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Abstract
Abstract This article discusses Moscow's fundamental attitude toward international security: the perceived need for “reliable defense” and the resultant rejection of nuclear deterrence. On this basis, different ways of translating the Soviet security interest into arms diplomacy are analyzed. The Kremlin's effort to conclude an intermediate‐range nuclear forces (INF) agreement with the U.S. in 1987 must be understood as a natural outgrowth of policies that have developed over a long time.
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