Strategic Depth Research Articles

Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism

The change in Turkish foreign policy in the twenty-first century’s second decade has its origin in the approach referred to by Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu as Strategic Depth. Because it aims to give Turkey status as a Eurasian power, this approach has been described as neo-Ottomanism, referencing the geographic extent of the Ottoman Empire. Because of its intrinsic pragmatism and the geographical region that is its focus, Strategic Depth has been influenced by Eurasianist thought in Russia. But the Strategic Depth approach differs from Russian Eurasianist ideas because it refuses to place itself in conflict with Western civilization and instead positions Turkey as a bridge between Western and Muslim civilizations. To this extent, Strategic Depth may be described as a conservative interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism.

Russia’s Struggle for Military Reform: A Breakdown in Conversion Capabilities

This article assesses the recent attempts to reform the Russian military and the future prospects of successful reform. Despite serious social and economic ailments, Russia should still be able to modernize its military; however the key obstacles to reform lie in its leadership’s inability to shape existing resources into military capabilities. First, the article examines the decay in Russia’s manpower, defense budgeting, and defense industrial base. Second, the article surveys the security environment in which Russia must tailor these strategic resources. However, the state of these resources and Russia’s security needs do not justify the capabilities that the Russian military has developed. Therefore, the article identifies Russia’s inability to transform resources into capabilities as the missing link in military reform. Specifically, these poor ‘conversion capabilities’ include dysfunctional civil-military relations, misguided threat assessment and strategy formulation, and opaque doctrine. Finally, the article concludes that absent any external existential threats or a military disaster, successful military reform is unlikely, with implications for both the threshold at which Russia decides nuclear weapons are necessary as well as its perceived need for strategic depth.

Turkey`s Harmless Tango Between East and West

Turkey got actively involved in world politics and international relations after AKP came to power in early 2000s. Turkey`s foreign policy since AKP came to power, has the theoretical basis in Davutoglu`s Strategic Depth . New doctrines rely on historical right inherited from the Ottoman Empire, which contributed towards Turkish pro-active and multi-dimensional foreign policy. Without forgetting traditional Western allies, Turkey has established itself as a regional power in the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia with significant success. This paper attempts to analyze how Turkey has been playing a harmless tango between its traditional allies in the West and regions in the near abroad which had made Turkey a global player in the international relations. Then, it is important to analyze Turkey's transformation and its approved role by the Western powers as a strong Islamic country with secular governance in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Croatian pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1848

Since the early 1860s many Croat politicians, both prominent (from Ante Starcevic and Ante Pavelic to Franjo Tudjman) and little known, have been openly expressing the ambition to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia at a favourable moment and under certain conditions, invoking Croatian state and historical right in support of their pretensions. These pretensions, born out of the belief that the unfortunately shaped territory of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia lacks the necessary strategic depth, have led to a fully-fledged strategy for creating an ethnically and religiously pure Greater Croatia and to constant conflict with the Serb side which also lays claims, predominantly ethnic, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Macedonia after the Cold War

The provided paper describes main features of the Turkish foreign policy towards Macedonia after the Cold War. The strategic character of the bilateral Turkish‑Macedonian partnership has been underlined. This partnership has its roots in the pragmatic tendency of the Turkish foreign policy to strengthen its influence and provide stability in the Balkan Peninsula. It is also a part of the broader context of the Turkey’s foreign policy which is determined by global factors and centuries‑lasting history of bilateral relations. A particular dynamism of the Turkey’s foreign policy under Justice and Development Party’s rule has been underlined in this paper. It has been clarified that implementation of the “strategic depth” conception – that forms a normative base for Turkey’s foreign activities under prime minister R.T. Erdoğan’s rule – has largely contributed to the deepening of bilateral relations.

The United States and Afghanistan: A Diminishing Transactional Relationship

The United States has a long and varied history of engagement with Afghanistan. But through all the tortuous turns and ups and downs, the relationship, from the U.S. perspective, has almost always been a transactional one. Given its front line status, Afghanistan has usually been a pawn in a bigger strategic game, initially between the Communist bloc and the capitalist countries in the region (including Iran under the shah, Pakistan, and India) and subsequently between the secular world and radicalized Islam. Afghanistan's current status as a ward of the United States and international community is unusual and will not last.This essay suggests that regardless of whether a bilateral security agreement (BSA) is signed between Afghanistan and the United States, and assuming Afghanistan does not again become a haven for terrorism targeting the United States, U.S. interest will diminish. So too will U.S. resources invested in the country-whether military, economic, developmental, or diplomatic. Neighboring powers, such as India, Iran, and Pakistan, who have an immediate stake in a secure, stable Afghanistan, will become more important players. Long memories, the need for strategic depth, and the fear that Afghan soil will once again become a battleground for proxy warfare will militate against the realization of the Afghan government's vision of the country as the peaceful and prosperous heart of Asia.The History of U.S. Engagement in AfghanistanA brief review of the relationship between the United States and Afghanistan is instructive. Following World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union competed to maintain influence with Afghan rulers, as the British and Russian Empires had done in the previous century, using modest levels of technical, military, and development assistance-the Great Game once again played out in Afghanistan. After the invasion of 1979, the United States sought to undermine Soviet power by supporting the mujahideen, using Pakistani security forces as the delivery mechanism. Once the Soviet Union left in 1989 and the Najibullah regime collapsed in 1992, Afghanistan dropped off the U.S. radar until the Taliban swept into Kabul in 1996. Then followed a period in which the United States had an ambivalent relationship with Afghanistan: not recognizing the Islamic emirate that controlled 90% of the country, but intermittently engaging with its authorities through intermediaries on specific issues; providing some humanitarian support through the United Nations and the Red Cross/Red Crescent; encouraging private-sector interest in a pipeline across the country; and expressing concern about women's rights.All that changed with September 11. Having decisively ejected the Taliban in a lightning military campaign, the United States promoted a Western and largely multilateral agenda to stabilize and reconstruct the country and rebuild its institutions and economy. But by 2006, as the Taliban reasserted their presence and security began once again to deteriorate, the United States had moved to a counterinsurgency approach. By 2009 and the Obama administration's surge, this had mushroomed into a full-blown military and state-building campaign with an annual price tag over $120 billion-perhaps the most ambitious the world has seen in the last 50 years.Next Steps in U.S.-Afghanistan Relations: The Short TermU.S. engagement in Afghanistan will continue to evolve. In the short to medium term, much depends on whether a BSA between Afghanistan and the United States is signed. As for the longer term, predictions are unwise, but the country's strategic importance to the United States is likely to diminish unless Afghanistan once again becomes an incubator for transnational terrorism.Afghanistan with a BSA. If a BSA is signed, there is no guarantee that Afghanistan will continue to be a recipient of exceptional levels of U.S. assistance-currently higher in per capita terms than any other country excepting Israel1-but the prospects will be stronger that the administration will have enough political support to honor the pledges it made in Chicago and Tokyo for military and civilian support, respectively, until 2016. …

The sacred mountain: Confronting global capital at Niyamgiri

Translocal mobilizations on issues of social and environmental justice have arisen across the world, often in response to the depredations of extractive industries linked to global capital networks. A key challenge in theorizing such mobilization is to understand how dispersed and diverse actors come together contingently around common campaigns of justice, and enable powerless and marginal actors to contend with powerful state and corporate actors. In my paper, I draw on DeLanda’s work on assemblages to engage with this question in the context of the case of Niyamgiri in India. The proposal to mine Niyamgiri, a mountain located in South Odisha in India, gave rise to a transnational mobilization which included local grassroots movements, activists, lawyers, conservation organizations and human rights/indigenous rights networks from around the world. I describe the mobilization as a translocal assemblage of resistance, individuated out of interactions between diverse actors across locations and scales. I discuss how this assemblage emerged through interactions between pre-existing actors, networks and institutions, and enabled marginalized and powerless communities to contend with powerful assemblages of state and capital. I argue that thinking in terms of assemblages can provide a strategic depth to social and environmental justice movements, which totalizing discourses of capital, power and revolution often foreclose.

موقف تركيا من أحداث التغير في المنطقة العربية

The Turkish politics has been never stable towards the Arab revolutions, especially when it is happened in Libya. The Turkish politicians did not take clear stand from the Libyan revolution but even they stood against any external intervention towards the general regime of MuaMar Al-Qadafe. Later on, they were forced to change their stand under the pressures of United States of America and Arab countries. So their stand was becoming similar to Arab countries and USA. But the rush of Arabian rapid changes and transfers made the whole world astonished including the Turkish leaders who were preferring quite transformation into Arab countries in a form which did not affect on the Turkish regional role which is increased within few past years in the Arab area. The Turkish role is based on the theory of "strategic depth" which means that the location of Turkey and its history made it ready to move positively in all directions, especially in the direction, which is close to its boundaries. Therefore, it can keep its security and achieve its interests. To do this purpose, it must end the Turkish boycott with Middle East area and its issues, which are since long decades. Turkey lived during these decades in isolation and backwards inside "Anodal Plain", and it conducts as marginal state or as apart of NATO and western camp.

The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft

While decisionmakers warn about the cyber threat constantly, there is little systematic analysis of the issue from an international security studies perspective. Some scholars presume that the related technology's scientific complexity and methodological issues prohibit orderly investigation; only a minimum degree of technical acuity is needed, however, revealing the scope of maneuver in the cyber domain. Other skeptics argue that the cyber peril is overblown, contending that cyber weapons have no intrinsic capacity for violence and do not alter the nature or means of war. This view misses the essence of the danger and conceals its true significance: the new capability is expanding the range of possible harm and outcomes between the concepts of war and peace—with important implications for national and international security. The cyber domain, moreover, features enormous defense complications and dangers to strategic stability: offense dominance, attribution difficulties, technological volatility, poor strategic depth, escalatory ambiguity, and proliferation to nontraditional and subversive actors. But even if the cyber danger is overstated, the issue merits serious scholarly attention. Whatever the current cyber revolution signifies, it is detrimental to the intellectual progress and policy relevance of the field to continue to avoid its central questions.

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Iranian Nuclear Programme: In Search of a New Middle East Order after the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War

Turkey's role in the Iranian nuclear dossier is often portrayed as that of a 'facilitator' and 'mediator' in scholarly analyses. NATO member Turkey was seen as a potential bridge-builder between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 'Western camp' of negotiators. During prime minister Erdogan's first legislature, however, Ankara's and Washington's foreign policy outlooks and strategic priorities started to diverge in the course of Turkey's new regional engagement in what has been theorized as a 'Middle-Easternization' of Turkish foreign policy. It is Turkey's location as a geostrategic hub in a politically instable region that informed Turkey's 'Zero problems with neighbors' policy and foreign minister Davutoglu's advocacy for a 'Strategic Depth' in Turkey's foreign and regional policies. Ankara emphasizes its need to uphold sound relations with its neighbors and publicly stresses an unwillingness to go along with Western pressure on Iran, and insists on the principle of non-interference and Iran's right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. All the same, Turkish-Iranian relations are undergoing a deterioration in the wake of the Syrian civil war at the time of writing, with both sides supporting diametrically opposite causes and factions. Turkish-Iranian fundamentally differing conceptions of regional order will also impact upon Turkey's leverage power to defuse the Iranian nuclear crisis. This paper therefore adds a timely contribution to our understanding of a multifaceted and nuanced Turkish foreign policy toward Iran that can be a critical complement to 'Western' diplomatic initiatives in the search for new paradigms for a new Middle East order.

Pakistan’s Strategic Obsession and the Road to Catastrophe: Is There a Way Out?

Pakistan’s obsession of searching for a ‘strategic depth’ across the Durand Line in Afghanistan and a ‘Muslim Space’ in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has proved to be a devastating policy for the country in pursuit of which its military-intelligence establishment implanted the seeds of Islamism, extremism and state-sponsored terrorism on both sides of their borders. This strategic overstretch, though driven by a strong military sense of geo-politics among its largely military rulers, is embedded in the country’s unrealistic yearnings, out of place perceptions and false grievances. The army outsourced its ill-conceived strategy to jihadi organisations and religious institutions and allowed local militias, terrorist groups, guerrilla armies and other non-state actors to emerge in different parts of the country who afterwards claim political and religious authority. Rawalpindi (army headquarters) supported these terrorists as a cheap way to keep India and Afghanistan off balance. But over the years, they have metamorphosed into a menace and the more powerful terrorist groups—which are also the more radical ones—have outgrown their handlers; fatally weakening the political institutions, declining the role of the state and creating monsters that threaten to devour Pakistani society. In the process, the failure of the state apparatus is creating a culture of impunity and ultimately leading to the breakdown of the rule of law in the country. Clearly, ongoing fragility appears to be a prelude to a failed state. Thus, the extremists’ growth and power in Pakistani society are a direct result of its policy towards India and Afghanistan. What is required is a four-dimensional approach to promote liberal democracy, to reduce the role of military, to reform madrassah, and to emphasise on economic development through cross-border trade with India and Afghanistan . The Pakistani strategic obsession has large-scale security implications both for its neighbours and the international community at large, and hence, requires closer scrutiny and analysis.

The Willing Ally?

Australia has long been a key ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, and it has welcomed US announcements of a ‘pivot’ towards the region in the face of a rising China. Canberra will lend political support, provide US forces with greater strategic depth, and offer selective military contributions, particularly in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Malacca and Lombok Straits. However, Benjamin Schreer and Sheryn Lee argue that, barring a dramatic change in the strategic environment, Australia will retain its focus on the immediate neighbourhood and will remain sceptical of attempts to construct an anti-Chinese coalition.

Relations, Iraq - Jordan after a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, Present data and future prospects

Relations have witnessed Iraqi-Jordanian period of U.S. occupation of Iraq, a remarkable development, contributed to the development of many of the political facts, prompting observers and political analysts to watch Mastúl to those relationships in light of fears of files are political took to emerge with the end of U.S. occupation of Iraq, and these files, security file, which took haunts decision-makers in both countries who seek to transit their relationship towards the further development and cooperation to maintain security and stability, which therefore constitutes a strategic depth for Iraq and Jordan alike

Canada, NORAD, and the Evolution of Strategic Defence

Canada proved to be reliable and cooperative partner of the Americans on variety of air defence initiatives in the early Cold War. Both countries constructed dense network of radar lines, prioritized their respective air defence forces, and eventually agreed to binational North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), imbued with the operational control of both countries' air defence forces. However, Canada's role in strategic defence was just as quickly challenged by the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. NORAD's raison d'etre shifted to the early warning and tracking of these long-range delivery systems, even as Washington became increasingly infatuated with the potential of missile defences from the late 1960s onward. Importantly, Canada consistently refrained from cooperating with the United States on strategic missile defence.At first glance, there is curious disjunction between how Canada was so cooperative when the bete noir was the Soviet nuclear-armed bomber but became intransigent when the United States contemplated active defences against ballistic missiles. However, one should also not overlook the long-term consistency in Canadian policy choices on strategic defence - cooperation on air defence entailed some serious reservations and conditions, while non-participation on missile defence was consistently offset by supportive behaviour. This reveals some important limits on how Canada is able to cooperate with the Americans and the degree to which it is able to disagree with them on strategic policy. It also provides clues on the likelihood that Canada could revisit its decision on missile defence and the conditions required for such policy change to take place.CANADA'S DILEMMA WITH AIR DEFENCEBy the late 1940s, the Soviet Union revealed an intercontinental bomber that could be armed with atomic gravity bombs. This created the possibility of direct atomic strikes against the continent using Canadian air corridors. As John Foster Dulles acknowledged, Canada's territory suddenly became a very important piece of real estate.1 Yet Ottawa was initially hesitant on the requirement for strategic defences against the air-breathing bomber threat. Senior military officials envisioned any Soviet attack on North America to be largely in nature. Given the ambitious radar proposals being put forward by the Canada-US military cooperation committee and US Air Force, they were equally concerned at the prospective cost of any air defence system.Yet Ottawa still agreed to activate fighter aircraft squadrons and form an air defence group (renamed command in 1951). It also approved the $5-billion accelerated defence program after the Korean War to rearm the Canadian forces, with the fledgling air defence forces key recipient. Indeed, rather than being seen only as diversionary tactic, defence planners in Ottawa seemed to accept the possibility that the Soviets might launch direct attack on the population centres and industrial targets of North America. In that regard, Canada's perception of Soviet bomber threat paralleled the growing American anxiety over its own vulnerability, as shown by the US construction of rudimentary early warning capability (the permanent radar network) and the growing resources allocated to US air defence command. Officials also understood that Canadian territory offered modicum of strategic depth against the Soviet bomber threat.2Canada remained sensitive that cooperation on strategic defence could lead to American forces being deployed on Canadian territory. True, it did agree to the joint construction and shared costs of the Pinetree line radar extension finally completed in 1954. But Ottawa also obtained number of assurances on Canada's involvement in and control over these radar stations that helped safeguard the country's sense of sovereignty.3 Meanwhile, the US Air Force (USAF) had strong incentive to undertake cross-border interceptions, which even Canada found attractive due to the country's limited number of fighter aircraft and interest in pushing any interception away from its populated areas. …

Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Ahmet Davutoglu, Strategik Derinlik: Turkiye'nin Uluslararasi Konumu [Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position] (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001). 2. “Turkey shifts sights eastwards as EU relations stall,” Oxford Analytica, April 24, 2012, http://www.oxan.com/Analysis/DailyBrief/Samples/TurkeyShiftsSightsEastwards.aspx. 3. Fareed Zakaria, “Worries About Turkey are Fact-Free Paranoia,” Newsweek, May 12, 2007, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/05/13/a-quiet-prayer-for-democracy.html. 4. See Laura Peterson, “The Pentagon Talks Turkey,” The American Prospect 13, No. 16 (September 9, 2002), http://prospect.org/article/pentagon-talks-turkey. 5. World Bank , “Turkey – World Bank Partnership, Some Highlights & Results,” January 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/FormatResults2010-ECA-CB-New-Turkey.pdf. 6. German Marshall Fund of the United States , “Transatlantic Trends 2010,”, http://trends.gmfus.org.php5-23.dfw1-2.websitetestlink.com/?page_id=3175. 7. German Marshall Fund of the United States , “Transatlantic Trends 2010,”, http://trends.gmfus.org.php5-23.dfw1-2.websitetestlink.com/?page_id=3175. 8. See “Istanbul summit tries to increase pressure on Syria,” BBC, April 1, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17576134. 9. For an analysis of Davutoglu's speech, see Sami Kohen, “Is Turkish Foreign Policy Too Ambitious?” Al Monitor, May 12, 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/04/overly-ambitious.html. Additional informationNotes on contributorsÖmer TaşpınarÖmer Taşpınar is a professor at the National War College, and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution

Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System

This paper is an attempt to provide a critical realist analysis of the concept of ‘strategic depth’ recently being used in analysing Turkish foreign policy. The article provides a criticism of the realist geopolitical thinking on which the concept of strategic depth is based using the insights of the critical realist philosophy of science. It takes the concept of ontological depth from critical realism and extends it to Gramsci’s analysis and develops the concept of hegemonic depth. Underlying the concept of hegemonic depth is the idea that geopolitical relations should be thought of in connection with the social structures that give rise to them. The article is intended as a contribution to a historical materialist analysis of Turkish foreign policy where a state-centric positivism dominates, as well as an attempt to develop a social theory of foreign policy based on critical realism.

India's ‘Af-Pak’ Conundrum: South Asia in Flux

The risks to global security from a failure in Afghanistan are great. Abandoning the goal of establishing both a functioning Afghan state and a moderate Pakistan places greater pressure on Indian security. Pakistani intelligence would be emboldened to escalate terrorist attacks against India once it is satisfied that the Taliban would provide it strategic depth in Afghanistan. This would surely force retaliation from India.

Afghanistan on the Brink :

The article is a comprehensive analysis on the domestic as well as regional status of Afghanistan after the impending US withdrawal of troops in the next two years. The analysis is built on various possible scenarios which may change a political course in the country and how the regional powers play their parts in stabilising Afghanistan. The article discusses the ground situation in Afghanistan – how the ISAF and ANA (Afghan National Army) are coordinating in counter-insurgency operations and how far the ANA is prepared to tackle the situation after withdrawal of US troops. The major issue discussed is the resurgence of Taliban as it is still not defeated. The other major concern is Pakistan’s growing salience and posturing for strategic depth. What would be the Pakistan’s role in stabilising Afghanistan where it has to tackle the Afghan Taliban as it battles Tehreek-i- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) at home? The article also discusses the role of regional powers after US withdrawal and analyse various outcomes that may lead to maintenance of status-quo.

The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy

The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy

Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11

After the fall of the Taliban, Pakistan's policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan had to adapt. ‘Brand Pakistan’ has suffered over the last ten years, portrayed in the media as an obstacle to peace. Pakistan is willing to support an Afghan political process – but on the basis that any agreement is credible and reflects Pakistan's critical role in the region. Ultimately, India, not Afghanistan, is at the heart of Pakistani strategic foreign policy, and this will continue to define the region into the future. An effective US-Pakistan bilateral relationship needs to be built on more than transactionalism.