Soviet Arms Research Articles

Baathism in practice: agriculture, politics, and political culture in Syria and Iraq

In the wake of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations at Camp David in 1978 and the Baghdad Summit reactions in November of that year to those negotiations, the rulers of Syria and Iraq announced their intention to unite their two countries. While unifying Arab ranks in the face of Sadat's 'sell-out' to the US and Israel was a strong motivation for the Baathists in Syria and Iraq to bury the hatchet in their smoldering feud, there were for both sides additional incentives. Both regimes saw in unification protection against Islamic fundamentalists aroused by events in Iran, while for his part Syrian President Hafiz al Assad deduced that union with Iraq would cover his Eastern flank while Syrian forces were bogged down in Lebanon and dug in along the frontier with Israel. Moreover, with the treasury nearly depleted and the Syrian lira drifting downward as a result of skyrocketing inflation since 1975, Assad seized the opportunity to lay claim to some of the Iraqi oil money. The union with Iraq also paved the way for resumption of Soviet arms shipments to Syria, which had been held in abeyance by the Soviets as long as the Syrians refused to cooperate with Iraq, a country in which the Soviets then enjoyed greater influence. For Iraq, union with Syria held out the possibility of manipulating Syrian internal politics. It also represented the final act in the long-drawn-out drama of Iraq overcoming its isolation in the never-ending Arab Cold War.1 Unification of Syria and Iraq was not indicative of an idea whose time had come. Instead it was the result of converging factors that made it mutually advantageous for both sides temporarily to link their fates. The prospects for long term political or even more limited forms of unification were never promising, for despite being ruled by two branches of what is ostensibly the same Baath Party, Iraq and Syria have fundamentally different political cultures. Their ruling parties are, therefore, far from being as similar as their shared name would suggest. Iraq, cut off from the West by the Great Syrian Desert and from the East by mountains and the Shatt al Arab, remains a much more traditional polity, based as it is on a society that has yet to be fundamentally and completely transformed through contact with the West and indigenous development. In contrast Syria, as a Levantine state, has long been exposed to outside forces, so her citizens tend to be more cosmopolitan, freewheeling, and eager to deal with foreigners in the hope of benefitting from them. As a result the Baath Party in Syria, confronting a more developed society and polity, does not attempt to keep as tight a grip on the political

A synopsis of the Soviet arms build‐up

A synopsis of the Soviet arms build‐up

Egypt Breaks the Deadlock

The recent drama of President Sadat's pilgrimage to Jerusalem, followed in quick succession by his call for a Cairo Conference of all Geneva parties to include the Palestinians and subsequently his open break with four Arab countries and the PLO, has seriously unsettled Washington's efforts to promote an overall Arab-Israeli settlement through a Geneva Conference. It is to be feared that Sadat's initiatives will further fragment the Arab world, lead to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, and consequently destabilize the area to the detriment of fundamental US interests. For some thirty years and through seven administrations, American Presidents and their top advisers have agreed that only through a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict could the ever-increasing US interests in the Middle East be assured. These interests have clearly involved the security and economic welfare of a Jewish state, to which the US has been committed since 1921, access to oil and the trade and financial ties which have ensued, free air and sea passage through the area, and political stability based on moderate, non-communist governments and minimal Soviet influence and presence. Washington has learned that whenever large-scale hostilities erupt as in 1956, 1967, 1970 and 1973 access to oil and to air and sea transit have been compromised and Soviet influence has increased. The events preceding the 1956 war introduced Soviet arms for the first time; the 1970 War of Attrition brought into Egypt a Soviet air defence system and 20,000 Russians, and the Western world knows the consequences of the 1973 war in so far as fuel supplies were curtailed. Today, American economic dependence on, and ties with the Middle East are far greater than ever before, as are its commitments in the area. About 2025 percent of American oil consumption 4 million barrels per day comes from the Mid-East at a cost of some $20 billion annually. These imports are paid for by providing goods and services, and through investment of $12 billion annually in the US by the oil producers-largely in US Treasury

The Soviet military and arms control

Abstract : Any effort to examine the attitudes and role of the Soviet military in arms control matters would be remiss not to point out the impossibility for Western observers to reach clear-cut, let alone definitive conclusions. The available data is simply inadequate to that task in the face of continuing Soviet secrecy about the USSR's political process and defense matters. To cite with reference to SALT but one example of this difficulty involving both attitudes and role, we do not know whether the military had more influence on the Soviet acceptance of the 1972 interim agreement on offensive weapons, at a time when Grechko was not in the Politburo and no professional military figures apparently participated directly in the Moscow summit meetings, or on the Soviet acceptance of the 1974 guidelines of offensive weapons, when Grechko had been on the Politburo for a year and a half and senior military representatives did take part in the Vladivostok summit. It should also be noted at the outset that the military do not necessarily think and act as a unified interest group on arms control.

Soviet arms and Egypt

Soviet arms and Egypt

Zigurds Zile, Robert Sharlet, Jean C. Love, The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection: A Case Study in Policy Implementation

Zigurds Zile, Robert Sharlet, Jean C. Love, The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection: A Case Study in Policy Implementation

The Soviet Union and Arms Control

The Soviet Union and Arms Control

The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection: A Case Study in Policy Implementation

The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection: A Case Study in Policy Implementation

The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection, A Case Study in Policy Implementation

The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection, A Case Study in Policy Implementation

The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection: A Case Study in Policy Implementation

The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection: A Case Study in Policy Implementation

The growth of Soviet arms technology a debate

The growth of Soviet arms technology a debate

Effects of Derogatory Attacks in Soviet Arms Control Propaganda

Effects of Derogatory Attacks in Soviet Arms Control Propaganda

Book Notes

JAPAN AND NUCLEAR CHINA: Japanese Reactions to China's Nuclear Weapons. By John Welfield.THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF TIBET. By Ram Rahul with a foreword by The Dalai Lama.A HISTORY OF MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Decolonization. By John Bastin and Harry J. Benda.THE ORGANIZATION OF THAI SOCIETY IN THE EARLY BANGKOK PERIOD, 1782–1873. By Akin Rabibhadaua.THAI STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A Study in Attitude Changes. By Jean Barry, S.J. Ithaca, N.Y.POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF INDIAN INDUSTRY: A case study of the Baroda business elite. By Howard L. Erdman.TENSION AREAS IN INDIA'S FEDERAL SYSTEM. By Amal Ray.STUDIES IN POLITICS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL. Edited by M. S. Rajan.THE IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY ON THE KASHMIR CONFLICT. By Louis D. Hayes.CHINA: Evolution of a Revolution 1959‐66. By J. D. Simmonds.THE SIEGE OF THE PEKING LEGATIONS: A diary. By Lancelot Giles.INDICTMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: The Case of Liu Shao‐Ch'i. By A. E. Kent.MODERN COMPARATIVE POLITICS. By Peter H. Merkl.BUREAUCRACY. By Martin Albrow.POLITICS OF THE NEW ZEALAND MAORI: Protest and Cooperation, 1891–1909. By John A. Williams. AucklandAUSTRALIA'S WESTERN THIRD: A History of Western Australia from the first settlements to modern times. By F. K. Crowley.AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TODAY. By Geoffrey Sawer.HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF AUSTRALIA: A select list of official sources. By Jennifer Finlayson.AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: An Introductory Survey. By J. D. B. Miller and Brian Jinks.ATLAS OF BUNDALEER PLAINS AND TATALA. By F. M. Rothery. Introduction by N. G. Butlin and J. N. Jennings.THE BITTER FIGHT: A Pictorial History of the Australian Labor Movement. By Joe Harris.THE CRUISE OF THE ROSARIO amongst the New Hebrides and Santa Cruz Islands, Exposing the Recent Atrocities connected with the Kidnapping of Natives in the South Seas. By Albert Hastings Markham R.N.AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN: Documents and Readings in Australian History. By W. MacMahon Ball.THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: A superpower dilemma. By R. Kolkowicz, M. P. Gallagher and B. S. Lambeth.SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Aaron S. Klieman.STRATEGIES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE. Edited by Jerry M. Tinker with Andrew R. Molnar and John D. le Noir.THE CHARTIST MOVEMENT IN SCOTLAND. By Alexander Wilson.PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT: Report of the Commission on International Development. By Lester B. PearsonTHE ATLANTIC FANTASY: the U.S., NATO, and Europe. By David Calleo.PUBLIC OPINION, THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY: Four Case Studies from the Formative Years. By Doris A. Graber.THE AMERICAN RIGHT WING: Readings in Political Behavior. Edited by Robert A. Schoenberger.COMPETITION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: An Economic Model. By Andrew M. Scott.USUAL POLITICS: A Critique and Some Suggestions for an Alternative. By George D. Beam.TWO HUNDRED AMERICANS IN SEARCH OF A GOVERNMENT. By E. E. Schattschneider.

The Soviet ABM and Arms Control

The Soviet ABM and Arms Control

The Soviet Union and the Neutralist World

Although Soviet interest in the "colonial ques tion" is as old as the regime, an active and well-financed policy was initiated only in 1954-1955 as more colonies attained na tional independence. The first Soviet loans and arms ship ments to Afghanistan and Egypt were designed to weaken the Baghdad Pact, support neutralism, and establish Soviet pres ence in the Middle East. The Soviet Union joined specialized international organizations, and Soviet leaders began to visit selected nonaligned countries. Soviet ideologists developed the concept of "national democracy" and "neocolonialism" in order to rationalize the operation. Long-term loans to a select group of neutralist states, at low interest rates with repayment often on a barter basis or in local currencies, are a significant feature of the Soviet offensive in the "third world." The So viet Union seeks to weaken and ultimately to eliminate West ern influence, disrupting regional military alliances and eco nomic ties with the West; Soviet loans and aid are also designed to promote political and socioeconomic conditions conducive to the strengthening of local Communist parties and are a means of obtaining neutralist support for Soviet foreign-policy objec tives. The Soviet campaign in the "third world" has had lim ited success, and may have consequences which its initiators did not anticipate.

Two Unorthodox Satellites

may seem paradoxical to place in the same category of the unorthodox two communist states, Poland and Hungary, which have presumably experienced such a different fate since 1956. The world has become accustomed to recognizing that Poland, since that critical year, has followed an unusual course in comparison with its fellow satellites in Eastern Europe. Although some of the experimentation of the period after 1956 has been modified or abandoned, there remain important respects in which the victories of that year have been preserved. The world has tended to have a very different image of post-1956 Hungary and to write it off as a new and even more distasteful form of Stalinism, imposed on a unwilling country by the brute force of Soviet arms. It has not been sufficiently realized that, in spite of the defeat of the revolution in 1956, those tragic events were not without some positive gains, at least in terms of the destruction of the old system, and that in more recent years Hungary has distinguished itself from other members of the Soviet bloc by a certain willingness to experiment with new ideas and methods. A dynamic analysis suggests that whereas Poland has made a partial retreat from the high-point of autonomy and non-conformity in 1956, Hungary has effected a noticeable advance in the direction of a nationally distinctive form of communism, thus bringing the two countries somewhat closer together in the spectrum of world communism. Not surprisingly, when the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961 produced the renewed onslaught on Stalin and Stalinism, it was nowhere greeted with more enthusiasm than in Hungary and Poland.