Intentional States Research Articles

Chromatic Illumination

We argue that introspection reveals a ubiquitous aspect of conscious experience that hitherto has been largely unappreciated in philosophy of mind and in cognitive science: conscious appreciation of a large body of background information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We call this phenomenon chromatic illumination. We begin with a phenomenological case study, involving an experience of joke-understanding in which the conscious aspect of chromatic illumination is especially vivid. Then we offer an account of the prototypical causal role of conscious intentional states (mental states that consciously represent their intentional contents), and we offer a contrasting account of the somewhat different prototypical causal role of conscious chromatic-illumination features of conscious intentional states. Finally, we describe the specific kind of physical-to-mental supervenience situation that needs to obtain in order for a chromatically illuminated conscious intentional state to figure as a supervenient mental cause that exerts both kinds of prototypical, content-appropriate, reasons-guidance vis-a-vis one’s cognition and behavior.

The Metaphysics of Practical Rationality: Intentional and Deontic Cognition

AbstractDespite growing appreciation in recent decades of the importance of shared intentional mental states as a foundation for everything from divergences in primate evolution, to the institution of communal norms, to trends in the development of modernity as a sociopolitical phenomenon, we lack an adequate understanding of the relationship between individual and shared intentionality. At the same time, it is widely appreciated that deontic reasoning concerning what ought, may, and ought not be done is, like reasoning about our intentions, an exercise of practical rationality. Taking advantage of this fact, I use a plan-theoretic semantics for the deontic modalities as a basis for understanding individual and shared intentions. This results in a view that accords well with what we currently have reason to believe about the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of norm psychology and shared intentionality in human beings, and where original intentionality can be understood in terms of the shared intentionality of a community.

A conceptual view of the act of testation to elucidate a testator’s intention in the South African law of succession: a proposed “act-based model” as opposed to the traditional “requirements model” (part 2)

By definition, the law of succession governs the devolution of assets. The recognition of testamentary succession enables a testator to express his/her will (intention) in terms of the disposition of assets in a last will and testament. The act of testation (or testamentary act) may be broadly defined as the practical manifestation of testator’s intention, where the latter is primarily concerned with the disposition of assets. Beinart describes the act of testation and its requirements as follows: “It is clear law that a will, before it can be given effect to as such, must be a conscious, serious and deliberate statement of intention, and therefore a mere indication of a testator’s last wishes, or a statement for future use, or a mere note, or instructions for execution of the will is not an act of testation. There must be a serious and complete and final act of testation made animo testandi, of such a nature as to show [the] testator intended his declaration to take effect as his will. Unless the declaration is of such a nature there is no act of testation at all.

You took the words right out of my mouth: Dual-fMRI reveals intra- and inter-personal neural processes supporting verbal interaction.

Verbal communication relies heavily upon mutual understanding, or common ground. Inferring the intentional states of our interaction partners is crucial in achieving this, and social neuroscience has begun elucidating the intra- and inter-personal neural processes supporting such inferences. Typically, however, neuroscientific paradigms lack the reciprocal to-and-fro characteristic of social communication, offering little insight into the way these processes operate online during real-world interaction. In the present study, we overcame this by developing a “hyperscanning” paradigm in which pairs of interactants could communicate verbally with one another in a joint-action task whilst both undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging simultaneously. Successful performance on this task required both interlocutors to predict their partner's upcoming utterance in order to converge on the same word as each other over recursive exchanges, based only on one another's prior verbal expressions. By applying various levels of analysis to behavioural and neuroimaging data acquired from 20 dyads, three principal findings emerged: First, interlocutors converged frequently within the same semantic space, suggesting that mutual understanding had been established. Second, assessing the brain responses of each interlocutor as they planned their upcoming utterances on the basis of their co-player's previous word revealed the engagement of the temporo-parietal junctional (TPJ), precuneus and dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex. Moreover, responses in the precuneus were modulated positively by the degree of semantic convergence achieved on each round. Second, effective connectivity among these regions indicates the crucial role of the right TPJ in this process, consistent with the Nexus model. Third, neural signals within certain nodes of this network became aligned between interacting interlocutors. We suggest this reflects an interpersonal neural process through which interactants infer and align to one another's intentional states whilst they establish a common ground.

ВПЛИВ СИТУАЦІЇ СПІЛЬНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ НА МОВЛЕННЄВУ КОМУНІКАЦІЮ ДІТЕЙ

The article highlights the results of research on the problem of children's speech communication, which occurs in the process of interpersonal interaction: role-playing, sports games, productive and creative activities. It is concluded that the success of practical interaction and communication depends on the child's ability to express their own intentions in speech and understand the intentions of the partner.
 It was found that the initial and common element is the intentional aspect of the content of speech, the manifestation of the child's positive or negative intentional orientation. It is assumed that the study of the intentional structure of dialogues in the process of performing a common task will help to identify the intentional state of children, their current intentions, will reveal the interdependence of speech and practical actions of participants in joint activities.

ВПЛИВ СИТУАЦІЇ СПІЛЬНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ НА МОВЛЕННЄВУ КОМУНІКАЦІЮ ДІТЕЙ

The article highlights the results of research on the problem of children's speech communication, which occurs in the process of interpersonal interaction: role-playing, sports games, productive and creative activities. It is concluded that the success of practical interaction and communication depends on the child's ability to express their own intentions in speech and understand the intentions of the partner.
 It was found that the initial and common element is the intentional aspect of the content of speech, the manifestation of the child's positive or negative intentional orientation. It is assumed that the study of the intentional structure of dialogues in the process of performing a common task will help to identify the intentional state of children, their current intentions, will reveal the interdependence of speech and practical actions of participants in joint activities.

Witgenstein on intention and theory of action

In the article we examine Wittgenstein's notes on several action theories in general context of intentional states. We show (based on the articles of Michael Scott) that the kinesthetic theory of action and theories of innervation, which were the object of criticism of Wittgenstein, do not play an essential role for understanding Wittgenstein's texts and therefore in this case the influence of historical and philosophical reconstruction on the understanding of Wittgenstein's corresponding notes can be considered insignificant. Late Wittgenstein's texts are directed against comparatively universal methodological and metaphysical principles. And therefore, criticism of theories of action can only serve as an optional illustration and an optional precondition for interpretation and understanding.

Are They Really Trying to Save Their Buddy? The Anthropomorphism of Animal Epimeletic Behaviours.

Simple SummaryAnthropomorphism, defined as attributing human traits to animals and other entities, seems to have appeared during evolution to improve an individual’s understanding of other species (or indeed the world in general). Yet anthropomorphism can have beneficial or harmful consequences especially for animals, and there seems to be little interest in monitoring the potential danger of this approach. Few studies have focused on the factors affecting how we attribute intentions or beliefs to animals, and more quantitative studies are needed to identify how and why humans attribute mental states and cognitive abilities to other animals. In this study, participants answer questions about three videos in which an individual (a sparrow, an elephant and a macaque, respectively) displayed behaviours towards an inanimate conspecific that suddenly regained consciousness at the end of the footage. A fourth video showed a robot dog being kicked by an engineer to demonstrate its stability. These questions were designed to measure how far participants attribute humanlike intentions, beliefs or mental states to non-human animals and robots. Men and older participants are less likely to attribute humanlike mental states to animals. Similarly, people who work with animals or have at least one pet at home demonstrated less naïve anthropomorphism. Conversely, we found that members of animal protection associations showed more biophilia (affinity for other living organisms), attributed more intentions and mental states to animals and were further from biological reality (current scientific knowledge of each species) than non-members. Understanding the potential usefulness of these factors can lead to better relationships with animals and encourage human-robot interactions.Anthropomorphism is a natural tendency in humans, but it is also influenced by many characteristics of the observer (the human) and the observed entity (here, the animal species). This study asked participants to complete an online questionnaire about three videos showing epimeletic behaviours in three animal species. In the videos, an individual (a sparrow, an elephant and a macaque, respectively) displayed behaviours towards an inanimate conspecific that suddenly regained consciousness at the end of the footage. A fourth video showed a robot dog being kicked by an engineer to demonstrate its stability. Each video was followed by a series of questions designed to evaluate the degree of anthropomorphism of participants, from mentaphobia (no attribution of intentions and beliefs, whatever the animal species) to full anthropomorphism (full attribution of intentions and beliefs by animals, to the same extent as in humans) and to measure how far the participants had correctly assessed each situation in terms of biological reality (current scientific knowledge of each species). There is a negative correlation (about 61%) between the mental states attributed to animals by humans and the real capability of animals. The heterogeneity of responses proved that humans display different forms of anthropomorphism, from rejecting all emotional or intentional states in animals to considering animals to show the same intentions as humans. However, the scores participants attributed to animals differed according to the species shown in the video and to human socio-demographic characteristics. Understanding the potential usefulness of these factors can lead to better relationships with animals and encourage a positive view of human-robot interactions. Indeed, reflective or critical anthropomorphism can increase our humanity.

Methodological impulses of Ján Horecký

Abstract The author of the study develops the ideas of J. Horecký, which relate to the language sign, the language system, language consciousness and its cultivation. Interpretations of J. Horecký’s statements on the systemic and communicative language sign lead to the conclusion that there is really only a communication sign as an ambivalent significant for users of the language who control the rules of its use. Significant are articulation‐acoustic units, which we feel as fictitious equivalents of what we experience when we are in the intentional state. J. Horecký’s reflections on the language system led the author to confront the user of the language as an actor of language practice with the user realizing himself as a reflexive linguistic being. In this confrontation, the language system came into focus in a practical and reflexive modality. On the background of these modalities of the language system, the author approaches linguistic consciousness in the interpretation of J. Horecký, in order to shed light on it in terms of two questions: (1) What is the degree of linguistic awareness of the mother tongue? (2) What is the “true” cultivation of language consciousness? These questions led the author to confront the linguistic realist with the anti‐realist and to discover a situation in which the linguist believes in realism but holds the position of anti‐realist. The author leans towards the realists and emphasizes the thesis that the representation of the language system is true when it corresponds to the language system resulting from the nature of language.

Hybrid collective intentionality

The theory of collective agency and intentionality is a flourishing field of research, and our understanding of these phenomena has arguably increased greatly in recent years. Extant theories, however, are still ill-equipped to explain certain aspects of collective intentionality. In this article we draw attention to two such underappreciated (and intertwined) aspects: the failure of the intentional states of collectives to supervene on the intentional states of their members, and the role of non-human factors in collective agency and intentionality (‘hybrid’ collective intentionality). We propose a theory of collective intentionality which builds on the ‘interpretationist’ tradition in metasemantics and the philosophy of mind as initiated by David Lewis and recently developed further by Robbie Williams. The collective-level analogue of interpretationism turns out to look different in some ways from the individual-level theory, but is well-suited to accommodating phenomena such as hybrid collective intentionality. Complemented with Kit Fine’s theory of variable embodiment, such a theory also provides a diachronic account of intentional collectives.

Shannon + Friston = Content: Intentionality in predictive signaling systems

What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for both types of intentional state.

The self and its causal powers between metaphysics and science

According to the thesis of powerism, our world is pervaded by causal powers which are metaphysically basic. The aim of this paper is to defend the existence of the self, defined as a substantial entity, and its mental powers. This claim, which may seem a bold one, should not be deemed as inconsistent with scientific evidence. In fact, this approach does not ignore empirical knowledge, but is not bound only to it in order to understand entities, properties, and the relationship between them. Aristotelian powerism may show that the self, as the subject of one’s mental acts, is a substance that has an essential nature. Firstly, we shall analyze the immediate evidence we have in support of the existence of the self as a substantial entity. We will show that the self is a substance because it possesses an essential character, i.e. an individual essence. We will take into account the Aristotelian perspective of substance, trying to show how the presence of a necessary property that makes every subject identical to itself and the phenomenal features of one’s private experience point to the existence of a substantial entity that corresponds to the self. Secondly, we will try to justify the adoption of a metaphysical theory of causation based on powers, analyzing it in comparison with the main competing theories, namely hypotheticalism and nomism. Then, we shall proceed to show the causal properties of the substance in question, namely the mental powers. In fact, thirdly, we will embrace the thesis of powerism by defending the existence of a set of mental powers that should be attributed to the self. We will describe the main features of mental powers and we will show that they are conceivable as the pure intentional acts we perform by directing an intentional state towards an intentional object. In this way we show how a classic problem of philosophy of mind, relevant to science as well, can be addressed in an original way by a metaphysical approach involving powers.

Animalhood, interests, and rights*

A being to which intentional states – such as desires or preferences – may be ascribed is a being capable of having (actual) interests, whereas to be the subject of interests of some kind is both a necessary and sufficient condition to be the holder of individual rights. After clarifying the sense in which, according to the ‘interest-theory’, the notion of a rights-subject specifies a distinctive normative status, this article will highlight the importance of distinguishing between subjectivity-dependent interests capable of being attributed to conscious beings, on the one hand, and biologically structured needs of conscious and nonconscious living beings, on the other. This distinction allows one to see that the moral requirement of recognizing legal rights for (individual) animals ought not to be conflated with biocentric demands of ecological justice. However, the argument thus delineated will not, without more, answer the crucial question of which specific legal rights ought to be ascribed to nonhuman animals. The article closes with an exploration of the need for holding onto the distinction between rights-subjecthood and personhood by analyzing some implications of Tooley's ‘particular-interest principle’.

‘Soft Law’ in the Mechanism of the International and National Protection of the Constitutional Electoral Rights

The publication explores the phenomenology and content of ‘soft law’ in the international and national law and reveals the designation of ‘soft law’ in protecting the electoral rights of the citizens. ‘Soft law’ is intended to mean optional international documents, most of which are resolutions of the intergovernmental organisations containing statements, commitments, guidelines, common positions or statements on policy or intentions. ‘Soft law’ documents are usually adopted by the statutory bodies of the international organisations on issues that reflect new problems, tendencies or trends in the field of electoral law, for which there is no political will or the accordance of all the member states in the form of a classical international treaty. When it comes to the content, the ‘soft law’ documents are all kinds of statements, obligations, guidelines, codes of conduct, codes of ethics, guidelines and standards, common positions or statements of policy or intentions.

Exploring the Orthogonal Relationship between Controlled and Automated Processes in Skilled Action

Traditional models of skill learning posit that skilled action unfolds in an automatic manner and that control will prove deleterious to movement and performance proficiency. These perspectives assume that automated processes are characterised by low levels of control and vice versa. By contrast, a number of authors have recently put forward hybrid theories of skilled action which have sought to capture the close integration between fine-grained automatic motor routines and intentional states. Drawing heavily on the work of Bebko et al. (2005) and Christensen et al. (2016), we argue that controlled and automated processes must operate in parallel if skilled performers are to address the wide range of challenges that they are faced with in training and competition. More specifically, we show how skilled performers use controlled processes to update and improve motor execution in training contexts and to stabilise performance under pressurised conditions.

Foundations of a we-perspective

What enables everyday collective attitudes such as the intention of two persons to go for a walk together? Most current approaches are concerned with full-fledged collective attitudes and focus on the content, the mode or the subject of such attitudes. It will be argued that these approaches miss out an important explanatory enabling feature of collective attitudes: an experiential state, called a “sense of us”, in which a we-perspective is grounded. As will be shown, the sense of us pre-structures collective intentional states and is thus relevant to an adequate understanding of collective attitudes. The argument receives indirect support by insights into distortions of interaction due to implicit stereotypes.

A Neural Dynamic Network Drives an Intentional Agent That Autonomously Learns Beliefs in Continuous Time

Autonomous learning is the ability to form knowledge representations solely through one’s own experience. To autonomously learn, an agent must be able to perceive, act, memorize, plan, and desire; it must be able to form intentional states. We build on a neural process account of intentionality, in which intentional states are stabilized by interactions within populations of neurons that represent perceptual features and movement parameters. Instabilities in such neural dynamics induce sequences of intentional behavior. In this article, we examine the neural process organization required to decide and control when learning takes place, to build the representations that can hold learning data, and to organize the selection of neural substrate to learn the novel patterns. We demonstrate how a neural dynamic network may learn new beliefs about the world from single experiences, may activate and use beliefs to satisfy desires, and may deactivate beliefs when their predictions do not match experience. We illustrate the ideas in a simple toy scenario in which a simulated agent autonomously explores an environment, directs action at objects, and forms beliefs about simple contingencies in this environment. The agent utilizes learned beliefs to satisfy its own fixed desires.

Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance

A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no-guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as commitments whose discharging requires complying with certain norms is preferable because it both respects the insight provided while remaining unscathed by the problems besetting this conception of normativity.

Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account

This paper aims to offer an account of affective experiences within Predictive Processing, a novel framework that considers the brain to be a dynamical, hierarchical, Bayesian hypothesis-testing mechanism. We begin by outlining a set of common features of affective experiences (or feelings) that a PP-theory should aim to explain: feelings are conscious, they have valence, they motivate behaviour, and they are intentional states with particular and formal objects. We then review existing theories of affective experiences within Predictive Processing and delineate two families of theories: Interoceptive Inference Theories (which state that feelings are determined by interoceptive predictions) and Error Dynamics Theories (which state that feelings are determined by properties of error dynamics). We highlight the strengths and shortcomings of each family of theories and develop a synthesis: the Affective Inference Theory. Affective Inference Theory claims that valence corresponds to the expected rate of prediction error reduction. In turn, the particular object of a feeling is the object predicted to be the most likely cause of expected changes in prediction error rate, and the formal object of a feeling is a predictive model of the expected changes in prediction error rate caused by a given particular object. Finally, our theory shows how affective experiences bias action selection, directing the organism towards allostasis and towards optimal levels of uncertainty in order to minimise prediction error over time.

The qua-Problem, Meaning Scepticism, and the Life-World

Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny (Language and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of language. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1999) argue that the pure causal theory of reference faces a problem, which they call the qua-problem. They propose to invoke intentional states to cope with it. Martin Kusch (A sceptical guide to meaning and rules. Acumen, Chesham, 2006), however, argues that, because Devitt and Stereleny invoke intentional states to solve the problem, their causal-hybrid theory of reference is susceptible to Kripke’s sceptical attack. Kusch thinks that intentional states are what allows the sceptic to get a foothold and thus interpret words in a weird way. In his view, Kripke is therefore correct in not regarding a causal theory as a solution to the problem. I think, however, that there is room to defend a causal-hybrid theory of reference. Drawing on Husserl’s notion of the life-world, I argue that this notion is helpful for overcoming some aspects of the qua-problem and the meaning scepticism which Devitt and Sterelny’s causal-hybrid theory of reference faces.