Three Images of Soviet Arms Control Compliance

Abstract

Arms control negotiations and occasional treaty successes (eleven bilateral agreements since 1963) have become the keystone in Soviet-American relations. The danger of nuclear war, spiraling arms competition, and domestic politics have worked to maintain the negotiations' centrality, even in an administration that has often sought to downgrade the importance of arms control in favor of strategic modernization programs and a tough stance against Soviet policies. The major thrust of the anti-arms control faction in the Reagan administration and Congress has rested on Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements. The Soviets, it is argued, cannot be trusted, have cheated in the past, and will do so in the future. Arms control is a one-way street that leads only to Soviet advantages while lulling Americans into a false sense of complacency. This article examines the extensive debate over arms control compliance issues during the Reagan administration. Is arms control a viable process and can it remain a major component of Soviet-American relations? How accurate are the administration's charges of Soviet noncompliance? To answer these questions this study will focus on the three agreements that have played the most important regulatory function in the Soviet-American strategic relationship SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) I, SALT II, and the ABM (Antiballistic Missile) Treaty. Soviet noncompliance will be measured against three competing images: deliberate cheating; bureaucratic structure and process; and conflicting interpretations of treaty obligations. Which of these images one accepts quite clearly affects the desirability of entering into agreements with the Soviets in the future.