Abstract
In the article we examine Wittgenstein's notes on several action theories in general context of intentional states. We show (based on the articles of Michael Scott) that the kinesthetic theory of action and theories of innervation, which were the object of criticism of Wittgenstein, do not play an essential role for understanding Wittgenstein's texts and therefore in this case the influence of historical and philosophical reconstruction on the understanding of Wittgenstein's corresponding notes can be considered insignificant. Late Wittgenstein's texts are directed against comparatively universal methodological and metaphysical principles. And therefore, criticism of theories of action can only serve as an optional illustration and an optional precondition for interpretation and understanding.
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