Abstract

The theory of collective agency and intentionality is a flourishing field of research, and our understanding of these phenomena has arguably increased greatly in recent years. Extant theories, however, are still ill-equipped to explain certain aspects of collective intentionality. In this article we draw attention to two such underappreciated (and intertwined) aspects: the failure of the intentional states of collectives to supervene on the intentional states of their members, and the role of non-human factors in collective agency and intentionality (‘hybrid’ collective intentionality). We propose a theory of collective intentionality which builds on the ‘interpretationist’ tradition in metasemantics and the philosophy of mind as initiated by David Lewis and recently developed further by Robbie Williams. The collective-level analogue of interpretationism turns out to look different in some ways from the individual-level theory, but is well-suited to accommodating phenomena such as hybrid collective intentionality. Complemented with Kit Fine’s theory of variable embodiment, such a theory also provides a diachronic account of intentional collectives.

Highlights

  • It is not uncommon in everyday thought and talk to ascribe intentionality, and propositional attitudes, to collectives

  • The default approach is to treat the intentional states of collectives as deriving in some manner from the intentional states that their members enjoy: collective intentionality is a secondary kind of intentionality built upon the primary intentionality of individuals

  • An adequate model of collective intentionality needs to pay particular attention to the structure of collectives, so we spell out the notion of structure that is involved and articulate it using the theory of variable embodiment (Sect. 3.4)

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Summary

Introduction

It is not uncommon in everyday thought and talk to ascribe intentionality, and propositional attitudes, to collectives. The default approach is to treat the intentional states of collectives as deriving in some manner from the intentional states that their members enjoy: collective intentionality is a secondary kind of intentionality built upon the primary intentionality of individuals. We draw attention to the phenomenon of hybrid collective intentionality, that is, collective intentionality that comes about as the result of interaction between human agents and artificial entities which may or may not be agents 3.1), we begin by articulating an interpretationist approach to collective intentionality This type of theory of content has been developed at a fairly sophisticated level for the case of individual intentionality An adequate model of collective intentionality needs to pay particular attention to the structure of collectives (or so we argue), so we spell out the notion of structure that is involved and articulate it using the theory of variable embodiment An adequate model of collective intentionality needs to pay particular attention to the structure of collectives (or so we argue), so we spell out the notion of structure that is involved and articulate it using the theory of variable embodiment (Sect. 3.4)

Some limitations of current approaches
How collective intentionality gets into the world
Collective intentionality does not only involve human beings
Hybrid collective intentionality
Clearing the ground for a positive account
Introducing interpretationism
Collective-level interpretationism
Collective evidence
Collective actions
Source intentionality and structure
Grounding and fixing belief- and desire-states
Ascriptions of structure
Embodied collectives
Fine’s theory of embodiment
Collectives as variable embodiments
An interpretationist view of variable embodiments
Final remarks
Full Text
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