Afghanistan Beyond 2014: The Search for Security in the Heart of Asia

Turkey’s ISAF mission: a maverick with strategic depth

Investigation of the prevalence, incidence, and determinants of post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) and other mental disorders associated with military deployment in international missions poses several methodological and procedural challenges. This paper describes the design and sampling strategies, instruments, and experimental procedures applied in a study programme aimed to examine military deployment-related mental health and disorders (prevalence and trajectories) and to identify vulnerability and risk factors (e.g. age, gender, type of mission, rank, and duration of deployment and a wide range of neurobiological, psychological, social, and behavioural factors). The study comprised two components. The first component, a cross-sectional study, included 1483 deployed and 889 non-deployed German soldiers (response rate, 93%) who served during the 2009 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. A standardized diagnostic instrument (Composite International Diagnostic Interview, CIDI) coupled with established questionnaires was administered to detect and diagnose PTSD and a broad spectrum of mental disorders and mental health problems. The second component, a prospective-longitudinal study, included 621 soldiers examined before (2011) and after return (2012) from the ISAF mission. In addition to the CIDI and questionnaires, several experimental behavioural tests and biological markers were implemented to probe for incident mental disorders, mental health problems and risk factors. Our methods are expected to provide greater precision than previous studies for estimating the risk for incident deployment-related and non-deployment-related disorders and their risk factors. We expect the findings to advance our understanding of a wide spectrum of adverse mental health outcomes beyond PTSD.

No previous multinational military operation compared in size and interculturality to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The increased scope brought with it new challenges. This chapter explores how differentiating narratives were employed by member states to legitimise their political actions to their domestic constituencies, through the example of the base narratives of the United States and Germany. The study employs the methodology of frame analysis to understand if and how a country’s base narrative influenced that country’s communicational themes during the ISAF mission. A base narrative inherently determines how a country will legitimise military action, but at the same time is unique to a particular country. This potentially makes it impossible to build a comprehensive communication strategy for all members of a multinational military operation.

Is the use of armed force by international forces in Afghanistan ethically justified? The answer is one of degree: the fighting is neither completely just nor completely unjust. To evaluate the extent of justification, a novel Just War Index (JWI) is introduced. It is a composite indicator: the average of estimated values for seven criteria from the long-standing Just War tradition – Just Cause, Right Intent, Net benefit, Legitimate Authority, Last Resort, Proportionality of Means and Right Conduct, each of which are evaluated on a 7-point scale. Because the two international missions using armed force in Afghanistan – the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) – have different mandates, different histories and different approaches to the use of force, they are evaluated separately. The ISAF mission is found considerably more justified than OEF though still ethically deficient.

: With all of the recent developments pertaining to a possible bilateral security agreement (BSA) regarding future troop presence and military cooperation between the United States and Afghanistan, another important aspect of the future of Afghanistan has gotten much less attention. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) just finished their first year of being fully in the lead for providing security in Afghanistan, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in support. With 2013 behind us, it is time to take stock of how the ANSF performed. CNA's Center for Stability and Development recently sent a team to Afghanistan to assess the ANSF, in support of a congressionally mandated study to determine the future requirements for the ANSF's size, structure, capabilities, and posture. We observed the ANSF first-hand and conducted hundreds of interviews of Afghan, ISAF, and U.S. officials at all levels, from national to tactical, in all of Afghanistan s regions. We came to eight major conclusions regarding the performance and capabilities of the ANSF in 2013. These empirical, independent observations, when taken together, show that the ANSF were generally successful in 2013 and performed better than most people realize.

The United States has a long and varied history of engagement with Afghanistan. But through all the tortuous turns and ups and downs, the relationship, from the U.S. perspective, has almost always been a transactional one. Given its front line status, Afghanistan has usually been a pawn in a bigger strategic game, initially between the Communist bloc and the capitalist countries in the region (including Iran under the shah, Pakistan, and India) and subsequently between the secular world and radicalized Islam. Afghanistan's current status as a ward of the United States and international community is unusual and will not last.This essay suggests that regardless of whether a bilateral security agreement (BSA) is signed between Afghanistan and the United States, and assuming Afghanistan does not again become a haven for terrorism targeting the United States, U.S. interest will diminish. So too will U.S. resources invested in the country-whether military, economic, developmental, or diplomatic. Neighboring powers, such as India, Iran, and Pakistan, who have an immediate stake in a secure, stable Afghanistan, will become more important players. Long memories, the need for strategic depth, and the fear that Afghan soil will once again become a battleground for proxy warfare will militate against the realization of the Afghan government's vision of the country as the peaceful and prosperous heart of Asia.The History of U.S. Engagement in AfghanistanA brief review of the relationship between the United States and Afghanistan is instructive. Following World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union competed to maintain influence with Afghan rulers, as the British and Russian Empires had done in the previous century, using modest levels of technical, military, and development assistance-the Great Game once again played out in Afghanistan. After the invasion of 1979, the United States sought to undermine Soviet power by supporting the mujahideen, using Pakistani security forces as the delivery mechanism. Once the Soviet Union left in 1989 and the Najibullah regime collapsed in 1992, Afghanistan dropped off the U.S. radar until the Taliban swept into Kabul in 1996. Then followed a period in which the United States had an ambivalent relationship with Afghanistan: not recognizing the Islamic emirate that controlled 90% of the country, but intermittently engaging with its authorities through intermediaries on specific issues; providing some humanitarian support through the United Nations and the Red Cross/Red Crescent; encouraging private-sector interest in a pipeline across the country; and expressing concern about women's rights.All that changed with September 11. Having decisively ejected the Taliban in a lightning military campaign, the United States promoted a Western and largely multilateral agenda to stabilize and reconstruct the country and rebuild its institutions and economy. But by 2006, as the Taliban reasserted their presence and security began once again to deteriorate, the United States had moved to a counterinsurgency approach. By 2009 and the Obama administration's surge, this had mushroomed into a full-blown military and state-building campaign with an annual price tag over $120 billion-perhaps the most ambitious the world has seen in the last 50 years.Next Steps in U.S.-Afghanistan Relations: The Short TermU.S. engagement in Afghanistan will continue to evolve. In the short to medium term, much depends on whether a BSA between Afghanistan and the United States is signed. As for the longer term, predictions are unwise, but the country's strategic importance to the United States is likely to diminish unless Afghanistan once again becomes an incubator for transnational terrorism.Afghanistan with a BSA. If a BSA is signed, there is no guarantee that Afghanistan will continue to be a recipient of exceptional levels of U.S. assistance-currently higher in per capita terms than any other country excepting Israel1-but the prospects will be stronger that the administration will have enough political support to honor the pledges it made in Chicago and Tokyo for military and civilian support, respectively, until 2016. …

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the time of writing constituted the largest ongoing deployment of European armed forces. In the autumn of 2010, EU member states contributed over 30,000 troops out of a total of 130,000. While the NATO operation in Afghanistan is principally led by the US, the sheer size of the European contribution alone — relative to their other engagements — more than justifies the inclusion of ISAF in a study of European crisis response operations (cf. Williams 2011: xi and Korski 2009). As a NATO operation, it illustrates the way the Alliance works as a platform for planning and conducting operations. For historical reasons, NATO procedures form the inspiration as well as the benchmark for the vast majority of military doctrine in Europe. Yet ISAF is not just a simple example of how NATO goes about its business. It constitutes an operation that by the end of 2007 hit a crossroads. While ISAF was originally conceived as a stabilisation operation, this mission was becoming increasingly untenable. Step-by-step, it transformed into a counterinsurgency operation. Although this was a US-driven process, it also illustrates how European states have been trying to come to grips with a rapidly deteriorating situation. As King (2011) has convincingly argued, the ‘ISAF experience’ is transforming European militaries like no other operation.

FDI has undergone a process of liberalisation over the last three decades. However, and despite the existing position in favour of this attitude, states have always maintained barriers of different natures and scopes to control it. The reasons for these barriers may have varied over time, and likewise the level of restriction on investment flows from abroad, but they have always existed. Nevertheless, as a general trend, barriers to foreign investment have been lowered steadily in recent years and there is now an attitude in favour of the liberalisation of FDI. However, and despite this positive approach to FDI, some major changes have been taking place worldwide in recent times. The economic crisis, the atmosphere of increasing securitisation, and the geostrategic changes that have come about since 2007 have led many countries to ‘reassess their investment policies’, in many cases on the basis of national security or national essential security interests grounds. Reasons for limits on FDI, which have always existed and are present in many IIAs, have gained further strength in the past decade, to the extent that national security and related grounds are nowadays considered one of the primary justifications for barriers to FDI. Indeed, it is in the field of FDI, more than in international trade, that national security interest exceptions may be truly tested. As national security concerns of all kinds multiply, more and more countries, even developed countries, are tempted to create – or have actually created – obstacles to foreign investment based on these kinds of grounds. Host states fear that foreign investors will gain control of essential security-related technology, compromise access to it or act in a way that advances the goals of foreign states. These fears are not new. Moreover, they are not related solely to FDI, either private or sovereign-driven, but also to other areas of the economy, and they have been to some extent anticipated by existing IIAs. As previously mentioned, the notion of ‘national security’ has evolved and now includes national interests or similar, concepts very closely linked to strategic sectors and national champions. IIAs already address the economic, political or security concerns that FDI, both private and public, poses.

Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, following in the wake of the United Statesled 7 October 2001 military invasion, has proven to be the most significant and closely observed Canadian international policy initiative since the Korean War. Over the past 12 years Ottawa has made a significant series of commitments to Afghanistan military, political, diplomatic, economic and social that have placed the Canadian Afghan relationship at the centre of Canadian external relations.The most prominent and visible component of that commitment has arguably been Canada's military involvement in Afghanistan. That involvement grew to upwards of 3000 members of the Canadian Forces1 deployed to Afghanistan, principally in Kabul and in Kandahar province. As a member of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Canadian military presence dramatically shifted from an emphasis on peacekeeping and logistical support to a direct combat role to a focus on training some 50,000 members of the Afghan National Army. This presence, however, has come at great cost in excess of 150 members of the Canadian Forces have died in the line of duty and more than 600 have been wounded in action.Beyond the actions of the Canadian Forces, Canada has sought to promote law and order in Afghanistan by training a wide variety of law enforcement officials in the country. Efforts have included having civilian and military police oversee the training of sizeable numbers (roughly 3000) of the Afghan National Police, corrections officers located in Kandahar, and officials with the Afghan National Customs Academy in Kabul.To aid in the effective administrative governance of Afghanistan, Canada has undertaken a variety of initiatives, including training, mentoring, and providing logistical support to strengthen the political role of local or community-based governance councils; providing direct administrative and financial oversight and training for key Afghan national ministries; directly assisting the fledgling Afghan electoral system, which included supporting the 2009 presidential and 2010 parliamentary elections; and working to identify and implement a series of confidencebuilding measures between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the 2010 Afghanistan Pakistan Border Region Prosperity Initiative.Canadian economic and social contributions have also been wide-ranging. Pivotal to these efforts has been the reconstruction of the Dahla Dam and the Arghandab irrigation system (designed to foster sustainable agricultural output). The Government of Canada has also provided community economic development assistance (grants and loans) to foster existing and new business opportunities; built, repaired and expanded some 26 community-based schools; worked to develop curriculum, pedagogical training tools, and teacher training programs for the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education; provided valuable assistance to Kandahar University (including construction of a boundary wall, a women's dormitory, and a water well); extended vocational and literacy training to 30,000 Afghans; spearheaded a national polio vaccination campaign; trained 1500 healthcare workers; significantly contributed to the World Food Programme; and undertaken landmine elimination and training activities.The year 2011 marked a watershed for Canada's engagement with Afghanistan.2 The formerly wide range of commitments is now decidedly more limited in scope. Most notably, Canada's active combat role has concluded. Ottawa is now focused on the ongoing training of Afghan National Security Forces, regional diplomacy, education, health, and humanitarian assistance. Afghanistan, in other words, is now treated much like other developing nations to which Canada provides foreign aid.Focus of this issueThere is a distinct need, in the wake of the end of active Canadian military combat involvement in Afghanistan, to undertake a systematic review and assessment of the impact of Canada's engagement in Afghanistan across a full range of political, diplomatic, security, economic, and social indicators. …

PurposeThis paper aims to present a study on the organization of military logistics under “hot” conditions in an expeditionary crisis response operation. The authors' main research question is: in what way is armed forces logistics sourcing organized in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan?Design/methodology/approachTo answer their research question, the authors conducted a case study including field research at military sites in Afghanistan. The case study is focused on military organizations that operate in a hostile and ambiguous environment. The authors compare sourcing of three categories of support services, i.e. facilities management, maintenance & logistics and security.FindingsThe authors' results include a systematic overview of the organization of command, logistic and accounting (sourcing) in the ISAF mission, involving multinational military partners and contractors. Second, the authors show how Canada, NATO, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA sourced the three categories of services mentioned in terms of sourcing profiles. Focusing on contracting, the authors outline which strategies NATO and the countries mentioned used in practice. And finally, differences and similarities are highlighted in the area of funding and accounting.Research limitations/implicationsWhile the authors' study provides insight in the use of sourcing profiles identified in this paper, more research is necessary to identify criteria for explaining sourcing decisions of armed forces.Practical implicationsThe paper provides a systematic overview for practitioners and scholars and enhances manageability and policy development relevant for those who prepare, execute, monitor and evaluate missions.Originality/valueThe authors' paper is one of the first to provide a systematic overview in operational defense sourcing relying on first‐hand field data. This area of study is fragmented and remains mostly closed for non‐military researchers.

The aim of the article was to identify the subject areas related to the management of the proposals of some elements and to propose the concept of managing Poland's national security for the purposes of developing the act on national security management announced in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland-2020. The main research problem was the question: What key elements and solutions should be included in the concept of national security management for the purpose of developing a draft act on national security management? The following hypothesis was adopted: The national security system should form a coherent, in terms of organization and functionality, system of interrelated management and executive bodies. Unfortunately, the existing national security system of the Republic of Poland does not fully meet the above requirements, which has already been signaled many times, for example during successive strategic national security reviews and strategic defense reviews. Moreover, the concept of national security management should, in particular, specify the answers to the following questions: 1) What is contemporary national security? 2) What is national security management? 3) What are the key challenges facing national security management? 4) What is the role of policy and strategy in national security management? 5) What should be the architecture of the national security management system during the war. The verification of the above hypothesis and answering the above questions required a critical analysis of legal acts, strategic documents and selected items of literature on the subject. The results of the author's many years of research in this area were also taken into account.

For many years, the experience of neurosurgeons from the German Armed Forces was limited to the peacetime care of patients in Germany. In 1995, German military neurosurgeons were deployed abroad for the first time. Since the beginning of the International Security Assistance Force mission, there has been a rapidly increasing number of opportunities for military neurosurgeons to broaden their experience during deployments abroad. Since the first deployment of a neurosurgeon to the German field hospital in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, a total of 140 neurosurgical procedures have been performed there. Sixty-four surgeries were performed for cranial or spinal neurotrauma management. During the entire period, only 10 International Security Assistance Force members required acute or urgent neurosurgical interventions. The majority of neurosurgical procedures were performed in Afghan patients who received acute and elective treatment whenever the necessary infrastructure was available in the field hospital. Fifteen patients from the Afghan National Army and Police and 115 local patients underwent neurosurgery. Sixty-two procedures were carried out under acute or urgent conditions, and 78 operations were elective.

During military missions, soldiers are exposed to specific events like assaults, contact with locals, limited food, insecurities and limited sleep (EVENTS). Simultaneously, soldiers have to cope with homesickness, a new environment, limited privacy and limited contact with family and friends. War conditions and stress are known to be responsible for combat stress reactions and diminished cognitive, physical and emotional performance. However, the influence of the experience of different types of EVENTS on soldiers' sustainability is unknown. The impact might be different when EVENTS are experienced during combat compared to being in a safe and secure environment. Furthermore, some EVENTS are more related to stress reactions then others. PURPOSE: Gaining insight in the influence of EVENTS on soldiers' physical, emotional and cognitive sustainability. This knowledge can be used to optimize soldiers' care, health and to increase operational effectiveness. METHODS: The study was conducted in Afghanistan during ISAF. Two groups of soldiers were investigated; a compound group consisting of 20 soldiers with duties solely at Kamp Holland and a patrol group consisting of 47 soldiers who were on patrols during the testing. During three weeks the patrol group filled out a diary with questions (items of the Stress Questionnaire, REST-Q, CSASS, own judgement, most important EVENT and its impact) twice a day. The compound group filled out the same questions on a laptop and were tested cognitively (N-Back, VigTrack), emotionally (Emotional Stroop) and physically (Harvard step test). EVENTS were categorized in positive and negative EVENTS (Event valence). A Multilevel Analysis was conducted to determine the variables predicting positive or negative EVENTS. Significance was set at p<.05. RESULTS: Little variation was found in the scores of the variables due to the absence of extreme EVENTS. Multilevel analysis identified the variables 'impact score' and 'Event valence' as predictors for the occurrence of a positive or negative EVENTS (compound group: Chi-square difference 65.60 (df=2), p<.01, patrol group: Chi-square difference 29.44 (df=2), p<.01). CONCLUSIONS: Event valence and the impact of an Event are variables that are useful to predict the type of EVENT experienced by soldiers.

The article analyzes the operational conduct of German forces in northern Afghanistan and the making of German strategy in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since the expansion of the Afghan insurgency to northern Afghanistan in 2007. It is argued that the German contribution to ISAF is characterized by a severe mismatch between politico-strategic planning and decision-making in Berlin on the one hand and operational conduct and requirements on the ground on the other. Since 2007, however, politico-strategic insistence that the German engagement in Afghanistan constitutes a contribution to a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction effort is steadily eroding. Analysis of German operational conduct in northern Afghanistan makes evident the existing mismatch between strategy and operations, but also reveals that the deterioration of the security situation on the ground has lead to a bottom-up-development of counterinsurgency doctrine, capabilities, institutions, and modus of operandi. Operations have been driving the making of German strategy, not vice-versa, which has severely hampered German efforts to counter insurgents’ progress in the north of Afghanistan.

: This report examines Iran's cultural, political, and economic influence in Afghanistan, especially in light of the U.S. drawdown. Many American policymakers and analysts worry that the departure of most international military forces from Afghanistan may result in greater instability there, which can be exploited by foreign powers, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. nuclear program, has often meant competition in other areas, including Afghanistan. Tehran has viewed the decade-long U.S. presence in Afghanistan with anxiety. Iran's fears of U.S. military strikes against its nuclear facilities, or perceived American plans to overthrow the Iranian regime, may have motivated it to provide measured military support to Afghan insurgents battling U.S. forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Iran also actively opposes the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) being negotiated between Afghanistan and the United States. U.S. policymakers may naturally think that Iran will seek to exploit the drawdown and undermine American interests in Afghanistan. However, the departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, a new pragmatic government in Tehran, and a possible resolution to the nuclear crisis may provide greater cooperation between Tehran and Washington in Afghanistan.