The United States and Afghanistan: A Diminishing Transactional Relationship

On November 26, 2013, National Security Advisor Susan Rice left Kabul in frustration as President Hamid Karzai refused to compromise in negotiations over a bilateral security agreement that would govern U.S. military forces remaining in Afghanistan following the conclusion in late 2014 of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. President Karzai's intransigence-several senior Afghan political leaders and advisers had urged him to reach an accommodation on the agreement-was likely due to a misreading of the appetite within the United States for continuing to provide high levels of support for Afghanistan, despite the shortcomings of the Karzai government and its episodic intemperate outbursts toward Washington. Stephen Biddle likened the situation to a game of chicken, in which each side expected the other to swerve at the last minute to avoid a damaging collision.1The U.S.-Afghan negotiations over a security agreement in the fall and winter of 2013-14, still ongoing as this roundtable went to press, have taken place against a growing chorus of voices assessing the impact of the long Afghanistan campaign on U.S. national security interests in the heart of Asia. These analyses range from discussions about how a decade-long focus on counterinsurgency operations has affected U.S. military readiness to critical assessments of the costs and benefits of the ISAF mission and whether the United States should cut its losses and seek a definitive departure from the region.2A prevailing assumption in many of these assessments is that the United States is likely to shift its focus away from the region toward other security challenges in Asia, such as China's increasing assertiveness in the East and South China seas or the threat of instability in or provocations from North Korea. In this Asia Policy roundtable, Xenia Dormandy and Michael Keating review the history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and argue persuasively that other issues in the Asia-Pacific will most likely capture Washington's attention following the conclusion of the ISAF operation in 2014. Certainly there are many within the U.S. policy community who seem to agree with the notion that providing billions of dollars a year to Afghanistan, perhaps for another decade or more, is no longer feasible.In the event that the United States does pull back, other powers will continue to vie for strategic influence in the region, and the outcome of that competition could have significant implications for broader U.S. objectives in Asia. The purpose of this roundtable, which comprises nine national and regional assessments, is to examine the range of strategic interests and priorities that Afghanistan's neighbors and other regional powers possess. Developed fully in the pages that follow, these interests can be grouped into three broad categories.The first is the search for security, and in particular the desire to prevent a resurgence of the Taliban for fear that Afghanistan will once again provide refuge to terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. This motivation, of course, first drove the U.S. intervention in 2001, and it remains a key concern for U.S. national security managers. Security is also a primary motivation for leaders in Russia, as Mark Katz points out; in the front-line states of Central Asia (namely, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan), which Kathleen Collins argues are preparing for a coming Afghan spillover of conflict, refugees, Islamist extremism, and drug trafficking; and in Iran, which, as Sumitha Narayanan Kutty notes, backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance during the civil war of the 1990s and was one of the earliest supporters of the U.S.-led intervention. China, too, has significant concerns about Islamism, which Beijing views as a key driver of the ethnic and religious tensions it is struggling to contain in Xinjiang. 3A second category revolves around economic interests and the protection of investments that have been or are being made in major energy, natural resources, and transportation projects in Afghanistan. …

: Conventional arms control negotiations should (1) help achieve U.S./ Republic of Korea (ROK) military objectives on the peninsula, and (2) produce a verifiable agreement. These are important objectives and we will return to them. However, there is a more important objective not always associated with arms control-how arms control could help the United States achieve its regional security objectives. In Northeast Asia, the United States has four main security objectives: (1) maintain ability, (2) maintain access and influence, (3) prevent a power vacuum or the rise of any regional hegemon, and (4) prevent nuclear proliferation. Conventional arms control can indirectly help the United States achieve these regional security objectives. Except for the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), these regional objectives are being achieved by maintaining ROK and Japanese security through bilateral security agreements between the United States and each ally. Because it has no territorial designs, the United States has served as a regional balancer and an honest broker in the region. To the extent that the United States can continue in that role, we will probably continue to accomplish American regional objectives.

The strategy and objectives of the US Central Command are derived from the US National Security Strategy and its orientations, as well as from the US military strategy. In fact, the US Central Command, which has been organized and provided with sufficient and necessary assistance by the United States to enable it to protect US interests in the area of responsibility, represents a serious threat to the peoples of this region and to all forms of growing movements, particularly nationalist movements hostile to the United States. The United States has not been satisfied with the above military measures to ensure its hegemony and monopoly over the Arabian Gulf region, but has also sought to establish a set of defensive arrangements and involve the countries of the region, specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, in these arrangements with the aim of legitimizing them. The GCC states have entered into bilateral security agreements with influential states in the international system, led by the United States, in an attempt to create a kind of regional interconnectedness with these countries. Perhaps most important of all the above is building international legitimacy for the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf region, in form and substance, despite the dangerous repercussions of this presence on Arab national security, especially after it was transformed from a temporary presence to a permanent one. This was announced by William Cohen, the former US Secretary of Defense, in late October 2000, when he said, “The US forces will remain forever, and there is no justification for their withdrawal.” His companion, William Dowd, also confirmed this during his tour of the Gulf, when he said, “We will be here permanently.” As for Colin Powell, the former US Secretary of State, he said that the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf is a long-term goal and not merely a temporary deterrent against President Saddam Hussein.

The practice of rendition — the involuntary transfer of an individual across borders without recourse to extradition or deportation proceedings — is not new. Indeed, the practice of snatching a defendant for trial — “rendition to justice” — has been used by governments for more than a century. Although rendition has been controversial in human rights circles, it has been celebrated by many as crucial in the fight against impunity for grave crimes. Former U.S. President George W. Bush was criticized for the “novel” practice of “extraordinary rendition” — the transfer of suspects to locations known for the systematic use of torture, including secret CIA prisons (this set of practices is hereinafter referred to as the “Extraordinary Rendition Program”). U.S. officials at the time defended the practice, relying on justifications developed to support “rendition to justice” and arguing that the U.S. Extraordinary Rendition Program was legal. Despite these justifications, international human rights bodies and intergovernmental organizations including the Council of Europe, the European Union, and human rights bodies of the United Nations, determined that the extraordinary form of rendition was unlawful under human rights law. Soon after former President Barack Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, he promised to end the most severe human rights violations carried out by the U.S. government in the name of fighting terrorism, including the use of torture and secret detention facilities. While this move was a positive signal that the United States planned to bring its practice into line with international norms, the Obama Administration in fact retained a number of problematic tools developed by previous Administrations. Although Obama signed executive orders ending the use of torture and secret detention, he did not order the cessation of all informal transfers. Nor did he pursue accountability for those who designed and implemented the Extraordinary Rendition Program. Instead, his Administration continued to quash rendition-related cases with the argument that such cases dangerously threatened to reveal “state secrets.” Although it is impossible to know precisely how many informal transfers were carried out by the Obama administration, the number plainly was significantly smaller than those conducted by the Bush Administration. Instead, President Obama increased the use of drones to target and kill suspected terrorists outside the United States, and continued the use of proxy detention in the name of fighting terrorism. The Trump Administration presents alarming new risks: in addition to the anti-terrorism tools left in place by the Obama administration, President Trump has promised to use torture and said he would fill Guantanamo Bay with “bad dudes” captured in the fight against al-Qaeda and ISIS. While President Trump’s most disturbing campaign promises have not yet come to fruition, the administration’s lack of transparency surrounding counter-terrorism measures, the on-going U.S. military engagements in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, and the hunt for Al Qaeda in Yemen present opportunities for the U.S. government to return to — or worsen — the abusive practices it pioneered as part of the Extraordinary Rendition Program. With the publication of the National Security Strategy in December 2017, the Trump Administration renewed its commitment to fighting terrorism in aggressive terms with little consideration for human rights. The threat that counter-terrorism measures will become more abusive is made more stark by the rise in nationalist governments pursuing protectionist policies with weakening regard to human rights guarantees. With governments moving to close borders, deport non-nationals, denaturalize their own citizens, and use informal means to transfer suspects, the mechanisms through which a state may transfer custody of an individual — and the permissible purposes for such handovers — have escaped careful scrutiny. In this era of global realignment, the human rights principles guiding inter-state cooperation in such matters must be reasserted. This chapter examines the legal norms governing informal transfers and detentions in this new era and sets out a minimum standard that must be upheld whenever a state renders an individual, no matter how extraordinary the context.

Iran served as a catalyst which changed the American perception of the nature of Soviet policies in the postwar period and provided the first stimulus for a radical reorientation of U.S. foreign policy and strategy. American policy toward Iran was formulated in stages corresponding to the crisis involving Iran, its close neighbors, and the Soviet Union. The process began with the Azerbaijan crisis of 1945-46; it followed the Greek-Turkish crisis of 1947, and the Iranian oil crisis of 1951-53. United States policy was expressed in (a) unilateral—direct or indirect—support for Iran's independence, as exemplified by specific and general policy statements and actions of the Truman era; (b) multilateral defense arrangements of the Eisenhower period (Baghdad Pact, 1955) ; and (c) bilateral security agreements with the Northern Tier states, including Iran, in 1959. As a result, the American policy of containment of international communism, with specific reference to Iran, could be regarded as having achieved its objective.

Concerns regarding potential nuclear proliferation activities of South Korea and Japan have increased following recent nuclear tests conducted by North Korea and following regional hegemonic actions by China. Both of these countries have bilateral security agreements with the United States, and are covered under the so-called “nuclear umbrella.” This paper poses the question: If these countries enjoy these security guarantees, what factors could contribute to their decision to pursue proliferation activities? This paper reviews some of the relevant literature on nuclear-decision making before proposing that perhaps these models are complementary rather than competing. For the purposes of South Korea and Japan, this paper asserts that there are two contributing factors that could cause either country to engage in proliferation activities: loss of confidence in the U.S. commitment to its extended deterrence obligations and regional security threats. Using case studies, this paper reviews the past proliferation activities by these two countries, and examines the mitigating factors that led to past decisions, and how such similar factors could impact future decisions. This paper uses historical analysis and investigation of contemporary security issues to examine the roles that extended deterrence and regional security have played and may play in the future, in each country’s interests in engaging in increased nuclear proliferation-sensitive activities.

continues," Amnesty continued, and "[w]ork must be done to uphold freedom of expression and to unwind the impact of the 'chilling effect' that Assange's treatment

: With all of the recent developments pertaining to a possible bilateral security agreement (BSA) regarding future troop presence and military cooperation between the United States and Afghanistan, another important aspect of the future of Afghanistan has gotten much less attention. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) just finished their first year of being fully in the lead for providing security in Afghanistan, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in support. With 2013 behind us, it is time to take stock of how the ANSF performed. CNA's Center for Stability and Development recently sent a team to Afghanistan to assess the ANSF, in support of a congressionally mandated study to determine the future requirements for the ANSF's size, structure, capabilities, and posture. We observed the ANSF first-hand and conducted hundreds of interviews of Afghan, ISAF, and U.S. officials at all levels, from national to tactical, in all of Afghanistan s regions. We came to eight major conclusions regarding the performance and capabilities of the ANSF in 2013. These empirical, independent observations, when taken together, show that the ANSF were generally successful in 2013 and performed better than most people realize.

IntroductionThe relationship between the United States and North Korea is wavering between confrontation and communication, depending on the choices made by President Obama and Kim Jong Il. To have a realistic outlook upon the situation, it would be of significant value to categorize the relationship and to determine the South Korean government's countermeasures based on these categories.President Obama has already made public his stance over the two Koreas. For South Korea, he has revealed his plan to develop the U.S.-South Korea relationship into one of companionship, based on alliance. In his electoral manifesto, The Blueprint for Change, he expressed his will to construct a new form of companionship that would go beyond a mutual alliance, summit conferences, and the Six-Party Talks. Instead of emphasizing bilateral relations, he chose to maintain a strong connection with multiple allies such as Japan, Australia, and Korea.President Obama has also established his stance1 upon the U.S. relationship with North Korea. In the spring of 2009, relations between North Korea and the United States seemed to be cold. However, by the end of the year, there had been some improvements, and the relationship now seems to have warmed. In the long run, it is likely that President Obama will attempt direct talks with Kim Jong Il, and so we can predict some improvement in the bilateral relations between the United States and North Korea. During the Clinton administration, while the Democrats were in office, North Korea felt unsatisfied due to the fact that there were insufficient improvements in relations. These situations have created the basis for the virtuous circle of dialogue between Kim and President Obama.In the process of improving relations, it is likely that President Obama will promote smart diplomacy by alleviating the remaining sanctions, admitting North Korea into a U.S.-led global society, and recognizing North Korea as a normal state. North Korea seems to anticipate this as well.Throughout this process, President Obama may move towards declaring the end of the Korean War and the beginnings of negotiation for a peace treaty. In the end, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) may reach a mutual agreement on the issue of normalization during President Obama's term.However, in the short run, President Obama is unlikely to be able to find an easy solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. North Korea is pressuring the United States with its Edge-of-Cliff policy, and is constantly intensifying the pressure.Also, the North Korean nuclear problem can be resolved only if there are changes in North Korea's stance, not those of South Korea or the United States. It is difficult to envisage a peaceful, complete settlement to the North Korean nuclear problem without North Korea's decision-making and participation. A complete settlement of the problem may even have to be delayed until after normalization between the DPRK and the United States.North Korea chose nuclear weapons as the most inexpensive method of ensuring national security. The United States has decided that it is dangerous for North Korea, the base of tyranny, to possess nuclear power and has urged North Korea to abandon it.2There are many factors in determining peace in the Korean Peninsula, but there are none as definitive as the confrontation and communication between North Korea and the United States. This does not mean that other elements, such as the role of South Korea and China, are unimportant, and these elements will be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, in this paper, the relationship between North Korea and United States will be considered as the most important factor in our analysis.If the two possibilities of communication and confrontation between North Korea and United States are mixed and the relation categorized, then four types concerning the future of the Korean Peninsula can be extracted. …

The Power of Putin in Russian Foreign Policy

The advent of individual players playing poker over the Internet using personal computers, no matter where they were located in the U.S., and playing against other players potentially from around the world (e.g., online poker), was the most visible form of online gaming that led to the original creation of RAWA.

: This report examines Iran's cultural, political, and economic influence in Afghanistan, especially in light of the U.S. drawdown. Many American policymakers and analysts worry that the departure of most international military forces from Afghanistan may result in greater instability there, which can be exploited by foreign powers, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. nuclear program, has often meant competition in other areas, including Afghanistan. Tehran has viewed the decade-long U.S. presence in Afghanistan with anxiety. Iran's fears of U.S. military strikes against its nuclear facilities, or perceived American plans to overthrow the Iranian regime, may have motivated it to provide measured military support to Afghan insurgents battling U.S. forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Iran also actively opposes the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) being negotiated between Afghanistan and the United States. U.S. policymakers may naturally think that Iran will seek to exploit the drawdown and undermine American interests in Afghanistan. However, the departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, a new pragmatic government in Tehran, and a possible resolution to the nuclear crisis may provide greater cooperation between Tehran and Washington in Afghanistan.

One of the factors effective in determining foreign policies of the countries is the issues of national security. This is especially true of the bilateral relations of countries which experience common security problems and affected by this situation. After its independence the Uzbekistani administration perceived their basic threat as 'fundamentalism'. Thus in the first years of independence, Tashkent tried to come closer to The United States of America (USA) so as to overcome this threat. In response to this, the USA, did not develop a comprehensive policy towards Uzbekistan. But the USA faced a similar security threat with September 11th attacks. Along with the increase of the Central Asia's geopolitical importance following the September 11th attacks, Washington increased its relations with Uzbekistan and bilateral relations reached to the level of strategic partnership. Because of the common threat perception, the USA overcame the Taliban by taking advantage of Uzbekistan's geopolitical position. Meanwhile the Uzbekistani administration largely avoided 'radical' movements through this war. However, emergence of the Colour Revolutions in the former Soviet republics, supported by the USA, destructed these relations. But in recent years both Kerimov and Obama administrations have tried to amend Uzbek American relations. Some positive developments have been witnessed since 2011. Because the USA, who has problematic relations with Pakistan administration, needs Uzbekistan's land again. In this study, the bilateral relations between the US, which became the sole super power in the post-Cold War period, and Uzbekistan, the most powerful country in Central Asia, are analyzed in the context of security issues

112P Treatment landscape for stages I–III NSCLC in the United States (US) community setting before and after 2020

Background: Novel options for perioperative systemic anticancer immunotherapy are currently being evaluated for early-stage high-risk ER+/HER2– breast cancer, for example, neoadjuvant pembrolizumab plus chemotherapy (chemo) followed by adjuvant pembrolizumab plus endocrine therapy in the phase 3 KEYNOTE-756 trial (NCT03725059). This retrospective cohort study aimed to describe patient characteristics and chemo treatment patterns in this patient population overall and based on chemo receipt status. Methods: This study used the Syapse Learning Health Network, a database capturing the continuum of care for patients treated at US community practices, to select adults (≥18 years) with initial diagnosis (1/1/2016 – 1/30/2023) of high-risk (grade 3 AND T1c–T2/cN1–cN2 or T3–T4/cN0–cN2) ER+/HER2– breast cancer who had first surgery at the primary site, as in KEYNOTE-756, with latest data up to 05/31/2024. Patients enrolled in a clinical trial or with lobular carcinoma in situ, lymphoma, or other primary cancer were excluded. Using descriptive statistical tests, we compared baseline characteristics between patients who received chemo in the neoadjuvant and/or adjuvant setting and those who did not receive chemo. Real-world time on treatment (rwToT) with neoadjuvant and adjuvant chemo was estimated using Kaplan-Meier curves. Results: Of 16,998 adults with HR+/HER2– nonmetastatic breast cancer at diagnosis, 441 patients (2.6%) with high-risk ER+/HER2– breast cancer (clinical stage I/II/III: 4%/55%/41%) underwent surgery and were eligible for the analyses. Median age was 55 years (range 23–89); 99% were women (60% postmenopausal); 68% were White; 95% (n=160) with known performance status had ECOG 0/1. Ductal carcinoma was most common (91%). Overall, 7% had ER-low positivity; 89% had positive clinical nodal status (cN1/N2: 81%/8%); and 69% were PR+. Of the 16% (n=71) with available Oncotype DX score, 42% scored high (>25), 31% intermediate (18–25), and 27% low (<18). Of the 44% (n=192) with available data, 7% were documented to have a germline BRCA mutation. Of 441 patients, 400 (91%) received systemic therapy in the neoadjuvant and/or adjuvant setting. About 78% of the cohort (346/441) received chemo, including 71% (n=244) in neoadjuvant, 23% (n=78) in adjuvant, and 7% (n=24) in both settings. Chemo recipients, compared with chemo non-recipients (22%; n=95), were relatively younger (median [range]: 53 years [23–84] vs. 68 years [30–89]; p<0.001) and less often postmenopausal women (55% vs. 78%; p<0.001) with Medicare insurance (19% vs. 53%). Several baseline clinical characteristics differed significantly between chemo recipients and chemo non-recipients, including clinical stage III (44% vs. 29%; p=0.03), node-positive status (92% vs. 79%; p<0.001), ductal carcinoma tumor histology (93% vs. 84%; p=0.02), and Oncotype Dx high RS (61% vs. 10%; p<0.005). Median follow-up time was 26.2 months (range: 1.1–87.9). Among patients who received neoadjuvant only (n=69) or adjuvant only chemo (n=19), rwToT was 4.1 months (95% CI, 3.7–4.4) and 2.5 months (2.1–4.5), respectively. Conclusions: In this real-world study among patients with early-stage high-risk ER+/HER2– breast cancer, approximately 3 out of every 4 patients received chemo in the neoadjuvant and/or adjuvant setting. Younger patients with more advanced tumor stage and node-positive status were more likely to receive chemo than older patients with less advanced tumor stage and node-negative status. Our future work will describe more details of chemotherapy use and its impact on clinical outcomes, characterizing the unmet need in this high-risk patient population. Citation Format: Peter Fasching, Jagadeswara Rao Earla, Yezhou Sun, Kim M Hirshfield, Yu-Han Kao, Giovanna I Cruz, Amin Haiderali. Chemotherapy use in patients with early-stage high-risk ER+/HER2- breast cancer in the United States (US) community setting: A retrospective observational cohort study [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the San Antonio Breast Cancer Symposium 2024; 2024 Dec 10-13; San Antonio, TX. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Clin Cancer Res 2025;31(12 Suppl):Abstract nr P1-11-20.