Coalition of the opting – Part 1: Venturing into new alignment strategies based on financial derivatives theory

Abstract

This article introduces the ‘coalition of the opting’ as a novel alignment strategy situated between non-alignment and traditional collective security. Drawing on financial derivatives theory, particularly options contracts, the approach offers a flexible alternative to rigid alliance commitments. It provides nations with the ability to secure defense capabilities through time-limited, binding contracts that allow future decisions to be deferred, thus maintaining strategic flexibility. The ‘coalition of the opting’ aims to address the predictability and commitment challenges inherent in existing alignment strategies by creating tailored agreements that ensure partner support when needed, without the full obligations of traditional alliances. While not a substitute for collective defense, this concept seeks to lower the entry threshold for binding commitments, thereby optimizing national defense with partner support. Since the ‘coalition of the opting’ is in its early stages, further theoretical investigation and counterfactual analysis are required to assess its viability.