain steady relationships with the other 19 processes which are critical to living systems (Miller, 1978). Optimal levels of security effectiveness exist which maximize the probability of system success. Too much security results in rigidity so the system cannot evolve or adapt to environmental changes, while too little security results in chaos so the system cannot survive. A catastrophe model can be used to describe the relationships between probability of system success, system health, and effectiveness of security processes.

A dynamic model of protocoalition formation in ideologicaln-space

Axelrod's (1970) notion of “connected coalition” is generalized to the N-dimensional case, and a simple but powerful model of coalition dynamics is put forth which generates connected coalitions with certainty in the unidimensional case and which usually, but not necessarily, gives rise to minimal winning coalitions. Political decision making is discussed at the levels of the group, organization, society, and supranational system. Unlike most other models in the coalition literature, the model presented: (a) is based on notions of ideological policy proximity rather than on notions such as least resources or zero-sum conflict; (b) posits a dynamic process of protocoalition formation which permits two actors to join in a (proto)coalition only when each is the other's most preferred partner; and (c) for sufficient information about the policy preferences/ideological views of the political actors, yields unique predictions as to which coalition can be expected to form.

Toward a theory of acceptable outcomes

This paper presents a theory which defines the characteristics of an outcome that is acceptable to a negotiator in the decider subsystem of a human, group, organization, society, or supranational system. It is generally held that any outcome that a negotiator finds to be preferred to his level of aspiration is acceptable. The theoretical issue is to establish the lowest level of aspiration a negotiator could have in a given situation. Conventional theory suggests that the lowest level of aspiration is the security level value or outcome a negotiator guarantees himself in the absence of an agreement. This paper suggests that conventional predictions understate the actual limit of aspiration and that the actual limit is defined in terms of the maxmax and minmax values rather than maxmrin value. The predictions of the theory are compared to experimental results, and no substantiated counter-examples were found.

Conflict as a determinant of territory

A model of spatial conflict is developed in which the outcome of the conflict is determined by the number of individuals of the same “type”—e.g., religion, ethnic group, or political belief—adjacent to the conflict. The model is discussed with respect to society and supranational systems, but may also be applicable at lower levels. This model is shown to generate territorial grouping out of an initially random distribution of individual types. This model is compared to null models in which the outcome and initiation of conflicts do not depend on spatial relationships and it is shown that these models do not generate territories quickly. A model in which the initiation of conflicts is spatially independent is shown to be able to dissolve existing territorial groupings, which is a result similar to Herz's hypothesis on the demise of territorial states. It is also shown that two types cannot coexist, even with territories, unless they are equal in power. The model is developed as both a computer simulation and a mathematical model; a number of generalizations of the model are suggested which might make it applicable to other social and biological processes.

A unified model for bargaining and conflict

A new model of decision making is introduced. It can be applied to two person systems, at the level of the group, as well as at the level of the organization, the society, and the supranational system. It is determinate when bargainers' information is complete, incomplete, or erroeous. The paper includes a determinate treatment of the outguessing regress, wherein each negotiator chooses his bargaining strategy (in part) based upon his expectations concerning the other's strategy, while expecting that the other chooses his strategy based upon corresponding expectations. The conditions under which negotiations break down or result in agreements which are less than Pareto optimal are also specified. The paper concludes with an application of the proposed model to manipulative bargaining, where negotiators employ manipulative tactics that alter their own or the other's expectations, utility functions, or alternatives, as well as to metabargaining, i.e., bargaining concerning which manipulative tactics will occur.

The asymptotic likelihood of agreement between plurality and condorcet outcomes

This article deals with collective decision making by voting procedures in living systems at the levels of groups, organizations, societies, or supranational systems. General principles are outlined which permit the determination of the likelihood of agreement, and disagreement, between plurality and Condorcet outcomes when system size is large, for any number of alternatives in virtually any culture. A method is developed which ascertains, for any number of alternatives, the system in which the likelihood of plurality/Condorcet disagreement reaches a maximum. The hypothesis that an inverse relation exists between the probability of plurality distortion and the probability of the paradox of voting is disproved. Methodological issues arising from previous work are considered.

Benefits and costs of confidential information: An application of systems theory and catastrophe theory

This article concerns confidentiality of information in social systems at the levels of the group, organization, society, and supranational system. It analyses the benefits and costs of confidentiality in terms of actual and potential Pareto optimality. A systems perspective based on the ecological concepts of successional and climax communities is used to analyze both the power and limit of confidential information as a single purpose instrument amid conflicting objectives. A cusp catastrophe is employed to model discontinuity in confidential behavior, which tends to reduce the quality and availability of confidential information and, therefore, increase the cost of obtaining it when confidentiality is violated. Finally, an approach to a selective protection of confidentiality is suggested which achieves both economic efficiency and distributional justice by varying the assignments of rights and burden of proof to different parties depending on their relative gains/losses and relative strength.

Effects of abstentions on voting procedures in three-candidate elections

This article deals with decision making in living systems at the levels of the organization, society, or supranational system. Abstention rates have a significant effect on the propensities of different voting procedures to elect the global Condorcet majority candidate in a three-candidate election when it exists. Hence any comparison of voting procedures that is concerned about the election of a global Condorcet candidate should reckon with abstention rates that may obtain for different procedures. Precise and approximate Condorcet propensities as functions of abstention rates are derived for the following voting rules for large electorates: Condorcet rules, including Black's rule; weighted scoring rules, including plurality and Borda rules; approval voting; and runoff elections in which a weighted scoring rule is used to eliminate one of the three candidates after the first ballot.

A single measure for point and interval predictions of coalition theories

Some theories of coalition formation (e.g., the weighted probability model) make specific point predictions about the probabilities that various coalitions will form, while others predict only that some coalitions should be more likely than others, without making specific predictions about probabilities. Similarly, some theories make point predictions about the distribution of rewards within a coalition, while others (e.g., the bargaining set) make range predictions rather than point predictions. These theories apply to decision processes of living systems at the levels of groups, organizations, societies, and supranational systems. A measure is developed for evaluating competitively these otherwise incomparable types of predictions. The measure, E, is the mean squared distance between the experimental distribution of proportions and the whole set of probability distributions consistent with the prediction. A “proportional reduction in error” version of E is also suggested.

Deterrence and arms races: An optimal control systems model

A mathematical model representing the notion of deterrence theory, as depicted in the literature, is studied. This model applies to decision processes of supranational systems. A nation deters its adversary by its capacity to absorb a first attack and to render a retaliatory attack. To construct the model representing this, concepts from the optimal control theory are used. The optimal policy is derived and the parameters in the model are estimated from defense expenditures of various nations involved in three post-World War II arms races. From the model so constructed, the stability properties of three current arms races are analyzed.

The global energy system.

A global energy system is conceptualized and analyzed, the energy distributor sub-system of the worldwide supranational system. Its many interconnections are examined and traced back to their source to determine the major elements of this global energy system. Long-term trends are emphasized. The analysis begins with a discussion of the local systems that resulted from the deployment of technology in the mid-nineteenth century, continues with a description of the global system based on oil that has existed for the past two decades, and ends with a scenario implying that an energy transition will occur in the future in which use of coal, nuclear, and solar energy will predominate. A major problem for the future will be the management of this energy transition. The optimal use of global resources and the efficient management of this transition will require a stable and persistent global order.

A paradigm for bargaining and a test of two bargaining models

A new experimental paradigm for two-person bargaining is introduced. It can be applied to decision making in two-person systems at the level of the group as well as at the level of the organization, the society, and the supranational system. The paradigm is used in a comparative evaluation of the Nash and Smorodinsky-Kalai solutions to the bargaining problem. The aim is to devise a means for experimentally analyzing two-person two-party bargaining processes which avoids a number of difficulties afflicting previous experimental paradigms. In particular, the paradigm presented here is intended to control equity and related processes as they affect the process and outcome of bargaining. A discussion of means for conceiving equity and related processes using the Nash and Smorodinsky-Kalai bargaining models is provided together with an illustration of procedures for experimentally controlling them. The experimental results strongly support the Smorodinsky-Kalai model over the Nash model.

Who accepts the pareto axiom? the role of utility and equity in arbitration decisions

Some controversy surrounds the role of equity considerations in decisions about resource allocation and policy decisions at the levels of the group, organization, society, and supranational systems. In two descriptive studies arbitration judgments for hypothetical two-party conflicts made by 70 public administration students were compared to predictions from four social welfare functions incorporating equity considerations: Sen's absolute deviation model, Sen's variance model, Keeney and Raiffa's multilinear model, and Rawls' maximin principle. Two experiments—one using regression analyses of ratings, the other using conjoint measurement analyses of rankings—yielded the same conclusions. The arbitration judgments are best described by Sen's absolute deviation model, W = [(a + b)/2] + (1 - )[- | a - b |/2], where W is the arbiter's evaluative rating of a contract which assigns utilities a and b to parties 1 and 2, respectively, and where is an empirical constant representing the tradeoff between utility and equity. This model not only has a better statistical fit to the data than do the others tested, but also predicts the substantial violations of Pareto optimality which did occur. Over half the participants in each experiment showed a willingness to accept reduced total utility in order to obtain a more equitable distribution of utility to the two parties. Implications for axiomatic social welfare functions, for future research, and for policy applications are discussed.

Theory content and explanatory power of simulation models

A concise methodology for the efficient modeling of behavioral phenomena in living systems at the levels of organisms, groups, organizations, societies, and supranational systems is proposed. The methodology helps resolve questions such as: When a model is to be made more complex? What variables are useful ones to add? When should the model development process cease? The methodology is founded upon (1) the precise identification and delineation of the set of behavioral phenomena to be explained, and (2) the development of a meaningful metric of the content or “size” of alternative explanatory models. From these data, measures of explanatory power (relative amount of the phenomena explained) and explanatory yield (the average amount of explanation per unit of theory content) may be derived. Explanatory power is shown to be an increasing function of theory content, and explanatory yield is shown to be a decreasing function of theory content. The methodology is illustrated in detail in the context of six successive simulation models of the cognitive behaviors of a subject solving a job shop scheduling task. The success of the final model in providing a complete description of one large class of the subject's behavior corroborates the usefulness of the methodology.

Counterpart strategy, prior relations, and constituent pressure in a bargaining simulation

This article concerns decision making by bargaining in systems at the levels of groups, organizations, societies, and supranational systems. A 2 × 2 × 2 (conflictual or peaceful × strong or weak × cooperative-competitive or competitive-cooperative) factorial design was used to examine the effects of the prior relationship between the bargaining parties, constituent pressure on the bargaining representative, and the counterpart's strategy. The dependent variables were subject decisions in the bargaining simulation, attitudinal factors, and future intentions. Data were collected from 160 male subjects in a laboratory simulation of group interactions. The task consisted of assuming the role of a management bargaining representative and making ten bargaining decisions on various issues. Results indicated that a cooperative-competitive counterpart strategy gave a higher level of overall subject cooperation, but a more competitive final decision, a less favorable attitude toward the counterpart, and less willingness to retain the counterpart in future bargaining. Strong constituent pressure produced greater subject competitiveness, but a more negative attitude toward the constituent. Peaceful prior relations resulted in a more cooperative initial decision, but did not affect the overall level of cooperation. Interactive effects showed that subjects encountering a cooperative-competitive strategy and conflictual prior relations were more willing to participate in future bargaining when they received strong constituent pressure. Conversely, if a competitive-cooperative strategy and peaceful relations occurred, there was more willingness to participate in the future when weak constituent pressure existed.

A naive approach to the Banzhaf index of power

A measure of power is defined for a weighted voting game which is based on the probability that an individual is in a winning coalition. It is proved that the Banzhaf index of power is equivalent to this measure. This suggests that the Banzhaf index is the appropriate measure to use when the results, rather than the process of coalition formation, are the important considerations. This article is applicable to decision making in living systems at the levels of the group, the organization, society, or the supranational system.

The politics of decrementalism: The case of soviet-japanese salmon catch negotiations, 1957–1977

Locating the Soviet-Japanese fishery negotiations of 1957–1977 in the broader perspective of emerging ocean politics, a time series model of negotiation processes and outcomes is constructed to show that the negotiations can best be characterized as the politics of decrementalism. A state space equations model allows some advantage over more conventional estimating procedures. Such a model is constructed to show the nature and characteristics of the decremental outcomes in the bilateral negotiations of 1957–1976 and takes account of the major policy intervention of 1962. The model is used to predict the 1977 negotiation outcomes on the basis of parameters recursively estimated from the 1957–1976 data set. The model, which applies to the bilateral subsystem of a supranational system, gives good predictive performance. Some conclusions and implications are drawn for conflict and its resolution in the context of Soviet-Japanese relations, as well as in the context of bilateral negotiations in the new ocean order.