Senate Armed Services Committee Research Articles

Technologies vital to U.S. defense selected

Concerned that the U.S. is losing its edge in technologies vital for national defense, Congress last September ordered the Department of Defense, in consultation with the Department of Energy, to draw up a Critical Technologies Plan by March 15 each year. The report is to list the 20 technologies deemed most essential to develop in order to ensure the long-term qualitative superiority of U.S. weapon systems. Responding to this mandate, DOD has submitted its first annual report to the House and Senate Armed Services committees. The report was released at a Senate hearing in mid-March before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry & Technology, chaired by Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D.-N.M.), initiator of the mandate. In addition, the Pentagon will submit a classified addendum this month amplifying on sensitive aspects of the technologies chosen. The report lists not 20, but 22 technologies. Among those chemically related are preparation of gallium arsenide (GaAs) and other compound semiconductors, high-temperatur...

Dangers of limited SDI

Recent efforts to redefine the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) are mostly aimed at building support for a system to defend US land-based missiles. This is thought to be a more feasible goal than President Reagan's dream of an impregnable shield to defend the US population against ballistic missiles. But a feasible idea is not necessarily a good one. While chasing the population-defense fantasy would destroy the existing arms control regime and waste the national treasure of money and talent, defending land-based missiles would be dangerous and destabilizing. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger held fast to the idea of population defense in January, when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that even early deployments of SDI systems that could be developed in the near future should be the first phase of a system that would protect the continent. But such statements may reflect the administration's determination to do away with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty more than its belief that population defense is a reasonable goal. The author notes that, to those longstanding problems of defense decision making, they must now add the pressures of SDI. Furthermore, whatever the motives of those who advocate redirecting SDI, it is clear that concernsmore » about the vulnerability of land-based missiles could be addressed in more sensible ways. 5 references.« less

Manpower, Personnel, and Training Methodology: Myths and Realities

For military personnel planners life seemed so simple in the days when there was a draft. Now, not only do we have personnel costs and weapon system life cycle costs that are rising dramatically into the billions but there is also a predictable drop off in the population eligible for military service through the 1990's. To complicate matters, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have frozen military manpower to the 1984 levels. In essence, this means that the defense establishment may be prevented from adequately supporting the operation and maintenance of many new systems currently under contract as well as shelving its plan to buy more technologically improved systems. More to the point of this panel session is the fact that supportability of new systems in terms of human resource requirements is often not addressed before the program decisions concerning new hardware procurements are made. The price tag of manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) is estimated at close to 60 percent of the life cycle cost of a weapon system. Each service is in the process of developing a comprehensive solution to an extremely difficult problem; that is, how to cope with the moving target of military personnel management. The panel members will discuss MPT problems and solutions unique to his branch of service. As in any ambitious program of the magnitude of this one, a number of myths and misconceptions have sprung up for one reason or another. Each panelist will attempt to dispell the voodoo-like personnel management considerations associated with the new process. Panacea or placebo, dogma or duplicity, and methodology or model, all will be discussed. Commander, George Council will present a paper on “Supportability: Pay Now or Pay and Pay and Pay Later.” The Navy is the farthest along in its quest to improve total personnel management. The process called the HARDMAN methodology (for military manpower/hardware integration) represents a giant leap forward to improve human resource considerations during the weapon system acquisition process. It identifies, through analytic procedures, early estimates of MPT requirements for planning purposes. In the process of accomplishing this, it improves communications within the MPT community, and provides early feedback for developing a training concept, and influences system operational and maintenance philosophies. Major Michael Smith in his paper on “Crisis in Transition” will indicate a different approach. The Air Force was an early leader in analytical personnel subsystems efforts. A HARDMAN-like program called CHRT (Consolidated Human Research Technology) and an improved version called ASSET (Acquisition of Supportable Systems Evaluation Technology) have been discarded. Both of these laboratory programs have since led to a more human engineering oriented approach using technology as the key driver along with computer-aided design to help determine MPT factors. Dr. Daniel Risser's paper, “Army HARDMAN: Its Origin, Evaluation, and Implementation to Date,” shows the outgrowth of MIST (Man Integrated System Technology) into the Army version of HARDMAN. While similar to the Navy's approach, the Army Research Institute is going to provide the Army with an objective, independent assessment of the validity and reliability of the HARDMAN methodology, including recommendations where improvements are needed. It will provide projections for MPT requirements for new Army systems during their material acquisition process. Lastly, we should always remember, depending on which service one works for, to fly before buy, trudge it before budget, and sail before sale.'

The Polls: U.S. Military Intervention

IN LIGHT of recent events in Lebanon, El Salvador, and the Falklands, not to mention Poland, Afghanistan, and Iran, it seems appropriate to take a look at American attitudes toward military intervention. Senator John Tower, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, remarked at the commencement exercises at the U.S. Military Academy last May that the American people are traditionally antimilitaristic (New York Times, May 27, 1981), yet the United States has been involved in a number of wars and other types of military interventions since World War II. A look at some long-term trends in attitudes toward the use of American troops should shed some light on this seeming ambiguity of American foreign reiations. It is clear that since World War II the American public has not been isolationist. When asked if it would be best for the country to take an active part in world affairs or to stay out, Americans have consistently favored taking an active part (Table 1). But in the minds of many Americans, taking an active part in world affairs does not necessarily mean using American troops abroad. In February 1979, CBS News/New York Times asked the question in general terms: Aside from an attack on the United States, is there any other situation when you might approve sending American troops to fight overseas? Of the respondents offering an opinion, 69 percent said there was no other such situation. When asked about more specific hypothetical situations that might justify the use of American troops, the American public tends to reject such an option. The Roper Organization has asked a number of such hypothetical questions (Table 2) and in most instances respondents oppose the use of troops, the most prominent exceptions being if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe and if the Soviet Union attacked West Berlin.' Furthermore, even in

Review: Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Vol. VIII: Eighty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956 and Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee. Vol. IX: Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, 1957

Review: <i>Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Vol. VIII: Eighty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956</i> and <i>Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee. Vol. IX: Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, 1957</i>

The Responsiveness of the U. S. Congressional Armed Services Committees to Their Parent Bodies

The U.S. House and Senate Armed Services Committees are traditionally assumed to be more supportive of the military industrial complex than the Congress as a whole. This analysis provides evidence that this assumption is correct and further reveals that these panels also are not responsive to changes in congressional sentiments toward the complex. Biased committee recruitment patterns may be sufficient to explain this phenomenon in the House. Armed Services fills vacancies primarily with those already more committed than their colleagues to a strong national security posture. This, however, is not the case in the Senate, where those recruited for the assignment are fairly representative of their colleagues. Here these members undergo post-assignment conversions to positions more supportive of the military industrial complex.

The Changing Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making

The role of Congress in defense policy-making has clearly been changing since 1968. The objective of this study is to describe and explain this change through the use of systemic indicators. A set of behavioral rules for the 1947–1967 period is developed by examining previous studies. Then empirical indicators are developed for the inputs, conversion processes, and outputs of the Congressional defense policy system. These indicators point to an increased role for Congress in the 1968–1974 period. Major factors explaining this change include the Vietnam War, decreased public perception of external threat, a rise in non-DOD defense policy alternatives, increased control of military procurement, a balanced Senate Armed Services Committee, continuing debate on national priorities, and the rise of a legitimate Congressional bloc critical of defense policy. Key variables in assessing the permanence of the change appear to be public perception of threat stemming from U.S.-Soviet relations and the conflict between foreign and domestic spending.

After SALT

In a seemingly paradoxical development, the major effect of the signing of the strategic arms limitation agreements in Moscow last May has been a resurgence of interest in the Administration's program to modernize the nation's strategic weaponry on an accelerated schedule. Almost before the ink was dry on the agreements, the Secretary of Defense appeared on Capitol Hill forcefully advocating a vigorous modernization program for U.S. strategic forces and stating that he could not support the arms control agreements without such compensating measures. Mr. Laird's position has been seconded by the President, although in a reserved fashion, and has been supported in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Settle the Manpower Problem Now

THE official Administration program for college deferments proposed by Secretary of Defense Marshall before the Senate Armed Services Committee removed partially at least the confusion and uncertainties besetting students and educators. The Marshall-Rosenberg proposals were received with mixed reactions. The plan certainly does not constitute an acceptance of the suggestion that no deferments be granted. It recognizes the need for specially trained and educated manpower. An intelligent policy must be formulated and adopted immediately. A large exodus of students has occurred since the holidays and this trend will be accelerated in the next two weeks since most institutions start the second semester on Feb. 1. Gen. Marshall was fairly specific in his suggestions on a policy for the 18-year-olds. He was less specific on the possible future status of those now in the colleges. Broadly speaking, the Marshall-Rosenberg proposals seem to be sound. We refer, of course, to the principles enunciated. We are not at ...