Soviet Arms Research Articles

Perestroika and Soviet national security

Radical changes in Eastern Europe, the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, and significant force reductions by the Soviet army signal a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations. Much has been written about these breakthroughs, but there are few satisfactory explanations of why they came about. Yet there is an explanation, and it is essential to understanding the full implications. In this major new book, Michael MccGwire describes the radical rethinking of Soviet national security that together with the decision to democratize Soviet politics prompted these developments. MccGwire was among the first to recognize the shift and foresee the implications. He masterfully laces the redefinition of Soviet security requirements in the broader context of world wide foreign policy and explains the implications for the United States. As MccGwire traces the whole Perestroika process, he explains that Soviet military from 1948 to 1986 had been driven by the possibility of wold war and the compelling objective of not losing. He then describes the course of events and the reasons underlying the fundamental change in Soviet defense and foreign policy that first became apparent in 1987. The Soviets at that point redefined their military doctrine: a world war could and would be averted by political means. MccGwire doesn't attribute the reorientation of Soviet policy to the confrontational policies of the Reagan administration during the 1980s, which almost certainly delayed the process, but rather to the bankruptcy of established Soviet policies, autonomous new rethinking, and concern about the danger of war. The book focuses on the 1981-1990 period, but MccGwire also reinterprets Soviet defense and foreignpolicy since World War II, including an original explanation of Soviet arms control behavior. Perestroika and Soviet National Security describes the truly momentous developments within the Soviet Union that have changed the face of Europe and our global interaction with the rest of the world. And most important, it looks at the hidden objectives that underlie policy to help clarify the fast-changing events and what they may mean for the future.

The Soviet Union and arms control: negotiating strategy and tactics

The Soviet Union and arms control: negotiating strategy and tactics

Goodwill Missions for Castoff Missiles

US and Soviet arms control negotiators were able to agree, with relative ease, on the general outline for deep reductions in strategic arms (START). But it has proved more difficult for them to decide what to do with all the missiles that will be decommissioned as a consequence of the treaty. Neither the US nor the Soviet Union is inclined to follow the INF Treaty precedent in which all the costly intermediate-range missiles were destroyed - a wasteful, if straightforward and readily verifiable, approach. Instead, START negotiators are considering plans to convert treaty-prohibited missiles into peaceful space-lauch vehicles. To date, however, the two sides have been unable to agree on what constitutes peaceful uses. An increasingly sharp dispute has arisen over whether the START missiles should be used only for civilian purposes, or whether some military uses would be permitted. There is little doubt about the technical and economic feasibility of conversion. Converted missiles have carried non-weapons payloads into space from the dawn of the space age. Despite the extensive experience both superpowers have in converting military missiles to space launchers, no missile conversion has yet been undertaken as a consequence of any arms reduction accord. 7 refs.

Port Access and Arms Sales

This article examines the strategic use of arms sales by the Soviet Union. It is concerned with how the USSR, through its arms sales, rewards clients who give it what it wants and punishes clients who do not. This study identified grants of port access and, to a lesser degree, ability to pay in hard cash as the virtually exclusive determinants of variation in the contract terms of Soviet arms sales.

Continuity and change in soviet arms control policy

Continuity and change in soviet arms control policy

OF SMOKE AND MIRRORS: GRAND STRATEGY BY COMMISSION

Abstract : Few enterprises are as demanding as that of attempting to craft an appropriate strategy for a power such as the United States in an ever more complicated world. Earlier endeavors include the classic NSC-68 written in 1950 and the so-called Nixon Doctrine prepared two decades later. most recent attempt Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Range Strategy (January 1988), compiled under the auspices of a prestigious commission co-chaired by Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter. objective of Discriminate Deterrence to devise an integrated strategy designed for the long term, to guide force development, weapons procurement, and arms negotiations. How well it has done in its pursuit of that objective, and why, the subject of this review. report consists of a summary and eight substantive chapters, with a dozen working papers and topical reports to be published separately. chapter titles themselves provide an indication of the scope of this effort: The Changing Security Environment, Third World Conflicts and U.S. Interests, Wars on the Soviet Periphery, The Extreme Threats, Influencing Soviet Arms Policy, Managing Technology, Managing the Defense Budget, and Connecting the Elements of the Strategy. Each chapter undertakes to identify relevant issues, assess the prevailing state of affairs, and then prescribe how the subject of that chapter should be handled by the United States in the years to come. result is meant to guide our defense planning for many years into the future -- at least twenty.

Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949-56

The thirtieth anniversary of the 1956 Suez crisis has sparked renewed scholarly interest in this milestone in twentieth-century history. Current research on the subject has been spurred by the recent declassification of American, British and Israeli diplomatic papers from the period which provide unprecedented insight into the many questions still surrounding the crisis.1 Among these is the central issue of Egypt-Israel relations in the period leading up to Suez. Events arising from the Egypt-Israel conflict helped precipitate the political crisis (e.g. the influence of Egypt's continuing purchase of Soviet arms and resistance to Western peace initiatives on America's decision to withdraw financial support for the Aswan Dam), and provided a pretext for its military conclusion, the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. The second Arab-Israeli war signified the culmination of over seven years of growing tensions on the Egypt-Israel border. The basis for this escalation lay in a subjective factor: conflicting Egyptian and Israeli interpretations of the Armistice Agreement, and two objective factors: deficiencies in the Armistice and the inherent instability of the Egypt-Israel border. The deleterious impact of these constant factors was increasingly exacerbated by changing circumstances on the domestic, regional and international levels: internal developments in Egypt and Israel, inter-Arab competition for regional domination, and Great Power rivalries and policies in the Middle East. The border war had its primary origin in the conflicting interpretations of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement (EIAA), signed in Rhodes in February 1949. Egypt, together with the other Arab states, held to the strict definition of an armistice according to international law, viz. that such an agreement did not end a state of war but was merely a declaration of truce. This position, repeatedly

Soviet ballistic missile defense and the western alliance

Introduction Background: Ballistic Missile Defense and Alliance Security Reassessments of Soviet Strategic Defense 1. Soviet BMD Capabilities and Activities Before the ABM Treaty Since the ABM Treaty Overall Soviet BMD Prospects 2. Interpretations of Soviet Behavior Race Interactions Bureaucratic Politics A Composite Hypothesis Approval of the ABM Treaty Military Doctrine Force Posture Trends Interpretations and inferences 3. Implications for the Western Alliance Soviet Strategic Priorities Potential Consequences in War Potential Consequences in Peace 4. Soviet Arms Control Diplomacy and the Unlikely Prospect of Breakout Incentives and Inhibitions Regarding Breakout The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative in Soviet Eyes Soviet Arms Control Policy 5. Alliance Reactions: Arms Control and Deterrence Grounds for Western Consensus Continuing Arms Control Efforts Force Posture Improvements Maintaining Stable Deterrence and Alliance Security Notes Index

Arms transfer limitations and Third World security

Preface. About the authors. Introduction. Part 1 Controversies: Third World arms control and world system conflicts Third World arms control in a hegemonistic world Third World arms control - a Third World responsibility Third World arms control, military technology and alternative security. Part 2 Supplier control: US policy on arms transfers to the Third World Soviet arms transfer restraint the conventional arms transfers talks - an experiment in mutual arms trade restraint problems and prospects of arms transfer limitations among second-tier suppliers - the cases of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany arms transfer limitations - the case of Sweden. Part 3 Recipient control: regional arms control in the South American context problems and prospects for arms control in South-East Asia Third World arms control - role of the non-aligned movement. Part 4 Integrating approaches: arms transfer control and proposals to link disarmament to development the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a model for conventional armament restraint. Assessment. Select bibliography. Index.

The American-Soviet Confrontation in Africa: Its Impact on the Politics of Africa

Despite enormous Soviet arms supplies to Africa, the V.S. stressed economic assistance throughout the 1970s and did not increase arms shipments. However, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the leftist regime in Mozambique and the Soviet-Cuban military build-up in Ethiopia and Angola, completely changed V.S. strategy in the 1980s. American emphasis shifted to the Horn of Africa. Increased aid was funneled to Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan. Support for Southern Africa states was minimal. The Reagan administration viewed South Africa as a bulwark against Communism and the Namibian question became stalemated.

Three Images of Soviet Arms Control Compliance

Arms control negotiations and occasional treaty successes (eleven bilateral agreements since 1963) have become the keystone in Soviet-American relations. The danger of nuclear war, spiraling arms competition, and domestic politics have worked to maintain the negotiations' centrality, even in an administration that has often sought to downgrade the importance of arms control in favor of strategic modernization programs and a tough stance against Soviet policies. The major thrust of the anti-arms control faction in the Reagan administration and Congress has rested on Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements. The Soviets, it is argued, cannot be trusted, have cheated in the past, and will do so in the future. Arms control is a one-way street that leads only to Soviet advantages while lulling Americans into a false sense of complacency. This article examines the extensive debate over arms control compliance issues during the Reagan administration. Is arms control a viable process and can it remain a major component of Soviet-American relations? How accurate are the administration's charges of Soviet noncompliance? To answer these questions this study will focus on the three agreements that have played the most important regulatory function in the Soviet-American strategic relationship SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) I, SALT II, and the ABM (Antiballistic Missile) Treaty. Soviet noncompliance will be measured against three competing images: deliberate cheating; bureaucratic structure and process; and conflicting interpretations of treaty obligations. Which of these images one accepts quite clearly affects the desirability of entering into agreements with the Soviets in the future.

Book Review: Coit D. Blacker, Reluctant Warriors: The United States, The Soviet Union and Arms Control (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 193pp., £19.95 hbk., £12.95 pbk.)

Book Review: Coit D. Blacker, Reluctant Warriors: The United States, The Soviet Union and Arms Control (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 193pp., £19.95 hbk., £12.95 pbk.)

Soviet Arms Control Policy in Perspective

Soviet Arms Control Policy in Perspective

Dimensions of Soviet Arms control policy

Abstract This article discusses Moscow's fundamental attitude toward international security: the perceived need for “reliable defense” and the resultant rejection of nuclear deterrence. On this basis, different ways of translating the Soviet security interest into arms diplomacy are analyzed. The Kremlin's effort to conclude an intermediate‐range nuclear forces (INF) agreement with the U.S. in 1987 must be understood as a natural outgrowth of policies that have developed over a long time.

The Soviet Defence Burden and Arms Control

Poor economic performance m the Soviet Union has led to a view in the West that Soviet leaders might seek an accommodation with the US which would allow them to transfer resources to the civilian economy. The economy has been characterized by declining growth in population, capital and produc tivity. Economic evidence suggests that defence priority has adversely affected economic performance by attracting a disproportionate share of resources and, in protecting military producers from the worst aspects of central planning, by imposing the systemic burden on the civilian economy. Econometric investigation by Western economists shows that the benefit in terms of higher economic growth from substantial decline in the growth of military expenditures is quite small, due to the inefficiency of the civilian investment process. An arms limitation is unlikely to yield a substantial transfer of R & D resources. A more fruitful source of economic benefit is likely to be the relaxation of restrictions on civilian enterprise. The military view of economic reform is likely to be ambivalent. It recognizes the need for a strong modern economy but is probably reluctant to yield its priority status. The international sector offers little prospect of relief. The East Europeans have their own economic problems and the Reagan administration has tightened its control on exports of technology which might at the margin ease the Soviet economic constraint. The resource saving from an arms agreement alone is unlikely to be sufficient to avoid the need for a fundamental re-assessment of policies.

United States–Soviet Relations and Arms Control

United States–Soviet Relations and Arms Control

Managing U.S.‐Soviet arms control initiatives: Do we speak the same language?

(1987). Managing U.S.‐Soviet arms control initiatives: Do we speak the same language? Comparative Strategy: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 165-184.

The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local War, 1945-1980

The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local War, 1945-1980

Soviet Union and the Third World: The Economic Dimension

This paper surveys some of the outstanding issues and changes in the economic dimension of Soviet involvement in the non-communist Third World over the last 30 years. It attempts to identify and integrate salient features of current knowledge about Soviet economic policy toward the less developed countries. After a survey of the evolution of Soviet arms transfers and economic aid and trade relations, the paper concludes with some reflections on the effectiveness of Soviet policy and prospects for future change. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 124, 420.

Attack on protectionism in the Soviet Union? A comment

Unlike the other countries in what we tend to call “the Soviet bloc,” the Soviet Union benefited financially from the oil crises of the 1970s, for it was a major petroleum and natural gas exporter. The oil crises also benefited the Soviet Union indirectly as a number of radical Third World oil producers acquired money to buy more Soviet arms. Moreover, the windfall increase in petroleum prices was supplemented by a similar windfall increase in the price of the other major Soviet export product, gold. The subsidies that the Soviet Union provided to Eastern Europe did not entail any sacrifice of resources that had been previously committed but required only that it forgo even greater gains. The politics underlying the Soviet decisions were the politics underlying the rapid expansion of export earnings.